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Abstract 
 
The research question of this thesis is what are the determinants of access to 
medicines and health care in developing countries? First, this thesis hypothesises 
that income is an important determinant of access to medicines and health care 
and that access is low for low income individuals. Second, this thesis hypothesises 
that an expectation of a high level of expenditure on medicines reduces the 
propensity to consume which implies a negative price elasticity. 
  
This thesis sets out to understand demand structures to answer this research 
question. The first chapter conducts an exploratory exercise to study government 
demand for medicines using price procurement data across a sample of 
developing countries. A different approach is used to impute price elasticities for 
medicines and range from -1.0 and -2.0. This means that a 1% increase in 
medicine prices, government demand for medicines will drop from 1% to 2%.  
 
The thesis begins the econometric analysis at the patient level using household 
survey data across a cross-section of 35 developing countries. Demand for health 
care is inelastic ranging from -0.19 to 0.6. The next two stages of empirical work 
use national household level data from India as a country case study. Price 
elasticities for outpatient care range from -0.17 to 0.43 and for inpatient care 
range from -0.13 to 0.03. Overall, the statistically significant price elasticity 
results are intuitive with a negative sign but are inelastic and at the lower end of 
the range found in the literature. The main determinants of health seeking 
behaviour are similar across different health settings studied in this thesis. These 
include having insurance and high household expenditure which implies that the 
poor will experience access problems. Other drivers include health status, gender, 
marital status, geographical location, education, employment and regulation. 
 
This thesis contributes to the evidence base because current research is limited 
and has typically drawn from smaller datasets. With a particular focus on 
medicines, the empirical findings offer policy implications in settings where 
pharmaceutical policies are not well developed. A broader approach to 
pharmaceutical policy making is necessary that considers reform measures on the 
demand and supply side from a health systems perspective.  
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Chapter 1 Thesis motivation, overview and scope 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Access to medicines is an important public health issue, particularly for those that 
can least afford to purchase them. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates that about 1.3 to 2.1 billion people are without access to essential 
medicines (WHO 2004a). As part of their Access to Medicines Campaign, 
Médicins Sans Frontières estimated that one third are without medicines, and in 
the poorest parts of Africa and Asia, this figure rises to 50% (MSF 2007).  
 
Globally the consumption of medicines is unequally distributed. In 1999 high 
income countries accounted for 15% of the world‘s population but consumed 90% 
of total medicines by sales; middle income countries accounted for 45% of the 
world‘s population and consumed 5.9% while low income countries accounted for 
40% of the world‘s population and consumed 2.9% (WHO 2004a).  
 
Patients use medicines to either improve or maintain their quality of life and 
health. Typically, patients living in developing countries require medicines to treat 
infectious disease but now many developing countries are also experiencing a rise 
in the prevalence of patients suffering from chronic conditions (such as diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease) which requires regular use of medicines for treatment. 
According to the WHO, ―expenditure on medicines accounts for a major 
proportion of health costs in developing countries and therefore access to 
treatment is heavily dependent on the availability of affordable medicines‖ (WHO 
2007). 
 
This demand for medicines in developing countries raises important policy 
implications where health systems are cash constrained and medicines are not 
typically subsidised as they are in high-income countries. This thesis explores the 
issue of access to medicines in developing countries with the aim to fill a gap in 
the evidence base in an important area of health policy.  
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This chapter is organised as follows. The next section, 1.2, provides an overview 
of the thesis and the thesis research questions. Section 1.3 presents the thesis 
outline and its contribution to research. 
 
1.2 THESIS HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
OBJECTIVES 
 
The overall research question of this thesis is: what are the determinants of access 
to medicines and health care in developing countries? To answer this question, 
this thesis has two main hypotheses. First, this thesis hypothesises that income is 
an important determinant of access to medicines and health care and that access is 
low for low-income individuals. Second, this thesis hypothesises that an 
expectation of a high level of expenditure on medicines reduces the propensity to 
consume (which implies a negative price elasticity). This thesis sets out to 
understand demand structures to answer this research question in four analytical 
chapters and related sub-research questions presented below. 
 
Table 1.1 Thesis research questions and research objectives 
Overall research question 
What are the determinants of access to medicines and health care in developing 
countries? 
Chapter 4 Research objective 
Impute price elasticities for sales to 
government purchasers in selected low 
and middle-income countries 
Research questions  
1) Is there variation in prices? 
2) What are the mark-ups over 
marginal cost? 
3) What is the imputed price 
elasticity and is price 
elasticity correlated with 
income?  
 
Chapter 5 Research Objective 
Determine the factors which affect access 
to medicines and health care in primary 
 
Research questions  
1) Does income affect access? 
2) Does regulation affect access 
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and secondary care in selected low and 
middle income countries 
to medicines? 
3) What is the price elasticity? 
Chapter 7 Research Objective 
Determine the factors which affect access 
to medicines in outpatient care in India  
Research questions  
1) Does income affect access in 
outpatient care in India? 
2) Does regulation affect access 
to medicines in India? 
3) What is the price elasticity in 
India? 
 
Chapter 8 Research Objective 
Determine the factors which affect access 
to medicines in inpatient care in India 
 
Research questions 
1) Does income affect access in 
inpatient care in India? 
2) Does regulation affect access 
to medicines in India? 
3) What is the price elasticity in 
India? 
 
1.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
 
An exploratory exercise is presented in Chapter 4. The approach taken in this 
chapter is a first step to study prices paid by public authorities in a selection of 
low and middle-income countries. Procurement prices are used in this chapter. 
These prices are also referred to as upstream prices in the drug supply chain. This 
chapter first studies whether there is variation in prices or whether prices are 
uniform across countries using procurement pricing data for medicines. The 
chapter also explores the mark-ups over marginal cost which is applied to 
medicine prices. The next stage of analysis is to impute price elasticities based on 
the Ramsey pricing rule. This pricing rule states that where there are a high fixed 
costs market prices are a function of the elasticity of demand. These estimates are 
a first attempt to provide information on the degree of price responsiveness in 
these settings. 
 17 
 
1.2.2 RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
 
Chapter 5 begins the econometric analysis at the patient level to study the 
determinants of access to medicines and health care. This chapter uses a cross 
section of household data for a sample of low and middle-income countries for 
cross county comparative analysis. Data on health care utilisation in primary and 
secondary care is used to first study whether income is a determinant. If this 
variable is significant and positively associated with utilisation then this finding 
suggests that low-income individuals will experience access problems. Next this 
chapter explores whether the regulatory environment has a positive effect on 
access. Finally, the extent to which access is affected by price is measured by 
computing price elasticities using patient level expenditure data. This information 
captures downstream prices, which refer to prices faced by patients. 
 
1.2.3 RESEARCH QUESTION THREE 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 extend the patient level analysis by using India as a country case 
study.  Chapter 7 assesses the determinants which affect access to medicines in 
outpatient care using household level data. Chapter 8 studies which determinants 
affect access to medicines in inpatient care using household data. In both chapters, 
the analysis studies whether income is a driver for access. If income is significant, 
and positively associated with utilisation then this finding suggests that the poor 
are negatively affected. The regulatory environment of the state is tested for 
whether it has a positive effect on access. Finally, price elasticities are computed 
using patient level expenditure data. 
 
1.3 OUTLINE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THESIS 
 
The thesis begins with a discussion on the concepts applied in this thesis drawing 
from the theory of the health care market followed by a discussion on the health 
 18 
policy context in low and middle-income countries in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 
presents a review of the evidence on access to medicines and health care, 
empirical approaches used and gaps in the literature.  
 
Chapter 4 conducts an exploratory and descriptive exercise of procurement prices 
of medicines in selected low and middle-income countries. This chapter explores 
variation in prices and markups for the same medicine across countries. This 
chapter uses a different approach to impute price elasticities ranging from -1 to -2. 
This means that for a 10% increase in price, government demand for medicines 
will drop from 10% to 20%. 
 
The econometric analysis of this thesis is presented in chapters 5, 7 and 8. Chapter 
5 analyses the determinants of access to affordable medicines in outpatient and 
inpatient care using a cross sectional household data from a sample of low and 
middle income countries. This chapter explores whether income is a significant 
factor, tests for the significance of the regulatory environment and computes the 
price elasticity of demand for health care. The results indicate that the price 
elasticity is 0.11 (5% significance) with estimates ranging from -0.19 to 0.6. 
 
Chapter 6 uses India as a case study and presents a discussion on the 
pharmaceutical regulatory environment at the federal level in India. This 
discussion provides useful policy context to frame the analysis in the subsequent 
two chapters. Chapter 7 and 8 use household survey data to determine the factors 
which affect access to medicines in outpatient and inpatient care in India. Both 
chapters test for the significance of income, whether regulation at the state level 
has a positive effect on access to medicines and computes price elasticities.  
 
In Chapter 7, price elasticities for outpatient care range from -0.17 to -0.16 (1% 
significance), and 0.16 (10% significance) with overall range from -0.17 to 0.43. 
In Chapter 8, price elasticities for inpatient care range from -0.13 to -0.10 (1% 
significance), -0.11 (5% significance) and 0.03 (10% significance) with an overall 
range of -0.13 to 0.03 for inpatient care. 
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The main determinants of health seeking behaviour are similar across different 
health settings studied in this thesis. These include having insurance and high 
household expenditure which implies that the poor will experience access 
problems. Other drivers include health status, gender, marital status, geographical 
location, education, employment and regulation. Overall the most significant price 
elasticity results are intuitive with a negative sign but are at the lower range found 
in the literature. A summary of the computed price elasticities is presented below. 
 
Table 1.2 - Summary of elasticity results 
Model Key 
Assumptions 
Sample Description Elasticity 
     MNL IIA and IID 
hold 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 4) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.19 (hospital) 
 0.11
**
 (clinic) 
 
MNL IIA IID hold India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 6) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.16*** (public)  
-0.17***(private)  
0.16* (self) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 4) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.03 (hospital) 
 0.63 (clinic) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 6) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.26 (public) 
0.43(private) 
 0.01(self ) 
 
Simple 
count 
models 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
due to over 
dispersion of 
excess of zeros 
India 
(inpatient) 
(Chapter 7)  
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.13
***
 to -0.10
*** 
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Two part 
hurdle 
Address some 
of the 
heterogeneity 
with two part 
estimation 
using count 
models 
India 
(inpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.11
**
 (2004) 
 0.03
*
 (1995-96) 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The implications of these estimates are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 9 presents the policy discussion by identifying high level issues, the 
policy implications for demand side and supply side pharmaceutical regulation 
and policy recommendations for the Indian case study. This chapter ends with a 
discussion on the limitations of the approaches used in this thesis and 
considerations for further research.  
 
This thesis contributes to the evidence base because current research is limited 
and has typically drawn from smaller datasets. This research will contribute to the 
evidence base in two key areas. First, the research provides new evidence of the 
drivers of access to medicines and health care drawing on larger datasets, 
estimates price elasticities and the effect of regulation. Second, the empirical 
findings offer important policy implications for the role of public intervention.  
With a particular focus on medicines, the empirical estimates could inform pricing 
policies in low and middle income countries where pharmaceutical policies are 
not well developed. A broader approach to pharmaceutical policy making is 
necessary that considers reform measures on the demand and supply side from a 
health systems perspective. This research is timely because it will fill gaps in the 
current debate on access to medicines and inform an important area of health 
policy. 
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2 Chapter 2 Health care market and policy context 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides background discussion to frame the thesis research 
questions and the analytical chapters that follow from it. Section 2.2 discusses 
health care market features relevant to the pharmaceutical market. The discussion 
then moves onto discussing the policy context and policy challenges of 
pharmaceutical regulation in low and middle-income settings.  
 
2.2 HEALTH CARE MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
2.2.1 RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
 
This section presents the relevant features of the health care market as they relate 
to pharmaceutical policy issues. It is important to present this discussion as the 
theory motivates the empirical analysis of this thesis. Health economic theory 
draws on the neo-classical theory of the market. This theory provides a basis for 
the role of government in the regulation and provision of services in the health 
care market due to market failure. While the health economic literature 
encompasses a number of issues supporting the case for government intervention, 
the focus of this section is to raise the features relevant to pharmaceutical issues: 
asymmetric information, externalities, merit goods and economic growth, 
monopoly and equity. 
 
A key characteristic of the health care market is the uncertain nature of the onset 
of ill health. This feature creates the need for insurance. In a market with full 
information for insurers and patients, insurance contracts would be set with 
premiums that are actuarially fair that would accurately account for the 
probability of the individual becoming sick.  
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In the insurance market, patients have more information about their health and 
high-risk individuals have an incentive to hide their true risk to avoid high 
premiums. The insurer however does not have full information on the insured due 
to this asymmetry of information so it is difficult to set the premium to the nature 
of risk. Without full information, the insurer raises premiums; the healthy drop out 
because they find premiums to be too expensive and results in the insurer having a 
more costly risk pool. This form of asymmetric information creates the problem 
of adverse selection and possibly no market at all. This creates inequities for those 
who cannot afford premiums. The market does not emerge for high-risk 
individuals, such as the elderly and the poor, because premiums would have to be 
set to the probability of becoming sick, which in these cases is close to 1. This is 
also inefficient because the outcome is that there are missing markets: patients 
would purchase insurance if the market worked well but they are excluded from 
the market.  
 
In reality, there are various market failures. An important feature is asymmetric 
information. The two main areas this occurs in health care are between the patient 
and the insurer and second between the patient and health care provider. This is 
referred to as the principal-agent relationship where the principal (e.g. patient) is 
dependent on the agent (e.g. doctor) because of their medical knowledge in their 
diagnosis and treatment. The transaction costs associated with the patient having 
the same level of knowledge as the health care professional is too high and as a 
result, the patient‗s demand for health care services, referred to as derived 
demand, is a function of the provider‘s treatment and diagnosis. As a result, the 
condition of a perfectly informed consumer is not met in the health care market 
requiring some level of government intervention.
1
  
                                                 
1
 The literature recognises the difficulty in understanding the meaning of ‗demand‘ for health care 
due to the agency relationship between patients and health care providers, information, trust, 
cultural attitudes, and health professionals ‗inducing‘ demand (Ellis and McGuire 1993). Demand 
is interpreted in a more limited way to be an empirical relationship between the degree of cost 
sharing and the quantity of use demand by the patient (Ellis and McGuire 1993). Empirical work 
indicates that the demand curve for health care is downward sloping (Ellis and McGuire 1993).  
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Another feature of insurance which arises from asymmetric information is the 
problem of moral hazard which can occur on the supply side or demand side. 
Supplier induced demand, refers to the financial incentives of how providers are 
paid which may encourage greater provision of health services (Donaldson C, 
Gerard K et al. 2004). For example, a fee-for-service payment system encourages 
higher levels of volume of care.  
 
Demand side moral hazard refers to when an individual may engage in risky 
behaviour than if they were not insured, referred to as patient moral hazard 
(Donaldson and Gerard 2004). In other words, it is the increased use of services 
when the pooling of risks leads to decreased marginal costs for the service 
(Folland S, Goodman AC et al. 2004).  
 
This is shown in the graph below, where a patient‘s demand for health care is 
assumed to be linear. If the patient has to pay for health care, the patient consumes 
q
1
 at price p where the marginal cost (MC) of consumption is equal to the 
marginal benefit (MB) of consumption (MC=MB). If insurance covers all health 
care costs the patient has no incentive to constrain consumption and could over-
consume. Health care becomes free. Price and MB is driven down to zero at q
*
. 
Total cost of care is shown by rectangle 0pbq
*
, which is larger than rectangle 
opaq
1
 if the patient had to pay for health care.  This over-consumption is termed 
moral hazard and results in a welfare loss as shown by  abq
*
. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Patient moral hazard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare loss
p
q1
MC=MB
q*
MB =0
P
Q
a b
0
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These distortions necessitate the government involvement to ensure the market for 
insurance exists. In low and middle-income settings the public and private 
insurance market is not well developed. Health systems are cash constrained and 
governments rely on individuals to finance much of their care. Therefore, this 
thesis studies patient demand for medicines in this context. As stated in Chapter 1, 
the WHO finds that medicines account for a major proportion of health costs in 
developing countries. The financial burden on patients is discussed in more detail 
in the next section. 
 
In developing country settings, many governments introduced user fees to offset 
potential demand side moral hazard. In these cash constrained settings, these 
policies were also used for revenue generation. The effectiveness of user fees in 
meeting either objective depends crucially on patients‘ price elasticities. Some 
empirical work suggested that demand for health care was relatively inelastic 
which would suggest that user fees could be useful for revenue generation. Their 
effectiveness, however, was limited and is further discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
While the focus of this thesis is not to test the presence of adverse selection or 
moral hazard, these issues were raised to provide general context for government 
intervention in the health care market. The aim of this thesis is to estimate price 
responsiveness using information on medicines prices and medicine expenditure. 
These issues are further explored in the subsequent chapters. 
 
Two features which further necessitate government intervention relates to 
externalities and health care being a public good.  Externalities refer to the costs 
or benefits that are not captured in the transactions between producers and 
consumers (Folland et al 2004). For example, in low and middle-income countries 
where there is greater prevalence of infectious disease, the provision of medicines 
directly benefits patients treated but this also prevents the transmission of the 
disease to others (World Bank. 1993; McPake B, Kumaranayake L et al. 2002; 
Mwabu, Schultz et al. 2007). In the case of medicines, an unregulated market 
would not account for an individual‘s willingness to pay for externalities, and the 
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medicine may be priced too high in private markets, resulting in too little 
medicines supplied, which makes a case for some level of price regulation (World 
Bank 1993; McPake et al. 2002; Mwabu 2007). Another argument is that the 
market may fail to produce ‗public goods‘ (Mills AJ and Ranson KM 2006). In 
economics, this refers to goods that are non-rival which means that the 
consumption by one person does not reduce the consumption of another and are 
non-excludable which means that a consumer cannot be prevented from benefiting 
from the good (Varian HR 2003). For example, the herd effect from vaccination 
could be thought of as an externality or at the limit a public good. The free or 
subsidised provision of vaccines directly benefits those receiving the treatment but 
also reduces the risk of the spread of certain diseases to those who did not receive 
treatment (Mills and Ranson 2006). 
 
Health care can also be argued to be a ‗merit good‘ where society believes it 
should be provided. These goods (e.g. expensive medicines) might be under 
consumed because individuals may not be the best judge of what is in their own or 
public‘s interest (e.g. children or the mentally ill) (Mills and Ranson 2006). 
Government intervention is further justified on grounds that it will better promote 
economic wellbeing (World Bank 1993). Evidence supports the argument that 
human capital contributes to economic growth (Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health 2001). Health is a component of human capital and it is linked to 
economic outcomes at both individual and country levels (Thomson S, Foubister 
T et al. 2009). Research has shown that a healthy labour force helps to secure 
labour supply, higher productivity, investment and savings (Thomson et al. 2009). 
In low and middle-income settings, access to health care and affordable medicine 
prices is extremely important as they will have knock-on effects for the economy, 
helping to raising the standard of living and reduce poverty (World Bank 1993).  
 
Fourth, another reason for government intervention relates to monopoly power 
which can result in high prices than if the market were competitive. Monopoly 
power could be a pharmaceutical firm, a hospital, or even by the profession as a 
whole (e.g. medical profession) (Mills and Ranson 2006). The relevant issue for 
this thesis is that the pharmaceutical market has a monopoly element because for a 
defined period of time one company holds the patent for a medicine. This will 
 26 
have implications for drug price setting. There have been some responses to this, 
namely price differentiation where prices of medicines are set according to 
demand responsiveness (i.e. price elasticity of demand) typically using GDP as 
proxy information to capture a country‘s income level. This thesis explores this 
topic in chapter 4.  
 
The final argument for government intervention is based on equity principles. 
There will be individuals too poor to pay for medicines, health care, and health 
insurance. It can be argued that income redistribution would address this, but 
equitable access is of concern and it can be argued that providing benefits in kind 
is appropriate, particularly given the other rationales set out above (e.g. 
externality, merit good) (Mills and Ranson 2006). In developing country settings, 
the private sector is largely unregulated. In the public sector, medicines are 
typically cheaper or even free but there is poor stock availability which implies 
that patients resort to the private sector to purchases medicines which may be 
unaffordable and undermine patient access to medicines. In the subsequent 
chapters, this thesis examines the determinants of access to pharmaceutical care 
and implications for equity in developing countries.  
 
While market failures are not specific to the health care market, it is widely 
recognised in the literature that the presence of uncertainty of ill health, 
asymmetric information and externalities and the degree to which they occur in 
the health care market make a strong case for government intervention, 
particularly in the area of health financing (Evans RG. 1984; McGuire A, 
Henderson T et al. 1988; McPake B, Kumaranayake L et al. 2002; Donaldson C, 
Gerard K et al. 2004; Folland S, Goodman AC et al. 2004). There is less 
agreement, however, on the extent to which government intervention should play 
a part in provision (Donaldson and Gerrard 2004).  
 
Government involvement can take a variety of forms in health care. In 
pharmaceutical markets these include pricing and reimbursement of medicines, 
importation of drugs, which can be sold over the counter or require a doctor‘s 
prescription, quality control and licensing for imported and locally made drugs 
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(Mills and Ranson 2006). Pharmaceutical issues in developing countries are 
further explored as they relate to the thesis in the following section. 
2.3 PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY CONTEXT IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  
 
While there are a number of policy issues in developing country settings that 
affect how health systems take care of their populations, such as revenue raising 
capacity, health financing, regulation of providers, historical patterns of 
development (e.g. colonial presence) and the power of different interest groups 
(Mills and Ranson 2006), this section focuses on the policy issues specific to 
pharmaceutical regulation in developing country settings. This discussion is 
important as it provides context to the empirical work carried out in the thesis 
which studies determinants of access to medicines.  
 
To begin this discussion, it is useful to turn to the WHO framework of the 
determinants of access to medicines which considers four important components 
of access: rational selection and use, reliable health and supply systems, 
affordable prices and sustainable financing as shown below. Rational selection 
and use relates to how pharmaceutical regulation promotes and encourages cost-
effective prescribing, (e.g. financial incentives to prescribe generics). Reliable 
supply is an important policy issue to ensure reasonable levels of stock and drug 
availability in these settings. Sustainable financing will have implications for the 
level of subsidisation for medicines or the extent to which patients are required to 
incur out-of-pocket (OOP) costs. This topic raises an important relationship with 
affordable prices. Medicine prices that are affordable to a wider population of 
patients will contribute to increased patient access to medicines. 
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Figure 2.2 - WHO Framework of access to medicines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While these four aspects play an important role in understanding access to 
medicines, the focus of this thesis relates to understanding access from the 
perspective of demand for medicines and implications of prices on access to 
medicines. In developing country settings, a key issue is that a large part of health 
care costs are not subsidised and so patients must incur these out-of-pocket (OOP) 
costs. The demand for health care is more a function of a patient‘s ability to pay 
for these costs or to forego care.  
 
We now turn to discussing issues that are relevant to the approaches used in the 
theoretical and empirical specifications in studying the determinants of demand 
for medicines in this thesis. The discussion now turns to government policies, 
implications for patients and the pharmaceutical industry. 
2.3.1 GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
1. Rational
selection and use
4. Reliable
health and supply 
systems
2. Affordable
prices
3. Sustainable
financing
ACCESS
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There are number of policy issues relating to government policies on 
pharmaceutical regulation. Some of the issues include financing, pricing, patients, 
pharmaceutical industry, market authorisation, pharmacovigilance, regulation of 
the supply chain, and incentives for providers. This section focuses on financing, 
pricing, patients and the pharmaceutical industry which are issues relevant to this 
thesis‘s analysis. 
 
Revenue generation and health system financing 
 
Sustainable financing is a key issue for governments in developing countries for 
financing of health services and in particular for medicines. Financing of health 
services refers to the raising or collection of revenue to pay for the operation of 
the system itself. This section highlights three important features relevant to this 
thesis: first public sector financing is smaller in these settings; second, drug 
expenditures constitute a greater share of total expenditures in these settings; 
third, patients typically finance a large portion of their health care. These three 
features are important to discuss because they have implications for this thesis as 
it focuses on understanding the determinants of demand for medicines.  
 
The three important functions of health financing are to collect revenues, pool 
risks, and purchase health services (World Bank 2008). In high-income settings, 
collection of revenues, pooling of risks and purchasing of health services are more 
developed than in low and middle-income settings.  
 
In low and middle-income settings the collection of revenue, pooling of risks and 
purchasing of services are less developed. Sources of financing include tax-based 
financing, user fees, private insurance, social insurance financing, and 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) and are described in the table below. It 
is important to note that donor aid is also a prominent feature in some developing 
country settings.  
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Table 2.1 - Types of Health financing 
Tax-based financing: Health services are paid for out of general government 
revenue such as income tax, corporate tax, value-added tax, import duties, etc. 
Certain taxes may be earmarked for health care (e.g. cigarette taxes or ‗sin taxes‘). 
All low and middle-income countries draw on a smaller tax base source relative to 
high-income countries.  
 
User fees: Patients pay directly according to a set health tariff. This is the 
common method of payment in the private and public sector. This policy was 
promoted in the 1980s particularly by the World Bank (Akin, Griffin et al. 1986). 
Many low and middle-income countries adopted this policy particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa. The international literature heavily debated this policy (Gilson L 
1988; Kanji N 1989). Overall the evidence suggested that this policy was 
regressive for low-income groups and showed to deter access for the poor. Some 
countries and many international agencies have now rejected user fees as a 
potential policy at least at the primary care level.  
 
Private insurance: Premiums are related to the expected costs of providing 
services to the individual. High health risk users pay more than the low risk users. 
Cross-subsidy is limited and membership is usually voluntary. For-profit or not-
for-profit companies operate. 
 
Social insurance financing: Health services are paid from contributions to a 
health fund. The most common source is payroll where both the employer and 
employee pay a percentage of their salary. Membership is usually mandatory. The 
health fund should follow strict government regulations. Premiums are linked to 
the average cost of treatment to the entire group paying into the fund, not to the 
expected cost of care of the individual. There are explicit cross-subsidies from the 
healthy to the less healthy. Some international agencies, particularly the World 
Bank promoted the adoption of social health insurance. In practice, this is a more 
complicated policy to pursue and few low-income countries attempted this while 
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it was adopted in some middle-income countries such as Thailand. 
 
Community-based health insurance: Premiums are set according to the average 
risk facing the population covered under the scheme. Enrolment is voluntary and a 
private non-profit entity is responsible for the funds. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, CBHI schemes emerged to address the problems of access created by user 
fees. 
 
Donor aid: During the 1990s, the World Bank was the single largest donor for 
health, nutrition and population (HNP) related policies accounting for about 18 
percent of global HNP aid, but by 2006, the World Bank‘s share was 6% in 2006 
(Michaud C. 2003; World Bank 2008; IEG 2009). This large shift in funding 
highlights the entry of numerous international donors who are contributing 
significant sums of money to developing countries (IEG 2009). The changing 
environment of international aid raises more challenges to coordinate 
implementation, including aid relating to supporting country level pharmaceutical 
policies (World Bank 2008; IEG 2009).  
Source: Bennett et al. (2008). 
 
The extent to which the system of health financing is pro-poor depends on the 
interaction between various sources of financing (Kutzin J 2001). If a social 
insurance system exists for those in the formal sector and a tax-based system 
targets those outside, then the equity effects will depend on how a well the tax-
based system can deliver a similar benefit package (Bennett S and Gilson L 2008). 
 
The unique features of the health care market—in particular the uncertainty of ill 
health highlight the importance for policy makers to manage the risks associated 
with health care costs on the demand and supply side. Demand-side cost sharing is 
where patients pay in the form of say user fees or insurance deductibles. Supply-
side cost sharing, however, sets incentives to health care providers to supply 
services (Ellis RP and TG. 1993). In practice this means that the price paid by the 
patient can be set separately from the price paid to providers who supply the 
service. On equity grounds, the literature notes that supply-side cost sharing is 
 32 
considered to be superior to demand-side cost sharing, which will discourage care 
among lower income groups (Ellis and McGuire 1993).  
 
 
Demand side cost sharing is heavily used in developing country settings, which 
raises equity implications for patients who can least afford to pay for treatment. 
The latest figures show that while in high-income countries government 
expenditure accounts for a large proportion of total health expenditure (61%), low 
and middle-income countries rely more on the private sector, 42% and 49% 
respectively (World Bank 2010).
2
 This is because formal sector activity is small 
and as a result governments have a smaller tax base to generate revenues. Public 
health spending as a share of total government spending ranges from 5.9% to 9% 
in low and middle-income settings. Per capita health expenditure is lower in 
developing countries: $22 per capita in low-income settings, $155 in middle-
income, while it is $4,266 in high-income settings (World Bank 2010).  
 
In these settings, user fees play a much greater role to complement resources 
raised through the tax system. While community based health insurance is 
typically implemented in areas where there are very high user fees, their coverage 
is limited (Bennett et al 2008). Only a few have social insurance schemes 
(Mongolia, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan and Vietnam) that account for more than 15 
per cent of government expenditure (Bennett et al. 2008).  
 
As shown in the table below, the figures indicate the low level of public sector 
financing: 38% to 55% of total health expenditure, while households tend to be 
the largest contributor of private expenditure ranging from 83% to 92%. The high 
level of OOP is a relevant issue for this thesis because a significant proportion is 
on pharmaceuticals (Cohen JC. 2000; Homedes N. and Ugalde A. 2001a; WHO 
2004a; IEG 2009). Drug expenditure accounts for a greater share of total health 
expenditures in developing countries than in high-income countries, ranging from 
7-20% in high-income countries, 15-30% in transitional countries and 24-66% in 
developing countries (Enemark U., Alban A. et al. 2005).  
                                                 
2
 World Bank development indicators for 2007 (World Bank 2010). 
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Table 2.2 - Patterns of financing in low and middle income countries 
 Public health 
expenditure as 
a percentage 
of THE 
OOP as a % of 
total private 
expenditure 
   
Africa (35 
countries) 
45.6 83.4 
 
South-East 
Asia (6) 
 
43.8 
 
83.4 
 
Western 
Pacific (6) 
 
55.3 
 
77.9 
 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
(4) 
 
37.8 
 
91.6 
   
   Note: Share of private expenditure is the difference between 100 and column 2. Source: Bennett et 
al. (2008); WHO data (WHO 2003) 
 
The discussion on financing has highlighted that public sector financing in health 
care is much lower in developing country settings. As a result patients face high 
OOP costs. The high share of OOP for patients has implications for access and 
demand for medicines because demand will depend on a patient‘s ability to pay or 
to forego treatment. This is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.3. 
 
Pricing policies 
 
Price regulation is an important element of government pharmaceutical policy and 
in high-income countries it can take a variety of forms. A number of approaches 
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exist: free pricing, international reference pricing, pricing relative to a substitute, 
price cuts, profit controls (OFT 2007a). In these settings, countries have well 
developed systems of health insurance including some level of coverage for drug 
expenditures. Furthermore, high-income countries have sufficient regulatory and 
enforcement capacity.  
 
In contrast pricing policies in low and middle-income countries are less well 
developed. For example, few employ pricing policies such as external reference 
pricing (Espin J and Rovera J 2011). In these settings, there are typically weaker 
public authorities, and less developed relationships with regulatory bodies, the 
judiciary and police; as a result, wholesalers and retailers may ignore official price 
limits because the risk of prosecution is limited (Seiter A 2010). One response to 
making prices more affordable is price differentiation. This means prices of 
medicines should reflect a country‘s level of demand. This issue is discussed in 
the exploratory analysis in Chapter 4.  
 
The outcome is that in developing country settings, evidence suggests that prices 
could be more affordable to patients (WHO/HAI 2006). Findings from a recent 
systematic comparative cross-section survey of selected medicines across low and 
middle-income countries found that there were wide variation in prices of branded 
drugs and generic drugs (WHO/HAI 2006). Price regulation and enforcement 
could in part address wide variation in prices. Furthermore, this survey found that 
government policies related to taxes, tariffs and import duties could raise the final 
price paid by patients, undermining access. This may in part be offset by lowering 
taxes/tariffs/duties and also less expensive prices supplied by international 
organisations and/or mission facilities. This survey also found that countries do 
not always procure at low prices (Cameron A, Ewen M et al. 2009).  
 
Furthermore, policy solutions should consider the local context as there can be 
wide differences within countries. For instance in Mozambique, local mark-ups 
are responsible for two-thirds of drugs‘ final prices in private pharmacies; 
statutory and profit ceilings are applied unevenly; the local market responds 
effectively to the urban population‘s diverse needs through its low-cost and high-
cost segments (Russo and McPake 2010).  
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The public authority‘s ability to negotiate with the pharmaceutical industry will 
affect the prices at which the authority procures medicines for its population. For 
example, some countries that procure well based on this survey are Jordan, 
Lebanon, Peru, Tunisia, and Uganda. Data from this survey is analysed in Chapter 
4 in an exploratory exercise to better understand the government demand and 
purchasing decisions of public authorities.  
 
2.3.2 PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
A key policy challenge for all countries is to balance industrial policy goals with 
health policy goals. There are a number of issues related to the pharmaceutical 
industry including intellectual property rights, pricing of medicines, competition 
in pharmaceutical markets, R&D particularly in areas of neglected disease that 
afflict developing countries and unethical practices of advertising and direct 
advertising to patients. This section focuses on the monopoly element of the 
pharmaceutical sector and implications for pricing policies that are relevant to the 
analysis in this thesis.   
 
Intellectual property rights are afforded to firms through the use of patents 
according to the World Trade Organization‘s legal framework found in the 
agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
(WTO 1994). This policy provides the legal framework for all countries that are 
part of the agreement to recognise patented pharmaceutical products. This has 
implications for pricing of medicines because the firm has a monopoly on the 
drug and in principle could set its price freely in a country‘s market. In developing 
countries, the implication is that high priced medicines would undermine access 
for patients. One proposed policy response is differential pricing (also referred to 
as Ramsey pricing or price discrimination). This policy means that pharmaceutical 
firms sell the same medicine to developing countries at different prices that reflect 
a country‘s price elasticity of demand (WTO and WHO 2001).  
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This policy is based on the Ramsey pricing rule (Ramsey 1927). Ramsey (1927) 
developed a model to determine the optimal level of tax rates to generate revenue 
from commodities. Ramsey was able to show that tax rates should be inversely 
proportional to the elasticity of demand and elasticity of supply. Elasticities are a 
unit less measure in economics. In the case of demand elasticities, there are three 
types of elasticities that can be measured: price elasticity, expenditure elasticity 
and income elasticity.
3
 
 
Different types of elasticities can be computed. In case of medicines, arc 
elasticities measure the percentage change in price and quantity of the drug 
between two points on the demand curve. Point elasticities measure elasticity at a 
particular point on the demand curve. Constant elasticities use log-log regression 
and assume that elasticities are constant along the demand curve (Phelps CE. 
1997). 
 
The application of the Ramsey rule has been applied more broadly in the public 
sector pricing of goods and services. Markets are assumed to be independent of 
one another and that demand is well structured and downward sloping. His 
formula proposed that where markets have high fixed costs the regulator cannot 
set prices to marginal cost (also known as first best solution). Therefore, the 
Ramsey formula is referred to as a second best solution. His rule states that goods 
should have a higher mark-up over marginal cost where demand is not very 
responsive to price (referred to as inelastic), while goods should have a lower 
mark-up relative to marginal cost where demand is responsive (referred to as 
elastic). This allows optimal price setting for consumers while allowing the firm 
to cover its costs (Armstrong M, Cowan S et al. 1994). Ramsey pricing also has a 
place in the literature on price discrimination where it is referred to as third degree 
price discrimination (Varian 1985). 
                                                 
3
 Applying the elasticities to the drug market, price elasticity reflects uncompensated demand 
curve which measures the percentage change in drug consumption when there is 1 unit change in 
the price of the drug. Expenditure elasticity reflects the compensated demand curve which 
measures the total percentage change in drug expenditure when there is 1 unit change in the drug‘s 
price. Income elasticity measures the percentage change in drug consumption with respect to a 1 
unit change in income. (Phelps C 1997). 
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While Ramsey‘s rule is proposed as a pricing solution for public authorities, it has 
been considered as a price setting rule from the perspective of the pharmaceutical 
industry to address inequities in access to medicines across low and middle-
income countries (WTO and WHO 2001). The proposal of price differentiation is 
to set affordable medicine prices based on a country‘s ability to pay. A measure of 
country demand has typically been based on proxies such as GDP which are 
intended to be an index of demand. The extent to which this is carried out could 
be undermined by other factors such as the threat of parallel trade, and leakage to 
other markets, or companies offering discounts that are unrelated to income 
(Hausman JA and Mackie-Mason  JK 1988; Maskus KE 2001; Scherer FM and 
Watal J 2001), resulting in uniform prices across all markets (Philips 1983). The 
issue of Ramsey pricing and the degree of price responsiveness is further 
discussed in chapter 4. 
 
2.3.3 PATIENTS 
 
Government policies and the interaction with the pharmaceutical industry have 
important implications for patients. Households face a significant burden in 
financing their health expenditure in these settings. This high level of demand-
side cost sharing (OOP) is the most regressive form of financing. This creates 
inequities in access to care because only the wealthy are in a better financial 
position to cover their OOP costs (van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 1992).  
 
The second related issue is that a significant proportion of private expenditure is 
on pharmaceuticals (Cohen 2000; Homedes and Ugalde 2001a; WHO 2004a; IEG 
2009) and drug expenditure accounts for a greater share of total health 
expenditures in developing countries than in high-income countries.  
 
Furthermore, the private sector plays a large role in medicine dispensing in these 
settings. There are a number of different types of providers selling medicines such 
as pharmacies, unlicensed drug sellers and self-dispensing doctors (WHO/HAI 
2006). While in many low and middle-income settings medicines may be 
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provided freely of charge in the public sector, these facilities are poorly stocked. 
As a result, patients resort to the private sector to purchase medicines where 
medicine prices are usually higher than the public sector, creating inequities in 
access to medicines.  
 
To explore this issue, the patient level analysis begins with a sample of low and 
middle income countries in Chapter 5. While India tends to procure relatively 
efficiently, it has one of the highest levels of household OOP. These 
characteristics of India form the basis of it being a country case study in this thesis 
and are presented in Chapters 6 to 8.  
 
The third related issue is that many countries have undergone or are in the process 
of going through an epidemiological transition (WHO 2002). The epidemiological 
transition refers to the changing nature of population disease burden from 
communicable disease to non-communicable disease. This transition occurs as a 
country moves through stages of modernisation and relates to higher income 
growth, increased sedentary lifestyles, and poor eating habits (Omran AR 1971; 
WHO 2002).
4
 Communicable diseases account for 36 per cent of the disease 
burden in developing countries, higher than previously, while non-communicable 
account such as diabetes and heart disease accounted for 54%, with injuries 
accounting for the remainder (9.8%) (Jamison DT, Breman JG et al. 2006). The 
burden of morbidity and mortality, however is greatest among the poor (Gwatkin 
D and Guillot M 2000a).  
 
                                                 
4
 Omran (1971) divided the epidemiological transition of mortality into three phases. In the last 
phase chronic disease replaces infectious disease as the primary cause of death. The three phases 
are: The Age of Pestilence and Famine: mortality is high which precludes sustained population 
growth, with low and variable life expectancy between 20 and 40 years; The Age of Receding 
Pandemics: mortality declines, life expectancy increases steadily from about 30 to 50 years and 
population growth is sustained; and The Age of Degenerative and Man-Made Diseases: mortality 
continues to decline and eventually approaches a relatively low level, life expectancy exceeds 50 
years, and chronic disease replaces infectious disease as the primary cause of death (Omran AR 
1971). 
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These issues imply that not only do households face a significant burden to 
finance their own health care costs, a large share of their health expenditure is on 
medicines, with the poor facing greater problems to finance their medicine 
expenditure. Furthermore patients‘ demand for medicines is not only for 
infectious disease but also for non-communicable conditions. Such conditions 
require constant use of medicines for treatment. In these settings, the demand for 
health care is much more a function of what patients can afford rather than relying 
on a well-functioning publicly insured health system. Therefore it is crucial to 
understand how prices affect access to medicines. 
 
2.4 SUMMARY 
 
In summary, this chapter presented a discussion on health care market 
characteristics that are relevant to pharmaceutical policies. The discussion has 
shown that health system design and pharmaceutical regulation face numerous 
policy challenges. These policy challenges are exacerbated by a weak public 
sector entity and a large unregulated private sector. Access to medicines and more 
broadly health care in developing countries are undermined due to the high OOP 
costs patients face in these settings. 
 
Empirical evidence on price responsiveness could give a more accurate picture of 
demand as insurance schemes are not well developed. This evidence is important 
for policy purposes. Affordable prices could increase access therefore information 
on price elasticities could better inform co-payment policies that take into account 
patient‘s price responsiveness to medicines. Thus, price elasticities are potentially 
important in price determination and could be an important element to inform 
pharmaceutical policy. Therefore this thesis sets out to better understand demand 
structures for medicines. The next chapter reviews existing evidence and 
identifies gaps this thesis aims to address in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
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3 Chapter 3 Review of the literature: evidence of access to 
medicines and health care 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a literature review of access to medicines and health care. 
First the discussion turns to measurement of access in section 3.2. Section 3.3 
provides a review of the evidence, empirical approaches taken, knowledge gaps 
and limitations with existing research. 
 
3.2 ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
 
3.2.1 DEFINING ACCESS 
 
A significant amount of research has been devoted to the concept of access in the 
health literature since the 1970s (Donabedian 1972; Aday LA and Andersen R 
1974; Penchansky R 1977; Gulliford M, Figueroa-Munoz J et al. 2002; Oliver A 
and Mossialos E 2004).  
 
Donabedian (1972) defines proof of access to be the use of service not whether 
the facility exists. He proposed that access should be distinguished between two 
components: initiation and continuation (Donabedian 1972). Aday and Anderson 
(1974) note a distinction between the potential to utilise: ‗having access‘ and 
initiation into the process or utilising a service: ‗gaining access.‘  
 
An important distinction exists between access to treatment and receipt of 
treatment (Le Grand 1982; Mooney 1983). Access depends on opportunities while 
receipt of treatment depends both on these opportunities and whether individuals 
have availed themselves of them (Wagstaff A and van Doorslaer E 2000a). The 
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literature typically defines access to mean ―receipt of treatment‖ (Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer 2000).   
 
Access is therefore a complex concept and it is widely recognised in the literature 
that access is a function of more than just the time and money costs in seeking 
health service (Le Grand 1982; Mooney 1983). Further extensions include income  
(Olsen EO and Rogers DL 1991), specifying services, quality, personal 
inconvenience, cost and information (Goddard and Smith 2001). Even though 
these distinctions were helpful to understand access in the health care context, 
some have argued that access should not strictly mean utilisation of health 
services (Penchansky 1977; Mooney 1983; Oliver and Mossialos 2004). Access 
describes a relationship between the individual and the health system and should 
reflect a ―degree of fit‖ between the supply and demand related factors 
(Donabedian 1972; Penchansky 1977; Gulliford et el., 2002; Oliver and Mossialos 
2004). 
 
Gulliford et al (2002) proposed components of access: 
 Health service availability which refers to the supply of health services 
 Health service utilisation which includes overcoming financial, personal 
and organisational barriers 
 Health service outcomes which refers to the relevance and effectiveness of 
services and their quality 
 Equity of access which refers to whether people get access in proportion to 
their need 
 
Similarly, Thiede et al. (2007) take a broader approach to define access as the 
―freedom to use health services‖ (Thiede et al., 2007, p. 105). These authors 
define access with respect to three dimensions: availability; affordability, 
acceptability. Availability refers to whether appropriate health services are 
available when they are needed. For example, this refers to geographic availability 
and also whether services are available equally to different groups of the 
population. Affordability refers to the financial access in the broadest sense (e.g. 
direct costs, indirect costs, household financial wealth). Acceptability refers to the 
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perception of health services among patients including attitude of health workers 
to patients, patients‘ cultural attitudes to health care services, condition of 
premises, waiting times, duration of consultations, and quality of care in public 
versus private facilities. 
 
This discussion has highlighted that even though there is no agreed upon 
definition of access in the literature, there is an acceptance that access 
encompasses many aspects. For the purposes of this thesis, the definition 
according to Thiede et al. (2007) is conceptually preferred because of its broad 
approach. Equally important, this definition explicitly considers acceptability of 
health services which in low and middle-income settings is appropriate due to the 
wide array of cultural and contextual factors. The broad definition provides 
greater scope for analysis of access and is used as a basis to inform the empirical 
approach taken in this thesis. 
 
3.2.2 MEASURING ACCESS 
 
Measuring access is not a straightforward task because of the number of factors 
that affect the form of access people have including the availability of drugs, 
health facilities, money, knowledge, and beliefs (Hausmann-Muela S., Ribera J. et 
al. 2003). These complications result in using more simpler measures such as 
equality of expenditure (whether people have the same amount of money spent on 
them) or equality of utilisation (whether patients go to a health facility equally 
often) (Palmer N 2008). Measures of access include health care use, OOP 
payments, health status, mortality, or funding allocations from government 
(Brockerhoff M. and Hewett P. 2000; Castro-Leal F., Dayton J. et al. 2000; 
Makinen M., Waters H. et al. 2000; Wagstaff A. 2000b).   
 
One approach is to look at the population according to subgroups for example by 
quintiles, to compare the richest 20 percent with the poorest 20 per cent. Groups 
could be divided according to economic status (Wagstaff 2000b), gender and 
ethnicity (Brockerhooff and Hewett 2000), health condition (Gakidou  E., Murray 
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C. et al. 2000) geographical location, age, education or occupation (Gwatkin DR 
2000b).  
 
Different measures of economic status are applied to developing country settings. 
Household consumption, expenditure, or asset ownership, are common proxies 
and are considered better measures in these settings. The challenge is that 
consumption data are not necessarily collected alongside health indicators. 
Income data are not considered reliable measures because there can be under-
reporting. Furthermore, they can be seasonally dependent and do not necessarily 
capture longer-term income or permanent wealth in low-income settings 
(Makinen et al. 2000; Palmer 2008). Education and occupation are more 
commonly used as proxies for social status. For example, data sets from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys allow analysis of household assets by creating 
an asset index and the application of principal component analysis (Filmer D and 
Pritchett L 2001). 
 
The disadvantage of strictly using utilisation data is that it will not capture all 
aspects of access; in particular it will not reflect individuals who need health care 
but do not receive it (Aday LA and Andersen RM 1981). Furthermore, utilisation 
may identify equity challenges in the distribution of health care services but it 
may not fully capture the appropriate level of quantity or quality of care (Thiede 
et al. 2007). For instance the utilisation pattern may be skewed towards lower 
income groups but this may be because the alternatives for the poorer segments of 
the population are unaffordable (Thiede et al. 2007). 
 
3.2.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY AND NEED 
 
Access therefore raises implications for equity and need for health services. 
Equity is considered to be a normative concept (Gwatkin D. 2002) that introduces 
the notion of fairness or social justice (Gulliford et al. 2002) while equality is an 
empirical one (Palmer 2008). Equality can be measured with respect to whether 
two people made the same number of health visits. Equity, on the other hand, is a 
value judgement and questions whether both patients should have had the same 
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number of visits. The literature recognises that definitions of what is equitable can 
vary between individuals and societies (Donaldson et al. 2004). Measuring equity, 
however, is not straightforward. The most common definitions in measuring this 
concept include equal health outcomes (Oliver and Mossialos 2004); equal access 
for equal need (Donaldson C and Gerard K 1993); and equal utilisation for equal 
need (Donaldson C and Gerard K 1993). 
 
Utilisation data aims to capture some level of need for health care services. 
Typically need refers to those who are ill but this definition is limiting as it does 
not capture the non-ill who could benefit from preventive health care (Wagstaff 
and Doorslaer, 2000a). Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) proposed the following four 
definitions:  
 need can be defined with respect to the individual‘s health status;  
 the capacity to benefit from health care;  
 the level of health care expenditure;  
 or the minimum amount of resources required to exhaust capacity to 
benefit.  
 
The authors note that the first definition does not capture preventive care; the 
second does not take account of resources spent, while the third definition does. 
The fourth combines need with capacity to benefit where need is assessed by 
considering the amount of expenditure required to reduce capacity to benefit to 
zero (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993). This last definition, however, implies that 
someone who requires more expensive intervention has greater need than 
someone with a more urgent need but for less expensive treatment (Hurley J 
2000). This fourth definition, however, is the most agreed upon in the literature 
(Folland et al. 2004).  
 
From an empirical perspective, the most commonly used approach to capture need 
is self-assessed health (SAH) as a measure of health status (Le Grand 1978). SAH 
is an ordinal variable, which provides information on the individual‘s perceived 
health status. Typically in health surveys, individuals are asked to rank their 
health into five categories ranging from very good or excellent to poor or very 
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poor. SAH has been used in empirical work such as to examine the relationship 
between health and socioeconomic status (Adams, Hurd et al. 2003); 
socioeconomic inequities in health (vanDoorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 1997); and 
between health and lifestyles (Kenkel 1995). 
 
Other SAH measures include information on individuals reporting the presence of 
chronic conditions or symptoms, referred to as quasi-objective measures. Some 
examples include identifying a specific chronic condition in a health survey (e.g. 
diabetes, asthma; cancer), or limitations in activities of daily living (ADL) such as 
eating, having a bath, or walking (Jones AM, Rice N et al. 2007). 
 
The predictive power of SAH has also been studied. Research shows that SAH is 
a useful measure and objective measure of health status and is a strong predictor 
of mortality (Mossey and Shapiro 1982; Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 2000; 
Singh-Manoux, Martikainen et al. 2006) and on health care use (van Doorlsaer et 
al. 2000).  
 
Even though there is evidence of the usefulness of SAH measures in empirical 
work, there may be reporting biases. Some of these include scale reference (Groot 
2000); state-dependence (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom 1995); and response category 
cut-point shift (Sadana R, Mathers CD et al. 2000). Sen (2002) notes that different 
population groups may under or over report their health status relative to other 
groups. Hernández-Quevedo, Jones et al. (2006) find that different population 
groups have different cut-point levels of SAH while having equal levels of ―true‖ 
health.  
 
Researchers have found that the differences in how individuals assess their health 
state can be due to a variety of factors. Some of these factors include perceptions 
about disease (Barsky, Cleary et al. 1992), culture and language (Angel and 
Thoits 1987; Zimmer, Natividad et al. 2000), social context (Sen, 2002); gender 
and age (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 2004); the ordering of the question and 
the medium in which questions are posed (e.g. written or face-to face) (Crossley 
TF and Kennedy S 2002).  
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The presence of potential biases has led to the development of a set of objective 
indicators. A comprehensive set of objective indicators was used to construct the 
McMaster Utility Index where Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) found bias 
by age and gender but not by income. Health vignettes are another approach 
currently used in the World Health Organisation World Health Survey (Bago 
d'Uva T., Van Doorslaer E. et al. 2008). A third method uses biological markers 
of disease such as blood pressure and walking speed (Johnston DW, Propper C et 
al. 2007). The use of such information combined with SAH measures could 
improve accuracy of results (Banks, Marmot et al. 2006). Some biomarkers may 
be subject to bias. Johnston et al. (2007) found an income gradient bias when 
hypertension is measured by a nurse rather than by an individual. Masseria et al. 
(2007) identify challenges with data collection of biomarkers because they may 
reduce response rates. Overall, there has been a considerable amount of research 
to further refine and improve objective measures of health status.  
 
Even though there are limitations with measures of access and need, a common 
approach in the literature to measure access uses the definition of equal utilisation 
for equal need and health status as a measure of need (Folland et al. 2004). For 
both conceptual and practical purposes this thesis will use the definition of equal 
utilisation for equal need to measure access. For practical purposes this thesis will 
use health status as a measure of need. 
 
 
3.3 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL WORK 
 
The discussion now turns to evidence from the literature. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
present evidence on price elasticities for health care and for medicines. Evidence 
on the implications for utilisation, equity, revenue raising and efficiency issues are 
discussed along with evidence from other demand covariates in 3.3.3 to 3.3.5. 
These findings are considered for comparative purposes with findings from high 
income settings in 3.3.6. Section 3.3.7 summarises this chapter, identifies gaps in 
the literature and explains how this thesis aims to contribute to the evidence base. 
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A number of methods were used to identify relevant papers. The literature search 
for price responsiveness for medicines is comprehensive. Evidence on price 
responsiveness for health care discusses the main papers on the topic. While the 
literature search focussed on developing countries, evidence from high-income 
countries in section 3.3.6 presents an overview of some of the main papers on the 
topic for comparative purposes. The following existing literature reviews on 
demand for health care and price responsiveness served as a basis for the literature 
search: Creese (1991); McPake (1993); Gilson (1997); Sepehri and Chernomas 
(2001);Hutton (2004); Palmer et al. (2004); James et al. (2006); Lagarde and 
Palmer (2008). These existing reviews were not restricted to analysis which used 
regression techniques and included studies which did not adjust for the effects of 
user fees on demand.  The search for relevant articles ended in December 
2011.The literature search involved identifying articles which cited the existing 
literature reviews. Additional searches used the Internet, and databases such as 
PubMed, Econlit, IBBS, Science Direct, ISI Web of Knowledge. A combination 
of keywords was used as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3.1 - Literature search keywords 
Keywords Combinations with keywords 
  Cost sharing, user fees, price 
elasticity, drug, medicine, 
pharmaceuticals, health equity, 
health inequity, access, utilisation, 
willingness to pay, price 
discrimination, government 
procurement 
Drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals, health 
care, utilisation, developing country, India 
  
 
3.3.1 PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR HEALTH CARE 
 
While the focus of this thesis relates to medicines, it is important to place the 
thesis within the context of the health care literature. This section provides a 
review of the important empirical papers on this topic relating to the use of user 
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fees and willingness to pay. This is because there is a larger evidence base on this 
topic thereby allowing us to draw out conclusions about whether there are 
differences in price responsiveness for health care relative to medicines. 
Furthermore, information on medicine expenditure is a significant portion of 
household health expenditures which will have implications for access (WHO 
2004a). 
 
An important issue that should be highlighted concerns data availability. Data on 
prices of medicines and volume consumed is lacking in these settings. This is 
because in developing countries, secondary data is not well developed to include 
multiple health visits so utilisation data is usually limited to one health care visit.  
As a result, analysis necessitates imputation of price elasticities. The typical 
approach draws on patient or household level health care expenditure data to 
compute price elasticities. Health expenditure data, however, may or may not 
include information on medicine expenditure. 
 
This lack of data availability has implications for the type of empirical analysis 
chosen in this thesis. The empirical models chosen use imputation methods to 
estimate price elasticities and are presented in the subsequent chapters. The 
studies reviewed in this section also use imputation methods to compute price 
elasticities.  
 
The table below provides a summary of the studies reviewed. Most studies are 
regionally focussed, cross-sectional, and draw on household level data and 
analysed different types of health care settings including outpatient, inpatient and 
type of services (e.g. family planning). Most employed regression techniques to 
model health care demand and to compute price elasticities while some carried out 
descriptive analysis on price responsiveness. Earlier studies computed time and 
distance costs that were small in magnitude ranging from -0.02 to 0.003 with the 
exception of a more recent study Dzator et al. (2004) which found slightly larger 
estimates ranging from -0.36 to -0.13. Typically, recent studies have primarily 
focussed on direct health care visit costs with estimates of price responsiveness 
ranging from being highly elastic to highly inelastic: -10.2 to -0.000. 
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Table 3.2 - Price elasticity for health care from the literature 
Dependent 
variable 
Measure Price 
elasticity 
Country Study 
     Outpatient 
visit 
Health visit 
related 
   
 Cost of visit -2.82 to -0.12 Cote 
d'Ivoire/Peru 
Gertler and 
van der Gaag, 
(1990) 
 Cost of visit -1.88 to -0.11 Cote 
d'Ivoire/Peru 
Gertler and 
van der Gaag, 
1990 
 Cost of visit -4.26 to -1.16 Benin Bolduc and 
Lacroix (1996) 
 Cost of visit -5.65 to -1.52 Benin Bolduc and 
Lacroix 1996 
 Cost of visit -4.9 to -2.007 Benin Bolduc and 
Lacroix 1996 
 Cost of visit -1.43 to -0.03 Peru Gertler et al. 
(1987) 
 Cost of visit -1.33 to -0.88 Ethiopia Asfaw et al. 
(2004) 
 Cost of visit -1.29 to 0.00 India Borah (2006) 
 Cost of visit -1.686 to -
1.069 
India Sarma (2009) 
 Cost of visit -1.07 to -0.01 China Qian (2009) 
 Cost of visit -0.32 Swaziland Yoder (1989) 
 Cost of visit -0.15 to -0.03 Malaysia Heller (1982) 
 Cost of visit -0.20 to -0.03 Kenya Mwabu GM 
and 
Wang‘ombe J. 
(1997) 
 Cost of visit -2.2 to -0.7 Gabon  Issifou et al. 
(Issifou S and 
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Kremsner PG 
2004) 
 Cost of visit -0.001 to 
0.000 
Philippines  Akin et al. 
(1986) 
 Cost of visit -0.3 to -0.03 Kenya Mwabu et al. 
(1986) 
 Cost of visit -0.23 to -0.16 Nepal Pokhrel et al. 
(2005) 
 Cost of visit -0.14 South Korea Kim et al. 
(2005) 
 Time related 
and distance 
related 
   
 Distance cost  -0.36 to -0.13 Ghana Dzator and 
Asafu-Adjaye 
(2004) 
 Distance cost -0.005 to 
0.002 
Philippines  Akin et al. 
1986 
 Distance to 
dispensary 
-0.0003 Mali Birdsall and 
Chuan (1983) 
 Distance to 
drug outlet 
-0.0001 Mali Birdsall and 
Chuan 1983 
 Distance time  -0.02 to -0.01 Malaysia Heller, 1982 
 Distance time -0.003 to 
0.003 
Philippines  Akin et al. 
1986 
 Treatment 
time 
-0.05 to -0.02 Malaysia Heller, 1982 
 Waiting time  -0.02 to 0.02 Malaysia Heller, 1982 
 Waiting time  -0.005 to 
0.003 
Philippines  Akin et al. 
1986 
 Quality 
related 
   
 Quality of -0.18 to -1.81 Ghana Lavy and 
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treatment Quigley 
(1993) 
 Quality of 
dispensary 
-0.18 Mali Birsdall and 
Chuan 1983 
 Quality of 
drug outlet 
0.04 Mali Birdsall and 
Chuan 1983 
 Quality of 
treatment 
-0.3 to -0.03 Kenya Mwabu et al. 
1986 
Inpatient 
visit 
Inpatient    
 Health care 
provider 
-1.52 to -0.03 Peru Gertler et al. 
1987 
 Cash price  0.001 Malaysia Heller, 1982 
 Time  0.001 Malaysia Heller, 1982 
Family 
planning visit 
Cash price    
 Cash price -0.23 to -
0.007 
Philippines Schwartz et al. 
(1988) 
 Cash price -10.2 to -4.8 Columbia Ojeda et al. 
(1994) 
 Cash price -0.82 to -0.31 Ecuador Bratt et al. 
(2002) 
 Time related    
 Distance time -1.16 to -0.09 Philippines Schwartz et al. 
(1988) 
 Income related    
 Asset value -0.02 to 
0.155 
Philippines Schwartz et al. 
(1988) 
Health care 
visit 
Intensity of 
treatment (1 
to 4 
consultations) 
   
 Intensity of -0.19 to -0.13 Ghana Lavy and 
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treatment Quigley 1993 
Log 
household 
medical 
expenditures 
Cost of visit -1.1 China Zhang (2007) 
 Income 0.7 Indonesia Chernichovsky 
D and 
Meesook O, 
(1986) 
     
 
Earlier studies such as Heller (1982) and Akin et al. (1986) were particularly 
influential in encouraging user fee policy in developing country setting because 
the authors found that price changes had little impact on changes in utilisation 
levels (McPake 1993). User fees were frequently adopted in part due to the 
economic crisis of the 1980s where governments in the developing world were 
looking for new revenue streams for cash strained sectors such as health care 
(Jiminez E 1987; Hutton 2004).  
 
Heller (1982) drew on cross sectional regional data and estimated the demand for 
outpatient care, inpatient care, obstetric care as a separate inpatient model, and use 
of a traditional practitioner as separate demand models. Heller assumes that there 
is complementarity between outpatient and inpatient visits (Heller 1982). He used 
a two-stage least squares model approach. To model outpatient demand, the first 
stage regression included inpatient stay as a regressor to account for the 
endogeneity that an inpatient visit would precede and outpatient visit. Then 
demand for outpatient care was modelled using a logit regression. Similarly, for 
the inpatient model the outpatient visit variable was used as an independent 
variable in the first stage regression to account for endogeneity that an outpatient 
visit would precede an inpatient stay. The assumption between the 
complementarity between inpatient and outpatient visits must hold to support this 
analytical approach. A limitation with this technique is that information on the 
reason for the visit is not given so it is unclear whether the assumption of 
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complementarity is warranted in every case which may in part explain the 
insignificance of the economic variables. 
 
Heller estimated price elasticities range from -0.15 to -0.03. Akin et al. (1986) 
found estimates ranging from -0.001 to 0.000. Heller found that for inpatient care 
the price elasticity of 0.001 was a result of the subsidised fee schedule for low 
income groups. Both studies found that poor health was an important determinant 
and that economic variables (e.g. cost of visit, household income) were not 
significant. Heller (1982) found that travel time, waiting time, treatment time, age 
and ethnic groups played some role in explaining the decision to seek care.  
 
Even though some evidence suggested that economic variables were not 
significant or had little impact (Birdsall N and Chuan P 1983; Bol D 1990), Lewis 
(1985) however, found mixed evidence in a review of family planning policies in 
selected developing countries. The different design methodologies used in the 
studies made it difficult to draw general conclusions but the author found that in 
some cases, for example Kenya, increases in the price of health care reduced 
demand (Mwabu 1983).  
 
More recent studies have found economic variables to play a significant role in 
affecting the demand for health services, questioning the validity of the results of 
these earlier studies (Bitran RA and McInnes DK 1993). One limitation of some 
of these early widely cited studies is that they have not corrected for endogeneity 
between the health expenditure variable and the decision to seek care. Some 
empirical work, however, has corrected for endogeneity between the health 
expenditure variable and the decision to seek care by using a hedonic pricing 
methods or by imputing expenditure values (Bolduc, Lacroix et al. 1996; Mwabu 
and Wang'ombe 1997; Asfaw, Braun et al. 2004; Qian, Pong et al. 2009). These 
studies found that the price variable was significant and found larger elasticities 
ranging from -5.65 to -0.03.except for Mwabu et al. (1997) which found a smaller 
range of demand -0.2 to -0.03. 
 
Discrete choice models have been used, including the logit model and the 
multinomial logit model (MNL) to model the decision to seek care. These models 
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are used when the outcomes are qualitative and unordered. For instance a logit 
model is employed when there are two qualitative outcomes: the decision to see a 
GP or not to visit a GP. A MNL regression is employed for when there are more 
than two outcomes. For example a patient may have three choices: to see a GP, to 
see a specialist or to visit a traditional practitioner. The outcomes are coded but 
the numerical values are arbitrary and are simply to represent the choice made. 
These models are estimated using the maximum likelihood technique. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
A limitation with the multinomial model is the possible violation of two of its 
properties: the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and independence of 
error terms (IID). The IIA assumption assumes that the choices made are 
independent of one another. This implies that for example the decision to see a GP 
is independent of the decision to see a specialist. This assumption then follows 
from the error terms being independent which follow a normal distribution (IID). 
This assumption of independence between choices may not hold in the decision to 
seek care. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Fewer studies have corrected for the violation these properties. In rural Benin, 
Bolduc et al (1996) found the MNL was violated and so compared their results 
with a multinomial probit function (MNP). The probit results found that the same 
fee increase in government hospitals would result in a 1.5% reduction to 
government hospitals, a 29% increase in visits to private clinics, and 7.5% 
increase in self-treatment. Own price elasticities were larger under this model and 
ranged from -5.97 to –2.37 versus -2.007 to-4.966 in the MNL model. The authors 
found that the cost of the visit, travel time, household income, household 
composition, poor health, education, the level of saving were important 
determinants in the decision to seek care. 
 
Other empirical work has used the nested logit model to correct for the violation 
of the IID and IIA properties. A nested logit model groups alternatives together 
which allows for variances to differ across subgroups while maintaining the IIA 
property and IID property within groups (Greene WH 2008). For example, Gertler 
and van der Gaag (1990) used a nested logit model and found a significant 
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relationship between price elasticity of demand and income. The authors grouped 
the choice to seek care together which contained two alternatives: hospital visit or 
clinic visit. The sample size was small, and the authors used a cross sectional 
household survey data from a rural setting in Peru and Côte d‘Ivoire. The authors 
found that lower income groups were more price responsive than upper income 
groups ranging from -2.82 to -0.12. The authors found that the main determinants 
to seek care included consumption, age, sex, poor health and household 
composition.  
 
Asfaw et al. (2004) and Qian et al. (2009) applied the same modelling approach. 
Asfaw et al. (2004) used a nested logit model to analyse the health care demand 
behaviour of households in selected rural areas of Ethiopia to measure how poor 
households respond to changes in user fees at different health care providers. The 
authors grouped the choice seek care at a clinic together which contained two 
alternatives: public clinic and private clinic. The authors found that the price 
elasticity of demand was -1.06 for hospitals, -1.33 for public clinic, -0.88 for 
private clinic and -1.06 for traditional healers. The poor are more price sensitive 
to the user fees of public health clinics relative to the other providers studied. A 
10% rise in the user fees in public clinics increases the probability of the richest 
quartile to withdraw from the health care market to self-care by 1.67% but by 
2.55% for the lowest quartile (Asfaw et al. 2004). The authors found that the 
health settings behaved as substitutes with estimates ranging from 0.006 to 0.52. 
These results imply that a 1% increase in the cost of visiting a given provider will 
increase the probability of visiting an alternate provider from 0.006% to 0.52%. 
The main determinants to seek care include the cost of the visit, waiting time, 
household income, distance, poor health, gender, education of the mother, 
relationship of the patient to the household head and age of the household head. 
 
Qian et al. (2009) studied household demand behaviour in a rural part of the 
Gansu province in China, which is one of the poorest provinces in China. The 
author applied a mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL).  The MMNL assumes 
that the error term is extreme value iid and the random components of the utility 
specification can have any distribution which implies less restrictive assumptions 
than the multinomial logit model or the nested logit model (Borah 2006). 
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Distance, type of illness, being an older person, and price were important 
determinants of health care demand. Price elasticities ranged from –0.32 to –0.01 
for public village clinic, -0.39 to –0.06 for private village clinic, -0.55 to –0.11 
township health centre, to –1.07 to  -0.16 for county hospital. Low-income 
individuals were more price responsive than high-income individuals. These three 
studies provide useful results but suffer from small sample size problem as they 
covered small rural areas in each country. 
 
Evidence from national sample surveys to correct for the small sample size 
problem is limited. Sarma (2009) and Borah (2006) both used the NSSO 
household survey from India but only on the rural sample (the complete dataset is 
used in the empirical work in Chapter 7 and 8). Sarma (2009) applied a nested 
logit model which grouped formal care separate from self-treatment. Formal care 
contained three alternatives: public facility, private facility and private doctor. 
Sarma found more elastic results with elasticities ranging from -1.686 to -1.069 
and Borah (2006) applied a MMNL model on the same dataset with elasticities 
ranging from -1.29 to 0.000. Sarma (2009) also computed cross price elasticities 
and found that the different health settings choices were substitutes and ranged 
from 0.10 to 0.70, which suggests that a 1% rise in the cost of a given provider 
will increase the probability of choosing an alternate provider from 0.1% to 0.7%. 
The MMNL has more usefulness for panel data or repeated-choice settings 
(Greene 2008). The MMNL has been less frequently applied to model the demand 
for health care than the nested model (Greene, 2008).  
 
Borah (2006) and Sarma (2009) had similar findings with respect to regression 
coefficients where the cost of the visit, household consumption, household 
composition, distance, poor health and education were important determinants. 
Borah (2006) found that social caste mattered. Sarma (2009) found that age and 
sex were also important determinants.  
 
A feature of these four studies: Asfaw et al.2004; Borah 2006; Qian et al. 2009; 
Sarma 2009 is that they corrected for endogeneity by imputing the cost of the visit 
for the provider that was not chosen. This approach has its own limitation because 
the model is sensitive to the imputation approach and that it could reduce the 
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actual variance in the price and income variables and therefore may underestimate 
true price and income elasticities.  
 
A limitation with household demand studies is to control for policy changes that 
may affect the household‘s decision to seek care. For comparative purposes, 
Zhang (2007) did not model the decision to seek care but carried out a difference-
in-difference approach on the consumption of inpatient services in the city of 
Hangzhou in China. His study aimed to study the effect of a policy decision to 
reduce the co-payment amount on inpatient care.  Zhang modelled the patient‘s 
visit cost in logs as the dependent variable. The main determinants were age, poor 
health, and insurance. He found that demand to be slightly elastic as a result of the 
policy decision to reduce the co-payment amount. He computed a price elasticity 
demand for inpatient care to be –1.10 as a result of a reduction in the deductible 
amount for inpatient care. This result is consistent with the evidence on user fees 
where utilisation increased as a result of reduction in user fees. Evidence on user 
fees is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.3. 
 
Descriptive analysis of price responsiveness has found demand to be inelastic and 
was computed based on changes in price levels and utilisation levels (Shepard D 
and E 1988; De Bethune, S et al. 1989; Stanton and Clemens 1989; Waddington 
CJ and Enyimayew KA 1989; Yoder 1989; Ojeda G, Murad R et al. 1994; Bratt, 
Weaver et al. 2002). Yoder (1989) was one of the few of such studies which drew 
on national data to study a policy change of the introduction of an increase in user 
fees in government facilities. Demand was inelastic for government facilities and 
was -0.32. About one third of the drop was from low income groups. The decrease 
in utilisation was also observed for preventive health care services such as 
immunisations, diarrheal and sexually transmitted diseases, not for minor 
ailments.  
 
Mataria et al. (2007) carried out a willingness to pay study. A contingent 
valuation method was used to model the demand and price elasticity for health 
care in Palestine. Demand becomes more elastic as user fees rise and price 
responsiveness depends on income level.  
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3.3.2 PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR MEDICINES 
 
A relatively small number of studies have explicitly studied price responsiveness 
for medicines because most of the data pertains to price elasticities with respect to 
health care. Available evidence from developing countries suggests that patients 
are more price responsive to medicines and to health care services than in 
developed country settings. These studies have typically used cross section 
analysis, and small sample sizes. Such studies have found elasticity estimates that 
range from -0.000 to -1.44 as shown in the table below.  
 
Table 3.3 - Price elasticity for medicines from the literature 
Dependent 
variable 
Measure Price 
elasticity 
Country Study 
     Outpatient 
visit 
Drug related    
 Drug cost -0.000 to 
0.006 
Philippines  Akin et al. 
1986 
 Drug and 
travel cost 
-0.79 (-1.44 
to -0.12 by 
income) 
Burkina Faso  Sauerborn et 
al. (1994) 
 Demand for 
malaria 
treatment 
-0.22 to -0.04 Ghana Dzator and 
Asafu-Adjaye 
2004 
 Demand for 
malaria 
treatment 
-1.05 to -0.49  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Laxminarayan 
et al. (2006) 
 Demand for 
malaria 
treatment 
-3.39 to -0.85  Ghana Asenso-
Okyere et al. 
(1996) 
 Demand for 
malaria 
treatment 
-0.58 to -0.05 Brazil De Bartolome 
and Vosti 
(1995) 
 Utilisation for -3.6 to -0.6 Sudan Abdu et al. 
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malaria 
treatment 
(2004) 
 Demand for 
deworming 
tablets 
-0.580 Kenya Kremer and 
Miguel (2007) 
     
 
 
Akin et al. (1986), one of the earlier studies found no significant relationship 
between price and drug cost (-0.000 to 0.006) in a region of the Philippines. The 
authors used a household survey from data collected in 1978 and supplemented 
this information by conducting a survey in 1981 to collect provider information 
such as data on payment practices, hours of operation, transportation costs. The 
authors assumed that relative prices were constant. Data available on provider 
levels indicated that there were no significant changes in supply. Independent 
variables included cash price, drug cost, travel time, waiting time, travel cost, 
asset value, self-reported measure of severity of illness, availability of physician, 
age and sex of individual and urban/rural residence. The authors carried out 
multinomial logit regression to model choice of provider (public, private, 
traditional, no visit) by splitting the sample results for adults and children. The 
most significant variable was perceived severity of illness which explained choice 
of provider. This study has been criticised for the limited income range that was 
used which could have affected the insignificant results of the economic variables 
(McPake 1993). Quality which was measured as the probability of seeing a 
provider was inadequately considered which could have further undermined the 
significance of the economic variables (McPake 1993). 
 
More recent studies have found economic variables to be significant. Sauerborn et 
al. (1994) and Daztor et al. (2004) De Bartolome et al. (1995), Asenso-Okyere et 
al. (1996) produced larger estimates but these studies did not correct for 
endogeneity between health expenditure and the decision to seek care ranging 
from -3.39 to -0.04. Sauerborn et al. (1994) found that larger estimates were found 
when separated by income. Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye (2004) found that own price 
elasticities ranged from -0.04 for a drug store, to -0.21 for a public provider to -
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0.22 or a private provider. The authors also computed price elasticities for travel 
time which ranged from -0.13 (drug store), -0.33 (private) to -0.36 (public).  
 
Laxminarayan et al. (2006) took a different approach and simulated the welfare 
effects for malaria treatment. The analysis combined the epidemiological models 
to account for malaria transmission and drug resistance and drew on economic 
models to consider the effect of demand for medicines with elasticities ranging 
from -1.05 to -0.49.  
 
3.3.3 UTILISATION AND EQUITY ISSUES 
 
Evidence on changes in utilisation levels has been largely based on price 
information of user fees in developing country settings. The literature shows that 
in general and consistent with the price elasticity measures, user fees result in a 
drop in utilisation. In some settings, utilisation remained below pre-charge levels 
(Bennett S 1989; Yoder 1989; Mwabu, Mwanzia et al. 1995). 
 
Deininger et al (2004) found that the abolition of user fees in a region of Uganda 
resulted in increased take up of health services among the poor and lower 
probability of sickness. Furthermore, a number of reviews have found that user 
fees are inequitable, disproportionately affecting low-income individuals who are 
deterred from using health services (Creese 1991, McPake 1993, Gilson 1997, 
Sepehri 2001, Hutton 2004, Palmer 2004, James 2006, Lagarde 2008). The 
evidence suggests that utilisation drops for important services such as preventive 
services and not simply for ‗frivolous‘ care (Creese 1991, p. 317). Bonilla and 
Rodriguez (1993) examined the effect of time loss and labour reallocations within 
the household due to the onset of malaria. The authors found that the impact of 
malaria afflicted men more than women but as a result, women bore a greater 
social and economic burden to care for the sick, and to look after farm production 
at the cost of reducing their own domestic tasks. 
 
Evidence is mixed on the degree to which insurance schemes are designed to 
mitigate the effects of user fees. For example, in the review by Palmer et al. 
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(2004) the authors found that cash payments could encourage uptake but suffered 
from perverse incentives. Various forms of pre-payment such as national social 
insurance to community-based schemes have not achieved adequate levels of 
coverage particularly among the those these schemes aim to target –the  poor 
(Preker, Carrin et al. 2002; Ekman 2004; Palmer N, Mueller D et al. 2004; Carrin, 
Waelkens et al. 2005). Inadequate coverage raises equity implications because 
patterns of use may become more unequal for those without coverage (Sepehri, 
Chernomas et al. 2005).  
 
Furthermore, an important issue is to understand that many factors can affect a 
patient‘s decision to spend money once they decide to visit a health facility 
regardless of whether pre-payment schemes exist or not. These could relate to 
cultural factors, where additional payments are expected as a form of gratitude 
(Falkingham 2004), perceptions of quality of care such as expectations of 
improved quality of service through the form of OOP payments (Kondo and 
McPake 2007). 
 
The welfare effects of such policies have been simulated in some studies. 
Consumer welfare losses could be partially offset with reinvestment such as in 
quality improvements (Mwabu and Mwangi 1986; Gertler and van der Gaag 
1990). Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) found that such policies were still 
regressive with the lowest income groups experiencing a welfare loss of 10% of 
their income. Policy proposals to counteract this problem suggest some form of 
price discrimination or methods of exemption (Mwabu and Mwangi 1986; Ellis 
1987; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990) (Ellis 1987; Gertler van der Gaag 1990; 
Mwabu and Mwangi 1986). Ellis (1987) proposed price discrimination for 
laboratory tests and geographical discrimination. Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) 
suggest geographical discrimination and Mwabu and Mwangi (1986) proposed 
selective user charges in hospital units of a referral health care system.  
 
Evidence on long term analysis of utilisation levels as a result of price changes 
have shown mixed results. In some settings utilisation dropped but only to regain 
pre-charge levels (Waddington CJ and Enyimayew KA 1989; Chalker J 1995). 
For example, Chalker (1995) found that demand fell in the first year in two 
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districts in Nepal, but then increased in the second and third year as a result of 
greater availability of drugs (Chalker 1995). Other studies used data on utilisation 
of single providers and time series data to examine the introduction of user 
charges. These studies found a drop in utilisation after the introduction of the user 
charge, with a higher drop occurring among low-income groups (Parker 1986; 
Waddington CJ and Enyimayew KA 1989; Yoder 1989).  
 
Typically, long-term studies focus on one type of provider and do not properly 
capture substitution effects to other potential providers (Bennett S 1989; Mbugua, 
Bloom et al. 1995; Shaw P and Griffin C 1995). The other limitation of long term 
studies is the reliability of the data. Most studies draw on attendance data at 
facilities to carry out descriptive analysis (Sepheri and Chernomas 2001) and 
there is evidence that the officially estimated fees may underestimate payments 
actually made (Deolalikar A and Vasjishta P 1992).  A limitation of most of these 
studies is that the long term impact of fee changes have not been well measured 
because most could not isolate changes in user charges from other policy changes. 
Furthermore, the evidence base on long term analysis is limited because most 
studies have been cross-sectional.  
 
The negative effects on utilisation and equity have caused a shift in the 
international debate on user fees. The WHO urged member countries to work 
towards universal coverage of maternal, newborn and child health with the 
adoption of prepaid mechanisms and pooled health financing systems passed in 
resolutions 58.31 and 58.33 (WHO 2005a; WHO 2005b).  The World Bank‘s new 
strategy involves greater support to countries committed to support the removal of 
user fees for children and pregnant women (Meessen et al. 2009).  
 
While a number of policy challenges arise in low and middle-income settings 
(Peters et al. 2009), a recent multi-country study review aimed to rather focus on 
documenting how countries formulated and implemented user fee removal to help 
policy makers draw on lessons of good practices (Meessen et al. 2011). The 
review found that utilisation increased (Meessen et al. 2011; Riddle et al. 2011; 
Orem et al. 2011; Sekabaraga et al. 2011; Nimpagaritse et al. 2011;Ponsar et al. 
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2011; Witter et al. 2011; Steinhardt et al. 2011) but there are a number of 
important policy lessons from this analysis.  
 
In some settings, the introduction of subsidies led to gaming behaviour among 
health professionals (Riddle et al. 2011) and the abolition of user fees led to a rise 
in OOP (Orem et al. 2011). There are system-wide effects relating to capacity due 
to increased utilisation as a result of the increase in fees such as drug-stockouts or 
the capacity of facilities to recruit local staff (Nimpagaritse et al. 2011; Ponsar et 
al. 2011; Witter et al. 2011). 
 
The evidence suggests that user fee removal should involve 6 important elements: 
analysis of the country‘s initial position with respect to user fees (e.g. exemption 
schemes); estimation of user fee removal on utilisation; additional human resource 
requirements, drugs and others inputs, mobilisation of additional resources and 
development of local-tailored strategies; building political commitment; and 
communicating policy change to all stakeholders (McPake et al. 2011).  
 
3.3.4 REVENUE RAISING AND EFFICIENCY ISSUES 
 
In developing country settings, one of the arguments to support user fee policies is 
that it could be a partial response to inject further funds into the health system. 
There are, however, important policy implications. Evidence on the impact of user 
fees has shown that cost recovery is low and revenue generated is modest and 
generally below the anticipated 10-20% of total government recurrent health 
expenditures to around 5-7% (Gilson 1997; Pearson 2004). In some African 
countries the proportion of recurrent costs covered by user charges ranged from 
2.7% to 12.1% (Vogel R 1988). Yoder (1989) found that in Swaziland user fees 
recovered only 2% of the Ministry of Health Budget and contributed to 0.16% of 
total government revenue. To meet a contribution of 1% of total government 
revenue, user fees would have to be increased seven times above their current 
level, which would become highly regressive (Yoder 1989). In Uganda, fee 
recovery rates were 7% (Singh 2003). 
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An important related issue is the complexity of introducing exemption schemes to 
address inequities. Pricing structure and administrative costs will affect the level 
of cost recovery through user charges (Vogel 1988). For instance, inconsistent 
implementation of user charges and excessive use of exemptions have contributed 
to programme inefficiencies (Vogel 1988; Sepehri and Chernomas 2001). The 
administrative burden will not necessarily result in overall efficiency gains 
(Gilson 1997, McPake 1993). Success of such policies depends on the 
administrative capacity and leadership commitment (Preker et al. 2002). 
 
The literature suggests that the success of such policies depends on how well they 
are implemented. Exemption methods may counteract the regressivity of user 
charges to address equity concerns. Exemption schemes have to address the 
problem of abuse and their overall effect on the administration costs to address 
efficiency concerns.  
 
3.3.5 OTHER DEMAND COVARIATES 
 
While the principle focus of demand studies has considered the impact of price, 
some empirical work has also explored the impact of quality, time and distance on 
demand for health care. 
 
Typically the quality variable is estimated from a structural dimension such as 
drug availability, physician availability, machine availability and qualification of 
staff (Sepehri et al 2001). Perceived quality of care is an important determinant of 
health care utilisation and of the success of health system financing reforms 
(Annis 1981; Wouters 1991; Barnum H and Kutzin J 1993; Lavy and Quigley 
1993). Studies which have looked at quality have produced mixed results of its 
effect on utilisation.  
 
Some have shown positive effects where drops in utilisation are partially offset by 
quality improvements (Hutton 2004; James et al. 2006). For example, when 
combined with quality improvements, utilisation in smaller phased-in 
programmes increased in the long run (James et al 2006). Chalker (1995) found 
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that an increase in drug availability led to increases in utilisation after an initial 
drop due to the introduction of user fees. Few studies have tried to empirically 
estimate changes in demand while controlling for covariates and found estimates 
ranging from -1.81 to 0.04 (Lavy and Quigley, 1993; Birdsall and Chuan, 1983). 
 
Simulation techniques have found that increasing user fees could dampen the 
negative effect on utilisation as a result of quality improvements. Using a 
simulation approach, greater availability of drugs, and improvements in working 
conditions led to an increase in utilisation in government clinics (Mwabu and 
Mwangi 1986). Denton H, Akin J et al. 1990) as reported in Wouters (1991) 
found that in a region of Nigeria three aspects of quality were significant: 
percentages of years drugs are available, operational cost per capita, and facility 
condition, while machinery (x-ray machine and laboratories), number of support 
personnel, nurses and doctors per capita were not. Investment in quality 
improvements however, were not offset by the revenue generation from user fees 
(Denton et al 1990).  
 
In contrast, other studies have found results that were insignificant or with 
opposite signs. A measure of quality as the probability of being seen by a 
physician was insignificant (Heller 1982; Mwabu G, Ainsworth M et al. 1993). 
Haddad and Fournier (1995) found that in a rural setting in Zaire, the steady 
supply of drugs, the competence of nurses, and the improvements in infrastructure 
and machinery did not offset the reduction in utilisation. Greater availability of 
medicines was found to have a negative relationship on utilisation (Mwabu 1993).  
 
Qualitative studies have been designed to capture information on quality 
(Waddington and Enyimayew 1989).  Bitran (1989) and Yoder (1989) found that 
utilisation was lower where quality of care was perceived to be lower. Annis 
(1981) found that rural health posts had reasonable good quality of services but 
were not used. Even though these studies provide useful information on the 
importance of quality, they cannot control for the marginal impact of covariates 
on quality. 
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Quality is a difficult factor to capture in both cross-section and time series 
analysis (McPake 1993). Other important dimensions such as process and 
outcome are not captured (Sepehri and Chernomas 2001). This creates problems 
to control for endogeneity because of the multidimensional nature of this variable. 
For example drug availability is an important factor for patients but this measure 
is influenced by both demand and supply factors (Sepehri and Chernomas 2001). 
Even though drug availability provides useful information, it only captures one 
relevant aspect and cannot account for whether it would imply better treatment. 
This leads to a bias in the quantitative results because if price and quality are 
positively correlated, then the negative impact of user fees on utilisation could be 
weaker than empirically estimated (Deolalikar A 1998).  
 
Overall there is a limitation with the studies which measured quality. Most of 
these studies suffer from being small scale, short time horizons and lack robust 
methods of research design (e.g. randomised). Some of the evidence on quality 
was not modelled but rather observed which makes it difficult to properly assess 
the impact of quality on utilisation. 
 
The effect of distance has been more commonly modelled, in part because there 
are more reliable objective measures. Time related information is typically 
analysed as time spent travelling to the health facility while some empirical work 
has included waiting time and treatment time. Empirical work has found estimates 
that range from -0.36 to -0.0001. For example, Heller (1982) found that a 1% 
increase in waiting time will affect the probability of demand by -0.02% to 0.02%. 
Dzator et al. (2004) found that a 1% increase in distance will reduce the 
probability of demand for treatment by -0.36% at a public provider.   
 
Findings related to time and distance provide useful information but not all studies 
collect detailed information at the household level and more rely on information at 
the aggregate level (e.g. village level) to compute this information.  
 
3.3.6 PRICE ELASTICITIES FROM HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
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While the focus of this thesis is on developing countries, this section highlights 
for comparative purposes evidence from high-income settings. These findings are 
relevant because they highlight common themes that can affect access. A large 
body of empirical work on price elasticities for drugs and health care has occurred 
in high-income countries. This section draws on earlier reviews and major papers 
in this area. 
 
Cutler (2002) provides a useful review of price elasticities which are presented in 
Appendix A. Evidence shows that increased levels of cost sharing on patients 
reduces the demand for pharmaceuticals (Leibowitz A 1985; Foxman B 1987; 
Goldman, Joyce et al. 2007)
5
 and that poorer patients will be more responsive to 
cost sharing (Cunningham 2002; Reed 2005). Studies have shown that the price 
elasticity of demand ranges from -0.2 to -0.6 (Leibowitz A 1985; Blais L 2003).
6
 
These figures imply that a 10% increase in cost sharing would be associated with 
a 2% to 6% decline in prescription drug use or expenditures. 
 
The empirical evidence on differential responses by therapeutic class is mixed. 
Some studies found substantial reductions in the use of discretionary (e.g. 
antihistamines) medications than essential (e.g. antihyperintensives) medications 
in response to increases in cost sharing (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Landsman 
PB 2005) while others showed modest but inconsistent effects of higher cost 
sharing on use of essential and non-essential drug classes (Reeder CE 1985; 
Motheral B 2001). 
 
The direct link between cost sharing and health outcomes is limited. Greater use 
of inpatient and emergency medical services was associated with higher levels of 
cost sharing for prescription drugs among chronically ill patients (e.g. diabetes) 
(Soumerai SB 1994; Cole JA 2006). When the population is not limited to chronic 
illnesses, increased cost sharing did not lead to more adverse events such as 
                                                 
5
 In Goldman et al. (2007), the authors provide a comprehensive summary of evidence presented in 
Box 2.1. 
6
 The price elasticity of demand is used to measure the impact of cost sharing on drug spending.  
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outpatient visits, hospitalisations or emergency visits (Johnson, Goodman et al. 
1997; Fairman KA 2003). 
 
More broadly, medical care utilisation has been extensively studied in developed 
country settings. There is a significant amount of literature on the elasticity of 
demand for medical care. Studies have estimated elasticities ranging from -0.14 
(Phelps and Newhouse 1972a) to -1.5 (Rosett and Huang 1973). The Rand Health 
Insurance Experiment estimated demand elasticities for medical spending and the 
overall conclusion of the study determined a price elasticity of -0.2 (Newhouse 
and Insurance Experiment Group 1993). This estimate has served as a benchmark 
in the literature for subsequent research and policy work (Cutler 2002). In 
summary, studies of cost sharing for medicines and for medical care use suggest 
relatively price inelastic elasticities in developed countries and more price 
responsiveness in developing country settings. 
 
3.3.7 SUMMARY AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
The literature finds that low-income individuals are more price responsive than 
the wealthy. Therefore, charging for health services is inequitable as lower 
income groups are negatively affected. Despite differences in the type of health 
care (e.g. inpatient, outpatient setting), higher elasticities are found for low 
income groups. User charges had a modest impact on revenue generation and 
administrative challenges exist with the implementation of exemption 
mechanisms to provide financial protection to low-income individuals.  This 
evidence highlights a shift in the policy environment. Empirical work on inelastic 
demand initially provided the basis for widespread promotion of user fee policy. 
A decade of research showing the negative impact has moved towards prioritizing 
work on equity and the importance of quality along with increased emphasis on 
exemption schemes.  
 
The findings from the empirical work provide a useful guide on which factors 
seem to influence the demand for health care. The main determinants of health 
seeking behaviour include the price (e.g. or cost of the visit) which is negatively 
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related to the decision to seek care. Income (or some measure of household 
wealth) has a positive effect. Those in poor health are more likely to seek care. 
Education and insurance both have a positive effect in seeking care while distance 
has a negative relationship with the decision to seek care. The empirical work also 
distinguishes between the type of health care received (e.g. drug related, family 
planning) due to the heterogeneity of the provision of health care in outpatient and 
inpatient settings.  The literature also emphasises that the availability of traditional 
forms of care and self-treatment are equally important to the provision of 
modernised medical care offered in public or private settings. 
 
Age has shown to have a mixed effect: some studies point suggest that older age 
groups seek care. Other empirical work indicates that it is the younger ages that 
utilise health care which draws on human capital theory where families invest in 
the younger more productive members of the family. Sex has shown to have 
differing effects depending on the type of health care: men are more likely to seek 
care in general, but in particular cases women are more likely to seek care—for 
instance in relation to child delivery. Household size, travel time, and treatment 
time are important determinants.  Many studies looked at rural samples which 
affect the decision to seek care. Quality if measured also has an effect on the 
decision to seek care but these measures have been quite simple. Marital status not 
commonly modelled had a positive effect on the decision to seek care.  
 
The evidence base of empirical estimates of price elasticities could be improved 
as not all studies have controlled for covariates. This has also been confirmed by 
reviews in the literature of limited evidence on price responsiveness, small sample 
sizes and confounding factors (Sepheri et al. 2001; Palmer et al. 2004). Unlike 
high-income settings where estimation of price elasticities and determinants of 
health seeking behaviour come from well-funded and developed databases, a 
serious limitation is the availability of data from low and middle-income settings. 
Furthermore empirical work has not always considered the policy environment. 
Some work has more broadly considered implications for health policy financing, 
but not specifically related to pharmaceuticals. More evidence on the policy 
environment of pharmaceutical regulation and price setting in these settings is 
needed.   
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The aim of the empirical work of this thesis is to contribute to the evidence base 
on determinants related to health seeking behaviour and implications for demand 
for medicines. This thesis uses health expenditure information which includes 
information on medicine expenditure in its analysis of health seeking behaviour 
because empirical work is limited. Second, existing studies are largely drawn 
from small sample sizes of regions or districts, confined to either specific rural or 
urban areas. This thesis aims to fill the knowledge gap by carrying out analysis 
over country level data sets to understand health seeking behaviour and price 
responsiveness across rural and urban settings. Third, this thesis contributes to the 
evidence base to address endogeneity issues related to health expenditure and 
health seeking behaviour. Finally, information on price responsiveness has 
implications for policy. This thesis contributes to this topic by considering the 
pharmaceutical policy making environment. The subsequent chapters now present 
the empirical work related to determinants of access to medicines and health care. 
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4 Chapter 4 Analysis of prices paid by developing countries 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This section carries out an exploratory exercise on the issue of price sensitivity at 
the government level across a cross section of low and middle-income settings. 
The research objective and research questions are presented below.  
 
Table 4.1 - Chapter 4 Research objective and research questions 
Chapter 4 Research objective 
Impute price elasticities for sales to 
government purchasers in selected low 
and middle income countries 
Research questions  
1) Is there variation in prices? 
2) What are the mark-ups over 
marginal cost? 
3) What is the imputed price 
elasticity for individual 
countries? Is price elasticity 
correlated with income?  
 
 
The standard economic approach for measuring price responsiveness is to 
calculate price elasticities, which requires data on prices and on volume (or 
quantity). Developing countries, in general, do not have robust data on prices and 
the quantities of medicines consumed. As such the estimation of price elasticities 
through conventional approaches is generally not possible. Therefore, the gap in 
empirical evidence is largely because of an acute lack of data. 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted that many individual studies are based on primary data 
collection. The quality of secondary data is beginning to improve but there 
remains a general scarcity of data—especially for the smaller and lower income 
countries. Recent health related surveys have only begun to collect information on 
medicine prices but volume information is still lacking in developing countries. 
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In this section, volume information was not available. To overcome the lack of 
volume information, this chapter takes a different approach to determine price 
elasticities. Information on prices and mark-ups were used in conjunction with the 
general Ramsey formula. The Ramsey formula states that prices are inversely 
related to their demand elasticities (Ramsey 1927). Ramsey (1927) developed this 
relationship to determine optimal tax rates but this rule has had significant 
contribution to the public economics literature and has been applied more 
generally (Auerbach AJ and Feldstein M 1985). 
 
The findings from this section are based on a simple exploratory exercise and 
should therefore be viewed as suggestive. These findings point to the possibility 
that developing countries are price sensitive. The evidence is however weakly 
supportive of the finding that price elasticities are correlated with income. This 
implies that other factors beyond a country‘s income affect a country‘s ability to 
secure low prices. This underpins the importance of a robust procurement 
framework. These issues are further discussed in the policy implications in 
Chapter 9. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides the theoretical 
framework, and section 4.3 presents evidence from the literature. The chapter then 
turns to the data and methods in 4.4, results and limitations in 4.5 followed by a 
policy discussion and conclusion in section 4.6.  
 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND APPLICATION 
 
4.2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PRICING MODELS 
 
A brief background on the theoretical framework of pricing models is presented. 
While many aspects could be discussed, this section focuses on pricing in markets 
with a monopoly element, and marginal cost pricing (also referred to as a first best 
solution) before moving to second best solutions such as the Ramsey model and 
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its application to the pharmaceutical sector. This discussion is important as it 
provides a basis for the empirical work carried out in this chapter.  
 
We begin the discussion by revisiting the issue of monopoly, one of the features 
of market failure. This issue is relevant for the pharmaceutical market because of 
the monopoly element present in these markets is due to patenting of medicines. 
 
Let us begin the discussion with the extreme case where one firm, which supplies 
the market with a good, could freely set its prices. This is depicted in the figure 
below which assumes linear demand where the marginal revenue (MR) curve and 
market demand curve share the same vertical intercept, a. The MR curve is twice 
as steep in slope as the demand curve, as follows from the assumptions of 
monopoly and linear demand. The marginal cost curve is shown as MC and 
average cost is AC. From the firm‘s perspective, optimal output, q*, is where 
MR=MC. The market demand price at q* is read off the demand curve at p*. The 
firm maximises profit at price at p* and output q*. This is not socially optimal 
level, however. The market demand curve is also the marginal benefit (MB) 
curve. The regulator would prefer output to be at q
1
, where MC=MB and price is 
lower at p
1
. Not all consumers would be able to afford the price charged at p* and 
would result in a loss of welfare because output is less at q* rather than at q
1
. The 
amount of consumer surplus not captured results in a deadweight loss, as shown 
by the shaded triangle area,  efg.  
 
Figure 4.1 - Monopoly with linear demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Varian 2003
AC
Demand = MB
MR
p*
Output
Profit = π
q*
a
MC
p1
q1
e
f g
Welfare loss
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Based on this example, the implication for the pharmaceutical market is that if a 
medicine were priced at p*, the pricing of medicines well above marginal cost at 
p*. This loss in consumer welfare identifies two problems that the regulator must 
address. First, prices set above marginal cost would result in an inefficient 
allocation of resources and there is a clear benefit to find ways to reduce 
allocative inefficiency (Armstrong et al. 1994). The second problem is that 
monopolies have no clear incentive to cut costs as long as there are the only firm 
in the market, in the extreme case, or the one with significant market power 
(Armstrong et al. 1994). Thus, productive inefficiency results. Furthermore, a firm 
with monopoly power may be less quick to introduce new products as they would 
otherwise in a market with a number of competing firms. Although this is a static 
model, some would argue that profit is required for future research and 
development (R&D) to maximise future consumers‘ surplus. 
 
In principle the regulator has two broad policy responses, which is to introduce 
regulation to discourage the firm to freely set its prices or second, to introduce 
more competition in the market (Armstrong et al. 1994). There are trade-offs 
involved, however. These issues are relevant to the pharmaceutical sector because 
low prices could benefit consumers in the short-run but this may impose a price-
floor, where prices do not move any lower, to the detriment of consumers in the 
long run. Prices closer to marginal cost in a competitive market aim to give firms 
incentives for cost reduction and innovation (Armstrong et al. 1994). 
 
Economic theory proposes that the first best solution for regulators is marginal 
cost pricing. For marginal cost pricing to hold, certain market conditions must be 
met. Marginal cost pricing assumes that price of public goods are controlled, 
while uncontrolled prices equal marginal costs in the public sector. The private 
sector is perfectly competitive, distribution of lump-sum incomes is optimally 
chosen so the model deals with compensated demand. There is no revenue-cost 
constraint on the public sector and quality levels are fixed. There is no 
informational asymmetry and the regulator is well informed of the firm‘s cost 
structure. 
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The reason this is optimal can be shown by considering this situation where price 
exceeds the marginal cost. The consumer and firm could be made better off if the 
firm produced a further unity of the good in return for a payment somewhere 
between price and cost. The efficient allocation without making either party worse 
off is where the consumer pays a price for the marginal unit that is equal to the 
cost of producing that unit.  
 
This can also be shown as follows: Let C(Q) be the firm‘s cost of producing total 
output Q, and let C‘(Q) denote the marginal cost. If aggregate demand at price P 
is Q(P), then marginal cost pricing, which is the efficient solution holds where at 
P* if P*=C‘(QP*). 
 
There are two important caveats where marginal cost may not be optimal. The 
first reason is due to externalities. For example, if a firm‘s production of a product 
harms the environment by D(Q), then the total costs are C(Q) + D(Q). Price 
should then be set to equal total marginal cost C‘(Q) + D‘(Q). 
 
The second reason is that there may be other distortions in the market. For 
example, if the firm‘s output is used as an input by other firms (e.g. utility 
industry) then it may be desirable to set price below marginal cost to 
counterbalance the price/cost mark-up practiced by these firms who do not 
operate in competitive markets (Armstrong et al. 1994).  
 
These two caveats highlight that the cost structure of the firm affects the extent to 
which pricing at marginal cost is possible. Marginal cost pricing is not the 
solution in cases where the industry has high fixed costs or increasing returns to 
scale. This issue is particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry which is 
characterised as having high fixed costs (WTO and WHO 2001).  
 
While there are other forms of pricing options when there are high fixed costs, 
such as average cost pricing, and non-linear tariffs (e.g. two-part tariffs), Ramsey 
pricing has been proposed as pricing option for the pharmaceutical industry. This 
rule sets prices to vary according to price elasticity of demand. The development 
of this pricing rule is discussed further in the next section.  
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4.2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RAMSEY PRICING 
 
We now turn the discussion to the theoretical framework of the Ramsey pricing 
rule. This discussion is important because it highlights that a key feature of the 
Ramsey model took demand information into account in order to set prices 
optimally in markets where prices set to marginal cost were suboptimal. This 
section first presents the Ramsey model and then discusses its application to the 
pharmaceutical sector and its relevance for the analysis carried out in this chapter. 
 
Ramsey (1927) developed a model to determine the optimal level of taxation of 
commodities to generate revenue while trying to address distortions in the market. 
The discussion below highlights Ramsey‘s main findings. Please refer to Ramsey 
(1927), Boiteux (1971) and Baumol and Bradford (1970) for more detailed 
discussion. 
 
Ramsey assumed that such a pricing structure required segmented markets. This 
means that there is no threat of leakage or spill over from markets. He assumed 
that demand was well-structured as shown by downward sloping demand curve 
where the commodities were taxed. He assumed that the regulator has full 
information of demand and supply. He further assumed that all commodities were 
independent, with their own demand and supply equations.  
 
Ramsey set out in his model that there are n commodities of quantities, 
nxxx .., 21  
 
Denote )..( 1 nxxFu  is the net utility of producing and consuming the quantities 
 
Let the tax rates levied on these commodities be n .., 21  
 
Equilibrium which maximises u is r
rx
u



 r = 1,..n (4-1) 
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Revenue is the product of the taxes levied on the commodities where R  = 
 rr x  
 
Utility, u, is a maximum subject to  rr x = R where r is 
rx
u


 
 rrdxdu 0  
Subject to 
rs
r
s
srrr
dx
x
xdxdR 

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
0  
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Or 
= 



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 srs xx
x
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He showed that taxes reduce in the same proportion the production of each taxed 
commodity as 
n
n
x
dx
x
dx
x
dx

2
2
1
1  
 
Ramsey assumed that utility is a non-homogeneous quadratic function of the x‘s 
which means that the λ‘s are linear.   
 
For the rth commodity 
Let )( rr xp   be the demand price 
Let )( rrr xfq  be the supply price 
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Ramsey determined that 0


s
r
x

 , r s 
With (4-2) Ramsey showed that  
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Let ur, an ad valorem tax, be applied on the rth commodity 
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He showed that  
 
)(
)('
rr
rr
r
xf
xf
x  is the inverse of the elasticity of supply of the commodity which is 
positive for diminishing returns and 
 
)(
)('
rr
rr
r
x
x
x


  is the inverse of the elasticity of demand which is positive for a 
normal good 
 
He simplified this equation where ρr is the elasticity of demand and r  is the 
elasticity of supply so that  
 79 
 
)
11
(
r
r
r
r
u
u



  
 
Or  
r
rr
ru













1
11
 
 
He assumed that revenue is small enough and for infinitesimal taxes   is 
infinitesimal so that 
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Therefore Ramsey‘s analysis showed that the tax on each commodity is 
proportional to the sum of the reciprocals of the supply and demand elasticities. 
Under his model, elasticity information was a necessary condition for the model 
to determine the level of tax rates for a given range of commodities.  
 
The application of this rule has been applied more broadly in the pricing of goods 
and services.
7
 A special case of this rule has been considered in the public sector 
pricing for the demand of a good, prices are inversely related to the elasticity of 
demand.  
                                                 
7
 For example, in the utility industry where demand is typically inelastic (e.g. water) Ramsey pricing can be used in two-
part tariffs. The fixed charge is set high enough to cover the shortfall in profits while usage prices are set close to 
approximate marginal cost. Ramsey pricing can be applied to peak load pricing. This is where there are systematic 
fluctuations in demand (e.g. demand for heating is greater in the winter than in the summer). During a peak period, demand 
will be relatively inelastic, and so Ramsey prices are set high, while they are set lower during off-peak periods (Armstrong 
et al. 1994).  
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To show this result, total welfare is defined at the weighted sum of consumer 
surplus and firm profit. Consumer surplus V(P) is a function of a vector of prices 
P= (P1, … Pn,)which satisfies 
 
)(
)(
P
P
i
i
Q
P
V 


 
 
The firm‘s profit is  
 

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n
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The optimal prices where consumer welfare is maximised subject to the profit 
constraint of  
 
)()( PP V  subject to 0)( P  
 
is where the optimal prices P* are 
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CPQ *)(*))](([*)( PPQP  for each i  
 
The prices that solve this are referred to as Ramsey prices. The added term of λ, a 
constant factor, is the main difference between this formula and that of 
unregulated profit maximising prices. The constant factor, λ, is necessary but not 
sufficient condition for prices to be below marginal cost in one or more markets, 
where 
0/  jj PQ  for some i  j (Armstrong et al. 1994).   
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A special case is where consumer demand is independent so there are no cross 
price effects. The price/cost mark-up divided by the demand elasticity is constant 
across all products. The formula is then reduced to  
 
ii
ii
nP
CP 


*
*
 
 
This is referred to as the inverse-elasticity rule  
 
Or 
i
iii
i
Q
PQP
n
)/( 
        (4-3) 
 
is the elasticity of demand for product i 
 
 
The Ramsey rule is also known in the literature on price discrimination as third 
degree price discrimination where consumers are charged different prices to 
reflect demand sensitivities but each consumer pays a constant amount for each 
unit bought such as student discounts or senior discounts (Varian 1985).
8
 
 
According to this rule, prices should be closer to marginal cost where demand for 
medicines is more sensitive to price. Where demand is not sensitive to the 
medicine‘s price, also referred to as inelastic then price should be set high enough 
to cover any shortfalls in the firm‘s profits.  
 
It is important to recall the assumptions of this model in relation to the previous 
discussion on marginal cost pricing. Ramsey pricing, like marginal cost pricing, 
                                                 
8
 Third degree price discrimination could apply also where marginal cost is similar across markets, 
because then it is optimal both for consumers and for the firm to price products differently to cover 
its costs.  (Armstrong et al. 1994). Two other types of price discrimination exist. First degree price 
discrimination characterises a market where firms charge a different price for each unit of the good 
where the priced charged to each consumer is the maximum willingness to pay for that unit 
(Varian, 1985). Second degree price discrimination occurs where prices depend on the quantity 
sold but not across consumer such as quantity discounts or premia.  
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assumes that the regulator has information about consumer demand and 
knowledge of the firm‘s costs. All demand elasticities are assumed to be negative 
but prices can lie above or below marginal costs. Unlike marginal cost pricing, 
however, Ramsey pricing assumes that the regulator is restricted by an 
exogenously fixed deficit or profit.  
 
Therefore, Ramsey prices face challenges in implementation, particularly due to 
informational requirements. When informational requirements are relaxed because 
the regulator does not have information of the cost structure of the firm, 
productive efficiency cannot be easily met. The regulator may not necessarily be 
well informed of consumer demand or the industry cost structure to implement 
Ramsey pricing.  
 
One solution is transfers are used to improve productive efficiency but these are 
difficult to implement in practice as previously discussed (Laffont and Tirole 
1993). To address information requirements, other responses have been 
considered such as price cap regulation, and yardstick competition but again cost 
and demand conditions are required to be stable over time. For a more detailed 
discussion please refer to Armstrong et al. (1994).  
 
Thus, in a simple framework, the regulator is informed about demand and 
conditions in the industry. This is where Ramsey pricing is possible. More 
complex situations are where the regulator does not have as much information as 
the firm about its costs and effort level. Therefore the three trade-offs for the 
regulator are between allocation efficiency (set prices as close to marginal cost), 
productive efficiency (keep the firm‘s cost as low as possible), and minimise the 
adverse distributional effect of the excess profits of the firm due to its 
informational advantage (Armstrong et al. 1994).  
 
The aim of this section provided an overview of Ramsey pricing to motivate the 
empirical work presented later in this chapter. While the theoretical work 
discussed the role of the public authority, the following section moves to 
application of Ramsey pricing in the pharmaceutical sector from the industry‘s 
perspective. The literature proposes that Ramsey pricing for medicines could be 
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desirable because marginal cost pricing would result in deficits for the firm (WTO 
and WHO 2001).  
  
4.2.3 RAMSEY PRICING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 
 
This section discusses the application of the Ramsey rule in the pharmaceutical 
sector. The application of this rule has been proposed as a potential policy 
response for unaffordable medicine prices where it is the pharmaceutical firm 
which sets prices according to the Ramsey rule to take account of its costs and 
mark-ups. The prices that pharmaceutical firms should in principle vary according 
to a country‘s elasticity of demand for the medicine (World Bank/WTO 2001). 
While the previous section presented the pricing problem from the perspective of 
the government authority according to the theoretical framework, this section 
moves to the application of this pricing rule and to motivate the empirical work 
which follows.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry has become a global business. Global sales in 2010 
show that high income regions such as North America (39%), Europe (24%), 
Japan (11%) account for 74% of total spending. Branded drugs account for the 
same amount in spending but this is expected to decline as patents expire and lead 
to a rise in generic drug spending (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics 2011).  
 
This large industry has key features that are relevant to the application of Ramsey 
pricing. First, the pharmaceutical sector is characterised as having a monopoly 
element. Firms are rewarded a patent if they undertake research and development 
(R&D) in pursuit of improved medical technologies.
9
 A patent grants a firm 
market exclusivity, which can last 20 years or more (as shown in the figure 
                                                 
9
 According to intellectual property rights (IPRs) rules as set out by the World Trade Organization 
agreement (WTO), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Patent here 
refers to a product patent as defined in TRIPS. 
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below).
10
 The extent to which a firm has market power for the patent it receives 
depends on the availability of therapeutic substitutes.  
 
Second, this industry is characterised as having high fixed costs, which may or 
may not be exclusively attributable to research and development (R&D). Some 
studies suggest the average expenditure of R&D alone is $802 million per 
approved new drug  (DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003). However, the industry has 
unique features concerning its cost structure. The costs involved in developing, 
producing and marketing a drug can be categorised depending on where they are 
incurred and whether they vary with the volume of sales and/or the countries in 
which the drugs are sold (OFT 2007b). R&D is considered an international 
activity (considered a global cost) because it can be located anywhere in the world 
and once the drug is developed, R&D does not have to be incurred again (see box 
below) (OFT 2007b). The second type of cost relates to manufacturing which is 
usually concentrated in certain locations for economies of scale. Transport costs 
are involved to reach different markets. The remaining costs are specific to the 
country of sale and include distribution costs, marketing costs and interactions 
with government authorities for pricing and reimbursement negotiations (OFT 
2007b).  
 
Once a high proportion of R&D and manufacturing costs are incurred for drug 
development, the drug is potentially available in any country‘s market, provided 
the country can afford to purchase the drug. The nature of these costs means that 
the regulatory solutions available for an industry strictly located within one 
nation‘s borders may not be applicable to the pharmaceutical industry in other 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Patent extensions are used by firms to extend their product‘s patent life and monopoly power in 
the market. 
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Figure 4.2- Lifecycle of a drug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (OFT 2007b) 
 
Box 4.1 - Stages in the lifecycle of a drug 
1. Basic research is conducted (e.g. within public sector institutions, universities, 
etc.). 
2. Pharmaceutical companies can acquire patent protection once basic research 
has identified promising new molecular entity (NME). 
3. Pre-clinical trials involve testing of NMEs in laboratories. Less than 1% of 
compounds successfully make the transition from pre-clinical to clinical trials. 
4. Three stages of clinical trials are carried out on humans before market 
authorisation (licensing) is granted. An estimated 21.5 per cent of drugs 
successfully pass through clinical trials. 
 Phase I conducted on 20-100 healthy adults 
 Phase II in 100-300 patients to determine drug safety and efficacy 
 Phase III in 1,000-3,000 patients to collect further data on drug safety and 
efficacy 
5. Market authorisation (licensing) must be obtained before the drug is available 
in the country‘s market (e.g. the FDA in the US, EMEA in Europe, or national 
licensing authority). 
6. Phase IV, pharmacovigilance trials begin once the drug is available in the 
market to identify adverse drug reactions and continue throughout the drug‘s 
0
Pa
ten
t a
pp
lic
ati
on
Ac
ute
 to
xic
ity
Ph
ar
ma
co
log
y
Ch
ro
nic
 to
xic
ity
Pr
e-
cli
nic
al 
tria
ls
Basic research
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
m
o
le
c
u
le
s
 s
c
re
e
n
e
d
R&D
5 years
Ph
as
e I
Ph
as
e I
I
Ph
as
e I
II
Ma
rke
t a
uth
or
isa
tio
n (
FD
A,
 E
ME
A,
 et
c)
Cl
ini
ca
l tr
ial
s
10 years
20 years
Patent expiry
Manufacturing/Marketing/Distribution
Generic entry
15 years
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
m
o
le
c
u
le
s
 s
c
re
e
n
e
d
 86 
lifetime. 
7. Generic manufacturers are able to enter the market and sell generic copies of 
the drug after the drug‘s patent (and any supplementary protection certificate 
(SPC) has expired). 
Source: OFT(2007b) 
 
Ramsey pricing is a potential approach for pricing from the perspective of the 
profit maximising firm. In this sector, firms will not set prices equal to marginal 
cost because this would result in a loss. They would prefer to set prices above 
marginal cost. From the firm‘s perspective, if country markets are well 
segmented, IPRs are protected and there is little threat of parallel trade or leakage 
into other country markets, Ramsey pricing could be used. To implement Ramsey 
pricing, the firm, however, requires information about demand. One argument put 
forward in the literature is that a country‘s income could be used as a proxy for a 
country‘s price elasticity to inform price levels. Prices could therefore be set 
higher in high income markets (e.g. more inelastic) and lower in low income (e.g. 
more elastic). 
 
These features of the pharmaceutical market highlight the important relationship 
between the pharmaceutical industry and countries that purchase drugs on behalf 
of their population. The relationship is one of negotiation between the firm and 
the country (e.g. the government authority charged with negotiating). The country 
behaves as a monopsonist on behalf of their population.  
 
In practice, high-income countries have a higher degree of market power as a 
monopsonist when negotiating with firms due to the potentially high profit stream 
available in that country. Low and middle-income countries are cash constrained, 
do not reflect high profit markets and as a result, do not have the same degree of 
buyer power in price negotiations.  
 
In developing country settings, pharmaceutical policies are not typically well 
developed. Some countries have begun to use legal provisions under the WTO 
TRIPS agreement to have access to generic versions of patented medicines. Brazil 
and Thailand have issued compulsory licenses to generic manufacturers to 
 87 
produce antiretroviral medicines because the price offered by the patent holder 
were too high (Ford, Wilson et al. 2007). Mexico recently negotiated savings 
reductions in the purchase of public sector patented medicines. Some medicine 
prices remained the same while others fell leading to a net result of cost savings 
(Tamayo 2008).  
 
Non-government actors play an important role in procurement of medicines. 
International donor agencies have an interest to secure low prices for developing 
countries. Institutions such as the Clinton Foundation negotiate the procurement 
of medicines on behalf of many countries while other institutions such as the 
Global Fund to Fight Aids TB and Malaria work with a consortium of campaign 
groups to set low prices for medicines. Recent price negotiations underway would 
be to subsidise the majority of wholesaling costs of manufacturers to provide low 
cost malaria medicines (Mackenzie 2008).  
 
In summary, there is some theoretical basis that pharmaceutical firms with market 
power are likely to employ Ramsey type approaches in setting prices of 
pharmaceuticals. There is less agreement however, on the policy implications of 
this. While some argue that price sensitivity for a country is likely to be strongly 
correlated with income and hence the application of Ramsey pricing by 
companies alone would likely lead to an equitable outcome (with poorer countries 
being offered lower prices), there is a strong argument that other factors are likely 
to drive price sensitivity, in particular the effectiveness of procurement policies in 
developing countries. These issues are further explored in Chapter 9. The next 
section reviews evidence from the literature on the application of Ramsey pricing 
in the pharmaceutical sector before moving onto the empirical work. 
 
4.3 LITERATURE REVIEW OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING 
4.3.1 THEORETICAL WORK 
 
This section reviews existing evidence on pharmaceutical pricing. This provides 
useful background information on this topic before moving to the analysis in this 
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chapter. Section 4.3.1 presents theoretical work, followed by evidence of 
empirical work in 4.3.2; section 4.3.3 summarises this review and identifies gaps 
in the literature.  
 
The empirical application of Ramsey pricing has appeared in various parts of the 
literature when there are significant high fixed industry costs. Common 
applications of Ramsey pricing of goods occurred in transportation (Martin-Cejas 
2010), utility (Berry SK 2000), environment and agriculture sectors (Bourgeon 
and Chambers 2008). In these circumstances, Ramsey pricing is considered a 
more optimal pricing strategy than marginal cost pricing (Bös D 1985). 
 
The application of Ramsey pricing to the health sector has been limited. Harris 
(1979) applied the Ramsey pricing rule to study the pricing rule of hospitals. 
Harris (1979) considers the hospital pricing decisions as a problem of public 
enterprise pricing. The empirical results show that the hospital is able to cross-
subsidise its services among ancillary, special procedures and daily 
accommodations. Allowing prices to deviate from costs compensates for 
significant distortions and inequities in existing health insurance coverage and 
shows significant welfare gains under a Ramey pricing rule. While the focus of 
this thesis is determinants related to pharmaceutical care, the findings from the 
Harris model emphasise the importance of pricing decisions of health care which 
have implications for access to health care. 
 
Theoretical work on Ramsey pricing in the pharmaceutical sector has explored 
static (Dumoulin 2001) and dynamic effects (long term effects of R&D) of price 
discrimination (Hausman JA and Mackie-Mason  JK 1988; Malueg and Schwartz 
1994).  
 
For example, Hausman and Mackie-Mason (1988) found that welfare gains occur 
under static efficiency and dynamic efficiency scenarios because price 
discrimination allows patent holders to open new markets and to achieve 
economies of scale or learning and so has positive effects on R&D.  
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Mauleg and Schwartz (1994) conclude that price discrimination has positive 
effects on welfare over a uniform price when there are large differences in 
demand, a term referred to as demand dispersion. The authors also found that 
when price discrimination is applied across a designated group of markets (e.g. 
group countries according to a certain level of income) it is more welfare 
enhancing than uniform pricing and unrestricted market price discrimination.  
 
An important assumption in this work is that markets are independent of one 
another. This condition allows firms to set prices rationally in each market. When 
markets are not segmented, there is a threat of leakage and arbitrage where firms 
will move to uniform pricing across all markets (Philips 1983; Tirole 1988). Two 
confounding factors could discourage Ramsey pricing: the threat of parallel trade 
at the international level and spill overs in domestic markets.  
 
In the pharmaceutical sector, the threat of parallel trade occurs when the branded 
drug is exported from a lower priced country to a higher priced country without 
the authorisation of the patent holder (Malueg and Schwartz 1994; Szymanski and 
Valletti 2005). Therefore parallel trade discourages firms from price 
discriminating across country markets and as a result they may offer a uniform 
price across all markets. A uniform price will not be equitable as low-income 
countries will not be able to afford purchasing the drug. Empirical work confirms 
that the threat of leakage such as parallel trade (Malueg and Schwartz 1994; 
Szymanski and Valletti 2005) or smuggling has shown to weaken the incentive for 
price discrimination (Hornbeck and Ortun 2005).   
 
Furthermore, firms may be unable to price discriminate within a domestic market. 
Problems in market segmentation may result in firms offering high prices to offset 
internal spillovers between high and low-income segments of the market in a 
country that has high income inequality (Maskus KE 2001). This situation reflects 
a ‗kinked‘ demand curve (Scherer FM and Watal J 2001). Even though a 
particular drug is offered in a low-income country, it may be priced for high-
income individuals so it is unaffordable for the low-income individuals in that 
country (Maskus 2001). 
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Jack and Lanjouw (2005) develop a more comprehensive indirect utility model 
which considers the distributional effects for low-income countries. The two main 
conditions assumed under the standard model are that the prices should at least 
cover marginal costs in each country and second that pricing structures should be 
related to those that normally arise under a monopoly pricing regime (Jack and 
Lanjouw, 2005). The authors incorporate the effect of income on demand 
elasticity and health needs on demand elasticity. The authors find that when 
distributional concerns are accounted for, low-income countries may not 
necessarily be able to cover their own marginal costs of drug production and 
distribution. Furthermore, the price structure does not relate to what would be 
chosen by a monopolist in a proportional way (Jack and Lanjouw, 2005). They 
find that the relative markup is smaller when weight is given to social welfare 
than that would be chosen by a price discriminating monopolist (Jack and 
Lanjouw, 2005). 
 
Evidence is mixed on the long run effects. In the long run, mark-ups should move 
to competitive levels (Stole, Armstrong et al. 2007). Hoffler (2006) notes that 
market entry of competitive suppliers in the long run could have adverse effects 
on competition. This is because suppliers may be attracted to the price insensitive 
markets to charge higher mark-ups. As a result market entry may be more 
aggressive in these markets than in price elastic markets (Hoffler 2006). 
 
Even though the theoretical work has shown that there could be welfare gains 
from pricing goods relative their demand sensitivities, there is some empirical 
work on understanding and explaining the pattern of demand in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The next section turns to this topic with evidence from the 
literature. 
 
4.3.2 EMPIRICAL WORK 
 
While evidence from theoretical work in the previous section provides useful 
frameworks for demand analysis we now further extend the discussion and turn to 
empirical work. This area of research has used prices of medicines to understand 
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demand structures in developing country settings. This literature estimates price 
elasticities using upstream prices such as ex-manufacturer prices. The findings 
from this literature reflect demand decisions potentially at the procurement level 
and so differ from those presented in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 which reflect 
decisions at the patient/retail level which occurs further down the pharmaceutical 
supply chain. Data and data collection on medicine prices in developing country 
settings is limited thereby currently restricting more robust demand analysis.  
 
This section moves to provide empirical evidence on pharmaceutical pricing. 
Some studies have applied econometric methods while others are simple 
descriptive analysis. Econometric studies typically use per-capita income to 
quantify the relationship between wealth and price. This relationship is a proxy to 
explain that prices are related to demand. Descriptive studies have been carried 
cross country or within country analysis and include upstream and downstream 
prices.  
 
An early study found a strong positive relationship between price level and gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita across a cross section of low, middle and high-
income countries (32) using data from 1975 (Schut and van Bergeijk 1986). A 
simple OLS regression was used to model the relationship between price and the 
explanatory variables. A 10% increase in per capita income was associated with 
an average increase of 8% higher drug prices. The study found that besides 
income, regulation played an important role. Direct price control measures 
resulted in an average 20% price reduction. Policies such as procurement through 
a central government agency, promotion of generics and to a lesser extent, 
excluding patent protection were successful in lowering the general price level of 
pharmaceuticals. One of the limitations to this study was that it used aggregate 
data (price index) to explain movements in the price level. 
 
More recently, panel data sets have been used to shed light on the patterns of price 
movements over time. Scherer and Watal (2001) used wholesale price data and 
income using data for 15 AIDS drugs in 18 low and middle-income countries 
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between 1995-1999
11
. International price variations were correlated with GNP per 
capita at around 0.21. OLS regression was used where wholesale price was 
regressed against GNP, and dummy variables for type of drug, pharmacy, hospital 
setting and patent protection of the drug. The study found that per capita income 
helped to explain price differences but more importantly, this relationship 
weakened over time as the pharmaceutical firms offered discounts that were 
unrelated to per capita income. A limitation with this study is that it used a simple 
OLS technique and sensitivity analysis on the model‘s robustness was not 
performed. 
 
Rojas (2005) studied the wholesale price of a sample of drugs in eleven 
therapeutic groups across Central American countries. A panel-data regression 
technique was used to test whether the same drugs are sold at different prices 
across the countries and results show that there are significant differences in the 
price of drugs across the countries (Rojas, 2005). Countries differ according to per 
capita income, income distribution, and the nature and extent of the public health 
system. The author recommends the implementation of a regional price-
discrimination strategy. The analysis is limited because the regression model uses 
country dummies and did not include other characteristics of countries health 
systems or their systems of pharmaceutical regulation to control for differences in 
price levels. 
 
Findings from the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) come to a similar 
conclusion that government regulation plays an important role in affecting price 
levels (CBO 2004). The study, however, carried out analysis across high-income 
countries to determine differences in prescription drug prices. The study found 
that on average patented drug prices are 35% to 55% lower in high-income 
countries relative to the US. These differences are in part explained by the degree 
of pharmaceutical regulation to control prices and the buying power of 
government related authorities (CBO 2004).  
                                                 
11
 Argentina, Brazil, Central America, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Africa, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay and 
Venezuela 
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Two important papers have found support for Ramsey pricing and are widely 
cited in the literature. Danzon and Furukawa (2003)(2003) found that a 
relationship between price and income in high-income countries only. They 
calculated average price levels for pharmaceuticals in nine countries: Canada, 
Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom and the United 
States. The study sample used comprehensive price information. The authors 
constructed price indices based on manufacturer prices that included 249 leading 
molecules in the country sample and accounted for 30 to 60% of sales in these 
countries. Brand name, generic and OTC products with the active ingredient were 
included in all presentations (e.g. capsules, tablets, etc). The authors find that drug 
price differentials reflect income differences in 7 of the 9 countries except for 
Chile and Mexico. In these two countries, price differentials are five times greater 
than income differentials, implying that drugs are not affordable to most people. A 
limitation with this study is that the basket of drugs only captures 33% of drug 
spending in Chile and Mexico and is less representative than for the high 
countries used in the sample so the conclusions about these two countries should 
be viewed with caution.  
 
Danzon and Furukawa (2008) carried out similar analysis and expanded the set of 
countries from 9 to twelve (adding Australia, Spain and Brazil). The price 
differentials roughly reflect income differences but only in the high-income 
countries (9 of the 12 countries). In the less affluent countries price differentials 
are greater than income differentials: Brazil and Chile (3 times greater), Mexico 
(4 times greater). This study used more representative price information where the 
molecules used accounted for 64% to 80% of the country‘s sales. The authors 
argue that high drug prices in the Latin American countries partly reflect the 
skewed income distribution of income and the manufacturer‘s tendency to target 
prices to the affluent minority but overall drug prices are unaffordable, 
contributing to lower per capita use of drugs in these countries (Danzon and 
Furukawa 2008). A limitation with this study is that prices indices are sensitive to 
the basket used which could mask distribution effects at the molecule level.  
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Descriptive analysis has found differences in prices for the same drug across 
countries with similar income levels. Maskus (2001) looked at ex-manufacturer 
prices for 20 major brand name molecules in a mix of high, middle and low 
income countries (14) for the period 1994 to 1998.
12
 He compared prices per 
dosage and found that prices for the same drug in Canada, Italy and Spain were 
lower than in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa (Maskus, 2001). For 10 out of 18 
drugs in Italy, Spain and South Africa, South Africa had the highest price. Brazil 
and Mexico had the second and third highest average prices relative to Canada, 
Italy, Spain and Japan.  
 
A study in the Asia Pacific region among selected developing countries carried 
out a descriptive analysis of downstream prices (retail prices) where prices for the 
same medicine varied from 233% to 32,757% (Balasubramaniam 1996). 
Similarly, Myhr (2000) also carried out a descriptive analysis and compared 
prices and availability of medicines in Eastern African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania). Information on duties, taxes and mark-ups were also 
collected in rural and urban areas. The author found that prices at the retail level 
were sometimes double those in European countries.  
 
Pitaknetinan et al. (1999) carried out within country analysis in Thailand to study 
prescribing practices in a sample of nine hospitals in the city of Bangkok. Three 
hospitals were public, and six were private (three for-profit and three not for-
profit) were private. Mark-ups were estimated in the study using government price 
data. The authors found that prices of the same medicine in private hospitals were 
higher than in private pharmacies. Private hospitals had higher mark-ups on the 
medicine to cover hospital services. The government fee schedule suggests mark-
ups in the range of 15% to 30%. Some medicines in government hospitals had 
mark-ups of 400%. The study did not carry out further analysis to understand the 
reasons underlying the variation in mark-ups. 
 
                                                 
12
 Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, Spain, South 
Africa, Thailand, UK, USA. 
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More recent and comprehensive analysis by the WHO and Health Action 
International (HAI) confirmed these literature findings across a large cross section 
of countries comparing prices at the molecule level (WHO/HAI 2006). There is 
evidence to suggest that distribution margins (wholesale and retail pharmacy), 
particularly in low-income countries account for a larger share of the drug‘s 
overall price than the manufacturer‘s price (WHO/HAI, 2006). Furthermore this 
study highlighted that there are significant price variations for the same medicine 
within a country depending on whether it is offered in the public or private sector.  
 
A challenge with country price comparison studies is that there are many 
methodological issues that can affect the results including the types of prices 
compared, the source of the price data used, the methodology used to make the 
comparison and the parameters used in constructing price indices. All these 
factors make it difficult to draw out straightforward policy conclusions. A 
comprehensive review of international price studies found that these studies need 
to be viewed with caution because these studies along cannot clearly respond to 
general questions of whether prices in one country are too high with taking 
account of important factors such as rebate schemes, exchange rate movements, 
and a detailed understanding of the country‘s policy and market environment 
(OFT 2007c). 
 
4.3.3 SUMMARY AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
In summary the theoretical work has led to similar conclusions with the 
underlying Ramsey proposition that prices should reflect demand but there are 
distributional concerns on how well this could be achieved. The empirical work 
on explaining patterns of demand with price is mixed. These studies have 
typically looked at the relationship between price and income but are not based on 
a clearly defined theoretical model of demand. The evidence also highlights the 
importance of regulation in influencing price levels. 
 
The aim of the empirical work in this chapter is to provide evidence on the pattern 
of demand in low and middle-income countries. This analysis uses upstream price 
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information at the molecule level because empirical work in this area is limited. 
This study also draws on a large sample size across a cross section of low and 
middle income countries to improve the evidence base on demand for medicines. 
While the empirical work on the application of Ramsey pricing is mixed, the 
analysis draws on the Ramsey pricing rule for estimation purposes. Therefore, the 
empirical work in this chapter is only an exploratory exercise to impute price 
elasticities as the current evidence base is limited. The empirical work in this 
chapter has important implications for policy and for improving pharmaceutical 
regulation in these settings. 
 
4.4 DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.4.1 DATA SOURCES 
 
Data on government procurement prices across a sample of 16 low and middle-
income countries were used. The procurement prices are the prices that the 
government and other purchasers pay to procure medicines, generally through a 
tendering process. Data on tenders or orders tend to be collected at central stores 
or facility level. The procurement prices for the public sector are either collected 
in the administrative centre (procurement offices or central medical stores). Only 
a few situations the procurement prices included local taxes and handling charges 
(WHO/HAI 2006). 
 
 
The data on procurement come from the authority charged with procurement such 
as the central or regional medicine store or the Ministry of Health for 9 out of the 
16 countries. Four out of the 16 countries used a combination of data from both 
procurement authorities and government affiliated public hospitals while the 
remaining four collected procurement data from either government hospitals, or 
tenders from wholesalers.  
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Data from government hospitals were used in situations where the central 
procurement data were unavailable or if data from the hospitals would be more 
reflective of the procurement price. This is because the survey documentation 
notes that many other parties are involved in procurement in low and middle-
income settings. While government authorities may procure, hospitals in these 
settings may directly negotiate with wholesalers to achieve an even lower 
procurement price (WHO/HAI 2006). This issue and the implications for the 
results of the analysis are further discussed later in this chapter.  
 
The dataset comes from WHO and Health Action International (WHO/HAI) 
database for one year, 2003. The price information covers 18 therapeutic areas 
and 48 branded drugs in 16 countries.
13
 The table below summarises the 
therapeutic areas included in the analysis.  
 
Table 4.2 - Therapeutic areas for analysis 
Therapeutic area Number of drugs 
  Antacids 2 
Antibiotics 6 
Antifungal 3 
Antihistamine 1 
Antiinfective 1 
Antiinflammatory 2 
Antiparasitic 2 
Antiviral 4 
Asthma 2 
Cardiovascular 14 
                                                 
13
 China, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia and Uganda.(Qiang S 2005; Ye L 2005; 
Drug Information Centre Kazakhstan 2005; Bader R 2007; Ball et al. 2005; Drug Information 
Centre Kyrgystan 2005; Karam R 2004; Ministry of Health Morocco 2004; Federal Ministry of 
Health Nigeria 2004; Network for Consumer Protection 2004; HAI Latin American Office 2007; 
Babar et al. 2005; Batangan et al 2005; Sallouta R et al. 2003; Ministry for Public Health Tunisia 
2004; Ministry of Health Uganda 2004; WHO/HAI South Africa 2001). 
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Contraceptive 1 
Diabetes 3 
Nervous system disorders 7 
  Source: (WHO/HAI 2007) 
 
The WHO/HAI database contains a cross section of price data of branded drugs 
for 2003 on the following 16 countries: China, Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; 
Kyrgyzstan; Lebanon; Malaysia; Morocco; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; 
South Africa ; Syria; Tunisia; and Uganda.
 14
 Government procurement price in 
$USD for the originator branded drug in each country is used for each respective 
drug in each country.  
 
Prices for each country are presented as the median price and at the presentation 
level: drug molecule name; pack size and strength. Price information covers 18 
therapeutic areas and 48 drugs: antacids (2); antibiotics (6); antifungal (3); 
antihistamine (1); anti-infective (1); anti-inflammatory (2); anti-parasitic (2); 
antiviral (4); asthma (2); cardiovascular disease (14); contraceptive (1); diabetes 
(3); and nervous system disorders (7). This data set includes for the first time 
price information at a detailed level for many developing countries using the same 
survey methodology in each country setting. Data from the WHO/HAI database 
was extracted for all branded drugs across all countries where available. 
 
For estimation purposes, data on marginal costs were required. Two adjustments 
were made for this analysis. First, marginal costs of the branded drug were 
unavailable. The closest proxy available was the price of the generic drug in the 
market. The use of generic information as a proxy for marginal cost implies that 
all branded drugs studied were off patent. 
 
The second adjustment was for a small number of drugs only when generic data 
were unavailable. In this instance, average international procurement prices were 
                                                 
14
 China data were collected for two provinces: Shandong; and Shanghai and these observations 
were calculated separately but prices were not too dissimilar. Data for South Africa were collected 
for the province of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. 
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used as a proxy for marginal cost.  This information was supplied from 
Management Science for Health (MSH). MSH maintains a database of 
international procurement prices offered by international suppliers to developing 
countries. This dataset is a standard source of international procurement prices 
and is considered a gold standard (Russo et al. 2010). In the WHO/HAI survey, 
the MSH price data are used as a benchmark. Countries are considered efficient if 
their procurement prices are close to the MSH price data. A summary of the data 
used are shown below. 
 
Table 4.3 - Price data sources 
Source Sample Year Variables 
    WHO 16 countries 2003 Procurement prices at presentation level 
and pack size 
MSH 16 countries 2003 International reference procurement price 
at presentation level and pack size 
    
Source: WHO/HAI (2006) 
 
Table 4.4 - Income and expenditure data sources 
Source Sample Year Variables 
    World Bank 16 countries 2003 GDP per capita, GNI per capita
15
, 
total health expenditure as a % of 
GDP, per capita total health 
expenditure, per capita government 
health expenditure 
    
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2005) 
 
 
4.4.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
                                                 
15
 GNI per capita measures the sum of all income earned within a country. 
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The aim of this section is to better understand the demand structures at the 
government level in low and middle-income settings and draws on the previous 
theoretical and empirical discussion. The empirical approach is to calculate price 
elasticities to better understand this pattern of demand. Since the WHO/HAI 
dataset only contained information on prices and not on volume, the empirical 
method used the Ramsey pricing rule to impute price elasticities which only 
requires price information. A number of assumptions on firm behaviour are made 
in order to compute the elasticities. Therefore an important caveat is that we 
assume that these conditions must hold for the firm which may not take place in 
practice. Therefore, it is important to note that  the empirical work presented is an 
exploratory exercise to impute price elasticities as the type of data available for 
more detailed analysis were unavailable.  
 
The lack of volume information resulted in taking an uncommon approach from 
the literature. The analysis adopted the formulation of Ramsey pricing given as  
 
jj
jj
P
MCP


 1
 (4-4) 
 
where the procurement pack price of the branded medicine is Pj for medicine j. A 
true estimate of the marginal cost (MCj) of producing a given drug is not 
available. For this reason, the pack price of the generic medicine was used as an 
estimate of the marginal cost of producing the drug.
16
 
 
The model assumes that firms are profit maximisers, they have fixed costs, firms 
break even, and MCs are not zero. This model further assumes that cross-price 
elasticities are zero, and that there are no perfect complements. This analysis 
assumes that for branded products, there remains a monopoly element, that price 
is related to demand and that firms take cognisance of price-cost mark-ups.  
                                                 
16
 Note: Pack sizes for some medicines varied across countries. The marginal cost of the medicines 
was proxied using the generic pack price, which varied across countries.  The survey methodology 
of WHO/HAI collected pack prices of medicines because they were identified to be the most 
common unit of consumption.  
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The left hand side of the equation will estimate the differences between price and 
marginal cost as a fraction of price. According to the Ramsey pricing rule, the left 
hand side of the equation should be inversely related to the demand elasticity. 
Rearranging this formula, the elasticities computed in this chapter are calculated 
as follows. Prices were not aggregated and kept at the presentation level to 
provide as close an estimate of the price elasticity. Therefore this measure 
provides a lower bound of price elasticity due to the assumptions outlined above. 
MCP
P
j
j
j

  (4-5) 
 
This analysis requires a number of assumptions of firm behaviour to compute 
price elasticities and these may not be borne out in practice. While these 
conditions are required to hold for the estimation of price elasticities, it is 
important to note that the analysis is an exploratory exercise. As a result, a 
number of sensitivity tests are carried out to test to validity of the results and are 
presented later in this chapter.  
 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The WHO/HAI survey attempted to collect price information on the same drug in 
each country, but this was not possible because in many cases the same drug was 
not available. A total of 139 observations were available for analysis.
17
 In the data 
sample, the highest number of countries with the same drug was 7 for 
carbamazepine (treatment of epilepsy), 6 for ceftriaxone (antibiotic) and 
salbutamol (treatment of asthma). 
 
                                                 
17
 Note: Data from China was sampled in two regions and the corresponding elasticities were 
calculated separately. 
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Prices of medicines show significant variation by therapeutic class of drugs and 
even within therapeutic classes across countries. Even when data were normalised 
to price per pill, there still appeared to be variation across medicines even though 
in some cases variation was reduced. According to pack size, the top prices of 
branded drugs ranged from US$325 (fluconazole an antifungal drug in Tunisia, 
zidovudine and nevirapine are antiviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS in Lebanon) 
to less than a US$ 1.00. Most medicines were priced less than $US 50.00 with 
Jordan and Kazakhstan having the lowest prices. Antiviral drugs had the highest 
prices per pack while most antibiotics (except for ciproflaxin) were the least 
expensive for both branded and generics.  
 
The top prices of generics per pack ranged from US$ 62 (indinavir, zidovudine, 
nevirapine are antiviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS in Morocco, Malaysia and 
Lebanon) to less than US$ 1.00. Most medicines were priced less than US$ 10.00 
with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan having the lowest prices.   
 
According to prices per pill, the top branded prices per pill (fluconazole, 
ciproflaxin, fluoxetine an antidepressant in Tunisia, Morocco, Philippines) ranged 
from US$ 90 with most less than US$30 with Jordan, Peru and Pakistan with the 
lowest prices. The top generic prices per pill (ciproflaxin, fluoxetine, captopril an 
antihyperintensive in Morocco and Shanghai) ranged from US$ 25 with most less 
than US$10.00. There were also variations within a country. For example, 
Morocco also had one of the lowest generic prices for pill for an anxiolytic drug 
along with Jordan and the Philippines. 
 
The figures below show the standard error in prices by pill and pack size. Both 
figures show wide variations for certain antifungal and antibiotics drugs. There 
are also wide variations for antiparasitic drugs according to price per pill and for 
antiviral drugs by pack size. 
 
For example according to pack size, the standard error for most (14 out of 25) was 
less than five. Seven drug categories had standard errors from 30 to 160, and four 
drug categories had standard errors less than fifteen. (See Appendix B for a 
summary).This issue would need to be further explored by examining the system 
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of pharmaceutical regulation in each country to better understand price 
differences, but is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 - Standard error in prices per pill 
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Figure 4.4 - Standard error by pack size 
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Mark ups vary across the countries ranging from 50% to 100% with Peru (50%), 
Jordan (60%)  having the lowest and South Africa, Philippines and Kyrgyzstan  
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having the highest (90% to 100%) as shown in the figure below. Most countries 
have average mark-ups ranging between 70% and 80%. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 - Average mark-ups across countries 
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Note: Peru is based on only one observation 
 
 
 The top therapeutic categories with the most number of observations were 17 for 
antihypertensives and antibiotics and 15 for epileptic drugs as shown in table and 
figure below. Details of the data are found in Appendix B.  
 
Table 4.5 - Summary of drug data 
Therapeutic Category Drug Name Observations Dose 
    
Antacid Omeprazole 4 20 mg 
 Ranitidine 4 150 mg 
Antibiotic Ceftriaxone 7 1 g 
 Ciprofloxacin 5 500 mg 
 Co-trimoxazole 2 8+40 mg/ml 
 Amoxicillin  1 250 mg 
 Benzathine benzylpenicillin 1 1.2 MIU vial 
 Streptomycin 1 1 g vial 
Antifungal Fluconazole 3 200 mg 
 Fluconazole 2 150 mg 
 Itraconazole 1 100 mg 
Antihistamine Loratadine 3 10 mg 
Antinfective Pyrazinamide 2 500mg 
Anti-inflammatory Diclofenac 5 25mg 
 Paracetamol 1 500mg 
Antiparasitic Mebendazole  2 100 mg 
 Metronidazole  2 500 mg 
Antiviral Aciclovir 5 200 mg 
 Indinavir 3 400 mg 
 Zidovudine 3 100 mg 
 Nevirapine 2 200 mg 
Asthma Salbutamol 7 0.1 mg 
 Beclometasone 4 50 mcg 
Cardiovascular - Calcium channel 
blocker Amlodipine 2 
5 mg 
 Diltiazem 1 60 mg 
Cardiovascular - Cardio therapy Digoxin 1 0.25 mg  
 Isosorbide dinitrate 1 10 mg 
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Cardiovascular - Diuretic Furosemide 2 40 mg 
Cardiovascular - 
Antihypertensives  Captopril 5 
25 mg 
 Losartan 4 50 mg 
 Atenolol  2 50 mg 
 Nifedipine Retard 2 20 mg 
 Enalapril 1 20 mg 
 Lisinopril 1 10 mg 
 Methyldopa 1 250 mg 
 Prazosin 1 1 mg 
Cardiovascular - Lipid lowering  Simvastatin 3 20 mg 
Contraceptive Medroxyprogesterone 1 150 mg 
Diabetes Metformin 6 500 mg 
 Glibenclamide 1 5 mg 
 Insulin neutral 1 100ml 
Nervous system - Antipsychotic Fluphenazine 3 25 mg 
Nervous system - Anxiolytic Diazepam 4 5 mg 
Nervous system - Antidepressant Fluoxetine 6 20 mg 
 Amitriptyline 5 25 mg 
Nervous system - Epileptic Carbamazepine 8 200 mg 
 Phenytoin  5 100 mg 
 Valproic Acid 2 200 mg 
 TOTAL 139  
    
Figure 4.6- Frequency table of observations by therapeutic category 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Contraceptive
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Cardiovascular - Cardio therapy
Cardiovascular - Diuretic
Antihistamine
Cardiovascular - Calcium channel blocker
Cardiovascular - Lipid lowering 
Nervous system - Antipsychotic
Antiparasitic
Nervous system - Anxiolytic
Antifungal
Anti-inflammatory
Antacid
Diabetes
Asthma
Nervous system - Antidepressant
Antiviral
Nervous system - Epileptic
Antibiotic
Cardiovascular - Antihypertensives 
Observation Count
 
4.5.2 PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
 
Due to data constraints, price elasticities were imputed without recourse to 
volume information. Only price information at the presentation level for the 16 
countries in the sample was available. Therefore price elasticities were computed 
using the Ramsey rule as shown in equation (4-5). The computation of price 
elasticities contributes to a currently limited evidence base on empirical estimates 
for many of these countries. The sample of countries represents a broad group 
which was used for analysis. A sample of the calculations for the drug metformin 
used in the treatment of diabetes is presented in the table below. Full results are 
found in later in Appendix B. 
 
Table 4.6 - Price estimates for Metformin (500mg) 
Country Procurement 
brand pack price 
Procurement generic 
pack price 
Price elasticity 
    Nigeria 7.1 1.4 -1.2 
Pakistan 1.7 0.7 -1.6 
Shanghai 
(China) 15.3 2.8 -1.2 
Philippines 11.0 1.8 -1.2 
    Note: Pack size (100 tablets) 
 
 
Price elasticities have similar ranges both according to countries and across 
molecules. Estimates of the price elasticities for different therapeutic products and 
countries range from between -1 to -2. These measures of elasticity suggest that if 
the procurement price of the drug increases by 10%, demand for the drug could 
drop by 10% to 20%. This implies that developing countries are fairly responsive 
to changes in the price of medicines and if these estimates represent a good first 
approximation, as expected, certainly more so than high-income countries (Dzator 
and Asafu-Adjaye 2004; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2007).  
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The figure below (Figure 4.7) shows that across countries estimates are within the 
range without significant outliers. Similarly, the second figure (Figure 4.8) shows 
that across drugs, estimate are also fairly consistent. The outliers appeared random 
which suggests that there does not appear to be any systematic bias in the results, 
either by country or by drug. Details of these figures can be found in later in 
Appendix B. 
 
Out of a sample of 139 observations, 90 observations were kept for analysis and 
49 were dropped for two reasons. In the first case, observations where the branded 
price was below the generic price were not amenable to our method (19 
observations were dropped). The second case resulted in implausible estimates of 
price elasticities ranging between -3 and -27 (30 observations) where the branded 
and generic pack price were relatively similar in value. While this is not an 
insignificant reduction in the sample size, the pattern and range of elasticities 
were consistent across drugs and across countries. These data constraints are 
therefore further studied in the sensitivity analysis below. 
 
Figure 4.7 - Price elasticity by country 
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Figure 4.8 - Price elasticity by drug 
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Three approaches were taken to test the robustness of the results. First, the 
estimates were tested for robustness using sensitivity analysis. Generic prices 
were used as proxies, which were varied to see if the results would significantly 
change the results. Prices of generic drugs were increased and decreased by 5% 
and 10%. The results showed that estimates stayed within the range with very few 
changes in the country and drug specific results. 
 
Second, these estimates may be verified to some extent through comparison with 
the existing literature but the evidence on using procurement data is limited and 
employed different techniques. The analysis has studied the relationship between 
income and price (Schut et al. 1986, Scherer and Watal 2001; Rojas 2005), while 
this chapter‘s analysis assumes that the Ramsey formula holds. As a result 
estimates are not directly comparable but they have a similar implication which 
suggests that demand is elastic in developing country settings.  
 
Finally, data from developed countries were cross checked with these estimates to 
ascertain whether similar estimates would be found in developed settings where 
results are calculated at the patient level and so are not directly comparable. The 
findings from this chapter are more elastic than the patient level estimates found 
from developed countries where the range is between -0.2 and -0.6 (presented in 
Chapter 2). The data were not easily comparable due to differences in collection 
of price data, but these results are at least consistent that low-income countries 
had more elastic price elasticities.  
 
Previous empirical work examined correlations between price of the branded drug 
and the country‘s GDP per capita, which is used as a proxy index of demand. 
Empirical work has found mixed results.  
 
Correlations were calculated between price and measures of income: GDP per 
capita, gross national income (GNI) per capita.
18
 The analysis also extended the 
calculations to test for correlations between price and expenditure to assess 
                                                 
18
 GDP per capita measures the total value of goods and services created domestically or abroad 
for a country. GNI per capita measures the sum of all income earned within a country. 
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whether prices had some relationship with the level of health expenditure in the 
country. Three measures were used: per capita government health expenditure 
(PHE); total health expenditure as a % of GDP (HE); and per capital total health 
expenditure (HE). These results are presented below. 
 
Table 4.7 - Correlations between price and income, price and expenditure 
 
 GDP per 
capita 
GNI per 
capita 
PHE per 
capita 
HE % 
GDP 
HE per 
capita 
      Pack price -0.000 -0.011 0.066 0.120 0.215 
Price per 
pill 
0.007 -0.004 0.008 -0.022 0.050 
      
The results suggest almost no relationship with income measures (-0.01 to 0.007) 
and a weak relationship with expenditure measures (0.008 to 0.2). There was a 
small negative correlation between the price of the drug and the country‘s wealth.  
This result is not consistent with other findings where a positive association 
between a country‘s income and price was found (Schut et al. 1986; Scherer and 
Watal 2001). Expenditure measures between government health expenditure and 
the price of the drug suggest a small positive relationship. This implies that higher 
government expenditure on health is related to having higher priced drugs. These 
results have intuitive appeal and are consistent with literature findings (WHO 
2004). A study which examined the Global Fund data on pricing and procurement 
of retroviral drugs found that prices in lower middle-income countries prices were 
high compared with per capita income of the country. The study concluded that 
such price levels limit government purchasing power (Vasan, HoosII et al. 2006). 
Overall the results from this analysis are quite small to suggest strong 
relationships. 
 
4.5.3 LIMITATIONS 
 
There are limitations with the analysis which should be highlighted. The 
analytical approach assumes that firms follow the Ramsey pricing rule. This 
assumption was required because volume data were not available for direct 
computation of price elasticities. Volume information would have allowed for 
further analysis by drawing on a more robust data set. Furthermore, it was not 
possible to model the interaction between the government authority charged with 
procurement and firm behaviour. This would have empirically provided more 
insight into the role of Ramsey pricing in these settings. The mode assumed that 
firms are profit maximisers, they have fixed costs, firms break even and marginal 
costs are not zero. In practice firms may not exhibit all these characteristics. 
While the empirical work on Ramsey pricing in the literature is mixed and some 
suggest an absence of Ramsey pricing, this analysis assumes that this pricing rule 
holds which may not be borne out in practice and could not be tested in this 
exercise. 
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Second the results assume that the proxy for marginal cost: generic prices or 
international procurement prices are a reliable measure. Under the assumption of a 
monopoly market with Ramsey pricing, generics would not be present in the 
market as pure complements would not exist and products would still be on 
patent. Therefore, companies are likely to enjoy less market power which will 
limit their ability to apply Ramsey pricing. 
 
The approach to measuring price elasticity of demand draws on government 
procurement prices and while in most cases prices come from public authorities, a 
minority of cases come from government operated hospitals which procure 
directly with wholesalers to achieve a lower price. This limitation should not 
however, significantly change the results. Furthermore, elasticities were 
calculated using standardised pack sizes which may not necessarily be 
representative of pack sizes in each country.  
 
Furthermore, out 139 observations, 90 observations were kept for the analysis. 
The observations that were dropped were not amenable the method of calculation 
and so this limitation could affect the quality of data and the analytical method 
used.     
 
The empirical analysis is cross-sectional for the sample of countries and did not 
allow analysis over time. The extent to which the data are representative of each 
country would have to be verified with more detailed data for each country.  
 
This analysis could not pick up some of the more disaggregate features of the 
regulatory environment and could potentially mask important information within 
and across countries. Furthermore, non-governmental actors play an important 
role in procurement in these settings including international donor groups. These 
factors are not explicitly accounted for in the model and could confound the 
findings. For instance, international donor agencies may provide medicines free of 
charge which would have implications for the estimates and ranges of price 
elasticities imputed. The role of the regulatory environment n these settings would 
have to be supplemented with more qualitative information so clearer links could 
be made with the quantitative findings and the policy setting environment.  
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However this analytical approach ought to be viewed against the substantial data 
constraints faced in estimating demand curves for pharmaceutical products in 
developing countries because volume data are severely lacking. Even indirect 
methods of estimation could be useful because without which little can be said 
empirically concerning the welfare implications of price changes.  
 
While there are a number of caveats with this analysis, and the empirical approach 
adopted is not a technically sophisticated method, the analysis should be 
considered a first step and an exploratory exercise. This is because the data 
constraints allowed for only an indirect imputation of price elasticities and are 
therefore not a direct estimation of price elasticities. While the estimation method 
requires a number of assumptions, the sensitivity analysis does support the 
robustness of the results as the estimates were robust to sensitivity checks.  
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
The aim of this chapter was to better understand the pattern of prices of medicines 
across countries and country price responsiveness. The data set covers a large 
sample of countries and provides detailed information of elasticities at the 
presentation level. This empirical work aims to contribute to the evidence base 
because empirical findings at this detailed level are limited. 
 
The findings indicate that price elasticities at the government level range between 
–1 and –2 across all therapeutic classes studied. Sensitivity tests found that the 
results stayed within this range. While the technique required a number of 
assumptions of the Ramsey rule which may not be borne out in practice, these 
estimates are a first attempt at better understanding demand structures in these 
settings and are therefore the result of an exploratory exercise. While this 
specification in not a sufficient method to estimate price elasticities it is an 
adequate approach in light of the given data constraints. It would have been 
preferable to have data both on prices and volume which would have given a more 
accurate picture of demand in these settings. Due to a number of caveats with the 
data and the assumptions in the analysis, the estimated price elasticities are only 
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proxies as an indirect method was used in estimation because direct estimation 
was not possible and should therefore be viewed as suggestive.  
 
While the evidence cannot provide information on how governments negotiate 
with firms, simple descriptive analysis of the countries in the data sample showed 
that the countries vary with respect their procurement practices. Some are more 
efficient than others when compared to the average international procurement 
prices according to MSH data as shown in the table below.
19
 According to the 
WHO/HAI survey, even within countries, degrees of efficient procurement vary 
as shown between the regions of Shandong and Shanghai in China. Efficiency 
also varies depending on whether the drug was branded or generic. For example 
Kuwait is efficient only for generic drug procurement while Syria is less efficient 
for certain branded and generic drugs and the Philippines is relatively better at 
procuring branded drugs than generic drugs. For instance, countries such as 
Jordan have relatively lower markups and could be potential areas of future 
research. 
 
Table 4.8 - Procurement performance 
Efficient Not efficient 
  Shandong, Jordan, Kuwait
20
, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Peru, Syria
21
, 
Tunisia, Uganda 
Pakistan, Malaysia Shanghai, 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Philippines
22
 
  Note: Source WHO/HAI 2006 
 
This result underpins the importance of robust procurement strategies. Some 
previous empirical work suggests that regulation plays a role in affecting price 
levels (Schut et al. 1986, CBO 2004). There is anecdotal evidence in the case of 
AIDS/HIV drugs that countries are not in a position to purchase expensive 
                                                 
19
 Efficient according to the HAI study is where procurement prices are close to IRP or a ratio of 1. 
20
 Only for generics 
21
 Except for certain branded and generics 
22
 More inefficient for generics than for branded drugs 
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medicines and attempt to negotiate with firms for price reductions on branded 
drugs (Ford, Wilson et al. 2007).  
 
While government procurement is an important policy issue, government 
authorities are not the only ones involved in procuring medicines (Seiter 2010). 
Another important and related issue is the role of non-government actors in 
procuring medicines in these settings. In low and middle-income settings there is 
a complex relationship between the government and a variety of actors because in 
addition to the central medical store, a considerable amount of procurement 
activity is led directly by public providers as well as by actors in the private sector 
along with donor organisations. The findings from the exploratory exercise cannot 
properly account for the non-governmental actors in these settings because in 
some settings government procurement could play a small role in medicine 
access.  
 
For instance, it was noted in the country survey report that in Kazakhstan, 
hospitals are keen to achieve greater price discounts and so negotiate directly with 
suppliers and therefore this information was available for data collection (Drug 
Information Centre Kazakhstan 2005). The analysis cannot account for this 
complex relationship. For a minority of the countries studied, procurement prices 
were taken both from the central medical store and public hospitals. Therefore in 
some cases, the imputed elasticities are capturing the role of more than one 
procurement body. 
 
The evidence raises an important question on what are the main drivers of these 
estimates.  Income is weakly correlated which suggests that other factors are 
important because these results cannot directly suggest the extent to which access 
problems occur at the patient level. The empirical work in this thesis aims to 
address this issue and analyses determinants of access to medicines and health 
care at the patient level in chapters 5, 7 and 8. 
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5 Chapter 5 Analysis of determinants of patient access to 
medicines across countries 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The empirical work explores downstream prices at the patient level to better 
understand determinants of access to medicines. This chapter aims to address the 
following research questions as shown below. 
 
Table 5.1 - Chapter 5 Research objective and research questions 
Chapter 5 Research Objective 
Determine the factors which affect access 
to medicines and health care in primary 
and secondary care in selected low and 
middle-income countries 
Research questions  
4) Does income affect access? 
5) Does regulation affect access 
to medicines? 
6) What is the price elasticity? 
 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted that the financial cost of a health visit can undermine access 
to care, particularly in developing country settings where insurance schemes are 
not well established in the health system. High medicine costs may undermine the 
decision to seek care. Furthermore the literature showed that there are equity 
implications for patients that cannot afford the cost of the care. This in turn 
creates a welfare trade off, particularly in developing country settings where the 
raising the price of health services is a means to generate revenue for the cash 
strapped health care sector. A revenue generating mechanism will undoubtedly 
lead to welfare loss for patients who cannot afford the cost of care and the extent 
of the welfare loss is a function of the price elasticity. 
 
It is important to note that data constraints in these settings make it impractical to 
calculate price elasticities directly since these require information on both prices 
and volume. For this reason, studies on the demand for health care in developing 
country settings have used patient health expenditure data for the computation of 
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price elasticities. This method permits a less direct method of demand estimation 
but does give a useful picture of demand structure in these settings. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the evidence base by drawing on larger 
data sets for analysis and using robust methods because current evidence is 
limited. The data used in this chapter draw on patient level expenditure for the 
imputation of price elasticities as only this information was available for analysis. 
Patient health expenditure data is used to estimate price elasticities which contain 
medicine expenditure data. As medicine expenditure data account for the largest 
share of health expenditure in the data set, the price elasticity estimates have 
implications for patient access to medicines and health seeking behaviour. These 
issues are explored in this chapter using a cross section of household data from 
developing countries.  
 
The findings indicate that certain variables affect the decision to seek care and 
these include, gender, marital status, health status, insurance, urban settings, 
education, employment, and households with large monthly expenditures. The 
results suggest that demand is inelastic for hospitals and clinics and patients are 
not very price sensitive. Those more likely to choose a hospital go for reasons 
related to child birth, asthma, heart disease, bodily injury, minor surgery or other 
reason not specified. These responses seem intuitive and seem to capture the main 
types of services that hospitals provide to treat serious health problems. Those 
visiting a clinic are more likely to go for antenatal or dental care reasons. Price 
elasticities range from –0.19 to 0.6, but only an estimate of 0.11 was significant 
(5% level). While this range includes counterintuitive estimates as well, the 
empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters builds on this analysis to improve 
estimation techniques. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 presents a discussion on the 
theoretical approaches used to examine health care utilisation. Section 5.3 
presents the data sources used and methodology. Results from the descriptive and 
econometric analysis are presented in 5.4. Finally section 5.5 presents a discussion 
and conclusion. 
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5.2 THEORETICAL MODELS 
5.2.1 CHOICE MODELS 
 
A number of modelling approaches have been explored in the health economics 
literature to model health care use. As the literature review showed in Chapter 3, 
discrete choice models are typically applied to model the decision to seek care and 
to understand the determinants of health care demand. 
 
A logit model is typically employed where there are two qualitative outcomes. In 
the case where the outcome involves more than two answers, a multinomial 
logistical regression is employed. The outcomes are coded, for example, 1, 2, 3, 
but the numerical values are arbitrary. An important property of the multinomial 
logit model is that the dependent variable is an unordered categorical variable, 
unlike in an ordered limited dependent model. A multinomial logit model is 
applied to the data used in this chapter. 
 
A random utility model can be applied to an unordered choice model where the ith 
consumer faced with J choices has a utility of choice j such that (Greene, 2008)  
 
ijijij zU   '   (5-1) 
 
Greene (2008) shows that if the consumer makes choice j then the model assumes 
that the ijU  is the maximum among the J utilities. The statistical model is driven 
by the probability that choice j is made which is denoted as  
 
)(Pr ikij UUob  for all other k j  (5-2) 
 
The model depends on the distribution of the disturbances. The probit model has 
had less application because of the need to evaluate multiple integrals of the 
normal distribution. The logit model has become commonly used in a variety of 
research disciplines. McFadden (1974) has shown that if the J disturbances are 
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independent and identically distributed with Gumbel (type 1 extreme value) 
distribution then 
 
))exp(exp()( ijijF     (5-3) 
 
Let iY be a random variable that indicates the choice made then 
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Greene (2008) shows that ijz includes aspects specific to the individual and to the 
choice made. These should be distinguished for analysis where ],[ iijij wxz   and 
similarly  is split as follows ]','[  . This partitioning allows for ijx to refer to the 
attributes which vary across the choices and the individuals whereas iw refers to 
the characteristics of the individual and is the same for all choices. 
 
With this information the model becomes 
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For estimation purposes, it is useful to examine the two types of data separately 
(Greene 2008). For choice models where the data are individual specific the 
model is set out as a multinomial logit model 
jYob i (Pr
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w
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
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 (5-6) 
 
A normalisation is required because the probabilities sum to one so this implies 
that J parameter vectors are needed to determine J = 1 probabilities. In this case, 
00  . The equation can be rewritten as 
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For example, if the choice model had three possible outcomes the coefficients 
would be estimated as follows: )3()2()1( ,,   where y=1 is set as the base 
outcome and )1( is set to 0.  
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The computed coefficients, 
)3()2( ,  measure the change relative to y=1. Any of 
the three outcomes could be set to one. The difference is that the coefficients will 
have different interpretations but the predicted probabilities for y=1, 2, 3 will be 
the same.  
 
In the multinomial logit model, there are two important assumptions. The first is 
that the error terms are independent and identically distributed (IID). The second 
is the ratio
ik
ij
P
P
is independent of other choices, this assumption is known as the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and follows from the error terms 
being IID.  
 
These two properties have important implications for the discrete choice analysis 
of the decision to seek care. The IIA assumption assumes that the choices made 
are independent of one another. This property therefore assumes that the decision 
to see a GP is independent of the decision to see a specialist. This assumption then 
follows from the error terms being independent which follow a normal 
distribution (IID). This assumption of independence between choices may not 
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hold in the decision to seek care. Therefore the violations of these properties 
should be tested for their violation. To address this problem, the nested model is 
one solution. These issues are further analysed and empirically tested in later in 
this chapter.  
 
For estimation purposes the log-likelihood is derived for each individual where 
1ijd  if alternative j is chosen by individual i and 0 if not for the J + 1 possible 
outcomes. 
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The coefficients cannot be easily interpreted so by differentiating equation (5-8) 
the marginal effects on the probabilities are 
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This equation indicates that  enters every marginal effect through the 
probabilities and through the weighted average. Greene (2008) notes that for any 
particular ikijik wPw  /, does not necessarily have the same sign as jk  
 
These models aim to capture the probability of seeking care while controlling for 
health, socio demographic and income information. Jones et al (2007) succinctly 
identify the common regressor variables used in examining health care utilisation 
in the literature. 
 
 Table 5.2 - Health utilisation variables 
Category Variables employed 
  need/morbidity 
variables 
 self-assessed status, indicators of chronic conditions and 
limited activity, days of sickness/restricted activity and 
ideally objective health measures 
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Age accounting for imperfect health status measurement but 
also individual preferences 
Sex accounting for gender-specific health care requirements 
and tastes 
ability to pay and 
other socio-
demographic factors 
income, wealth, marital status, education level attained, 
labour market status and job characteristics 
prices price of health care and characteristics of insurance 
coverage 
proxies for access time costs and accessibility 
  
 
The data available for analysis is presented in the following section.  
 
5.3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
5.3.1 DATA SOURCES 
 
The data used for this section draws on a cross sectional household survey from 
the WHO World Health Survey Data 2003. The World Health Survey is a 
household survey that was carried out in developed and developing countries in 
2003.
23
 The survey carried out a systematic approach to surveying households in 
developing countries. This survey collected information on socio demographic 
characteristics, health state descriptions, health state valuations, risk factors, 
mortality, health care utilisation, health system responsiveness and health goals 
and social capital. This dataset provides a useful cross section of household 
information relating to the use of health services in 38 low-income and lower 
                                                 
23
 With the exception of China carried out 2002, Pakistan carried out in 2003/2004, and Kenya 
carried out in 2004. 
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middle-income countries as defined by the World Bank measure of GNI per 
capita.
24
 
 
The WHO World Health Survey collected information on medicine costs. This 
information is important for analysis because current empirical work is limited. 
Furthermore, this survey provides a large data set for analysis, unlike many 
existing small sample studies, and draws on a sufficient number of developing 
countries to carry out cross sectional analysis. The WHO survey is a relatively 
recent cross-country survey, which provides a reasonably new dataset for analysis 
of developing countries.  
 
The sample selection included 35 countries. Patients were asked about their 
decision to seek care if they felt ill within the past year. Patient responses fell into 
one of four categories: not sick, sick patients seeking care in hospital, seeking care 
in a clinic or sick patients choosing to do nothing. Adult visits to a health facility 
within the past year were used for analysis because this dataset was more 
complete than the data set for children. 
 
The following data were used in this survey and aimed to capture relevant health 
information concerning patient‘s health status, socio demographic information 
relating to accessing health services as noted in Jones et al. (2007). 
 
The age, sex and marital status of the patient were used in the analysis. Two 
variables about the patient‘s health were drawn from self reported health and 
whether the patient was diagnosed with any of the following chronic conditions: 
arthritis, angina, asthma, depression, schizophrenia or psychosis, diabetes, 
tuberculosis.  
 
Socioeconomic information was collected from a series of variables and included 
whether the patient had education, was employed, whether the patient lived in a 
rural or urban setting, whether the patient had private health insurance and the 
                                                 
24
 Low income countries were defined as having GNI per capita of US $765 and lower middle 
income were defined as GNI per capita US$766 to $3035 in 2003 according to the World Bank. 
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number of members living in the household. An indicator for wealth or income 
was drawn from the households‘ expenditure as no direct income information was 
collected. Data on the previous month‘s household expenditure was collected and 
included food expenditure, utilities, education, health expenditure, health 
insurance premium expenditure and other related household expenditure. 
 
Monthly household health expenditure included hospital expenditure, health 
professionals, traditional healers, dentist, medicine, health products, diagnostics 
and other related health expenditure. Household expenditure data contained some 
observations with extremely large values of expenditure that exceeded even 
average per capita monthly expenditures when compared with World Bank 
development indicator data. The common approach in the literature is to 
standardise expenditure data (Jones et al. 2007). The data were converted into 
US$PPP and then transformed into logs. To smooth out any kinks in the data, two 
times plus or minus standard deviation from the log normal of household 
expenditure and log normal of health expenditure per visit was included for 
analysis. This process dropped extreme values, 6,572 observations (5.2% of the 
sample) of household expenditure data and 8,140 observations (6.4% of the 
sample) of health expenditure per visit data from the analysis. 
 
Patients reported on their OOP costs related to the visit and included doctor‘s fees, 
medicine costs, diagnostic tests, transportation costs and other related expenditure. 
OOP were transformed into logs to account for non linearities in the data in two 
settings: clinic and hospital. Data on whether the patient was treated in a public or 
private setting was incomplete and was excluded from the analysis. In the survey, 
patients could indicate whether they were treated at home. While it would have 
been desirable to include this choice in the model, there were missing data on 
health expenditures so this response was excluded from analysis. 
 
One approach in the literature to address the endogeneity between price and the 
decision to seek care is to impute prices across all alternative choices but this 
method is subject to the limitation of reducing the variance in the price variable 
and thereby underestimating the price elasticity. To avoid this potential problem, 
the method used in this thesis estimates the predicted health expenditure for clinic 
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and hospitals as a regressor (Asfaw et al. 2004). The predicted health expenditure 
per visit was averaged over rural and urban settings within each country. The 
predicted health expenditure was calculated regressing the log expenditure in a 
clinic or hospital against age, sex, employed, education, urban or rural setting, log 
household expenditure and the reason for the visit.  
 
The reason for the visit included the following categories: high fever, severe 
diarrhoea or cough, immunisation, antenatal consultation, family planning, 
childbirth, dental care, arthritis, asthma, heart disease, bodily injury, minor 
surgery or other. 
 
5.3.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
Limited dependent models were used to estimate the likelihood of visiting a 
provider. In the WHO World Health Survey, patients were asked the following 
question:  
 
Question Q7016: When you last needed care where did you get care?  
Four responses were considered, whether the patient visited a hospital, visited a 
clinic, chose to do nothing, or was not sick. Each of the outcomes took the 
following values: hospital =1, clinic=2, do nothing =3 and not sick = 4. 
 
As a result of multiple responses, a multinomial logit model was used to 
determine the likelihood of visiting a provider. 
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)4(Pr iYob where the individual was not sick was set as the base outcome. The 
following regression model was run for the ith individual across j alternatives 
where j= 1, 2, 3, 4 in country p. The variables that were chosen were based on 
health economic theory, findings from the literature and variables available in the 
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dataset. The regressors were chosen to capture information on the patient‘s health 
status, utilisation, and socioeconomic information.  
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The Grossman model modifies what might be predicted from epidemiology theory 
alone: we would expect to find that health utilisation increases with age (Omran 
1971). There may be non- linearities with age so this term is also squared and 
included in the regression. Health status variables should suggest that those with 
good self reported health are less likely to seek care while those with chronic 
conditions are more likely to seek care.  
 
The effect of education and being employed should have a positive effect on the 
probability of seeking care according to health economic theory. Furthermore, 
those who are more educated and employed are likely to be able to afford the 
OOP cost associated with care. The insurance variable is treated as exogenous 
given the characteristics of the health care market as discussed in Chapter 2 and 
we would expect insurance to have a positive effect on seeking care. The evidence 
suggests that high OOP expenditures have a negative effect on the probability to 
seek care while household expenditures (e.g. a measure of household wealth) have 
a positive effect on the probability to seek care. 
 
Women should be more likely seek care due to their health needs in particular 
relating to child health and child delivery, however the literature points to mixed 
evidence suggesting that men are more likely to seek care. Similarly, the effect of 
marital status is ambiguous on the probability of seeking care. Household size is 
ambiguous and may be a proxy for capturing wealth of a household. Larger 
households may have lower wealth and are more likely to seek care. Alternatively, 
smaller households could reflect greater wealth and suggest that the wealthy are 
more likely to seek care because they can afford it. The effect of the urban dummy 
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variable is ambiguous as well. Patients living in urban settings may be more likely 
to seek care because there are likely to be more facilities available in urban 
settings. Alternatively, rural patients may be more likely to seek care if this 
variable is also a proxy for need: poor rural patients may struggle with health 
conditions and could be more likely to seek care.  
 
The country dummies aim to account for the heterogeneity and in part reflect the 
regulatory environment so the direction of the sign of these dummies a priori is 
ambiguous. The model requires one country dummy to be its reference base 
which is assigned arbitrarily. Dummies that capture the reason for visit were also 
included and the direction of the sign of these dummies a priori is ambiguous. 
Estimations were run with and without sampling weights but the results were 
consistent. Estimates without sampling weights are presented in this chapter. 
 
Table 5.3 - Expected signs of regressors 
Variable Expected Sign 
  Age + 
Sex +/- 
Good SRH - 
Chronic health + 
Education + 
Employed + 
Marital status +/- 
Insurance + 
Urban +/- 
Household expenditure + 
Predicted expenditure - 
Country dummy +/- 
Reason for visit +/- 
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5.4 RESULTS 
5.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The data set contained a cross section survey of 38 developing countries with 126, 
806 observations. Approximately 20% of the sample reported being ill within the 
past year of the survey. For purposes of analysis, missing data were removed 
along with extreme values, which resulted in 35 countries containing observations 
for analysis.
25
 The cross-sectional dataset contained a total of 42,668 observations 
for analysis. The regressions were run using STATA software. The countries used 
for analysis are presented below. 
 
Table 5.4 - Country sample 
 Country Observations Percent of 
sample % 
    1 Bangladesh 2,215 5.19 
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 414 0.97 
3 Burkina Faso 1,286 3.01 
4 Chad 471 1.1 
5 China 998 2.34 
6 Comoros 193 0.45 
7 Congo 261 0.61 
8 Cote d'Ivoire 695 1.63 
9 Dominican Republic 1,546 3.62 
10 Ecuador 751 1.76 
11 Ethiopia 625 1.46 
12 Georgia 686 1.61 
13 Ghana 1,037 2.43 
14 Guatemala 1,800 4.22 
15 India 2,908 6.82 
16 Kazakhstan 2,073 4.86 
17 Kenya 461 1.08 
                                                 
25
 Latvia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe were removed 
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18 Lao  438 1.03 
19 Malawi 1,847 4.33 
20 Mali 381 0.89 
21 Mauritania 448 1.05 
22 Morocco 1,225 2.87 
23 Myanmar 1,848 4.33 
24 Namibia 772 1.81 
25 Nepal 3,266 7.65 
26 Pakistan 2,223 5.21 
27 Paraguay 2,690 6.3 
28 Philippines 1,974 4.63 
29 Russia 464 1.09 
30 Senegal 342 0.8 
31 Sri Lanka 1,882 4.41 
32 Tunisia 1,688 3.96 
33 Ukraine 771 1.81 
34 Vietnam 831 1.95 
35 Zambia 1,158 2.71 
 TOTAL 42,668 100 
    
 
The table below summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
Table 5.5 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  Mean 
   Age Age of adult patient 41.9 
Sex 1 if patient is female and 0 otherwise 0.53 
Marital status 1 if married or cohabitating and 0 otherwise 0.64 
Self reported 
health 
1 if self reported health is good or very good and 0 
otherwise 
0.56 
Chronic 
condition 
1 if chronic condition present and 0 otherwise 0.35 
Education 1 if patient has primary education or a higher and 0 
otherwise 
0.53 
Employed 1 if patient is working and 0 otherwise 0.60 
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Urban setting 1 if patient lives in an urban or semi urban setting 
and 0 otherwise 
0.41 
 
Health 
insurance 
1 if patient has health insurance and 0 otherwise 0.18 
Household 
size 
Number of members living in the household 4.77 
Household 
expenditure 
Previous month‘s household expenditure (US$PPP) 366.88 
Predicted 
OOP 
expenditure 
Predicted OOP expenditure (US$PPP) 6.17 
   
 
The cross sectional sample has an average adult age of 42 years, and is fairly 
evenly split between men and women and whether the individual has at least 
primary education or not. Close to two thirds of the sample are married and 
employed, one third have a chronic condition, 40% live in urban settings and less 
than 20% have private health insurance. Among those who reported being ill 
within the past year of the survey, the majority (93%) of these sought care, with 
most seeking outpatient care (86%), while a smaller percentage visited a hospital 
(6%) and 8% did nothing.  
 
Medicine expenditure accounted the largest share of OOP expenditure with an 
average of 57%  or by setting: 57% in clinic setting and 51% in hospital setting. 
Average expenditure in a clinic was higher than in inpatient settings as most 
patients sought outpatient care with an average expenditure of US$PPP 5.40 in 
clinic and US$PPP 0.41 in hospital. OOP expenditure by country ranged from 
US$PPP 12 in China to US$PPP 0.24 in Mali with most countries spending on 
average US$PPP 6 as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 5.1 - Average OOP US$PPP 
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5.4.2 MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
 
The coefficients of the multinomial logit regression are presented below. Each of 
the columns presents the coefficients for patients who reported being ill relative to 
not being sick which is the base outcome. While the actual coefficients are 
difficult interpret, the sign of the coefficient indicates its effect (positive or 
negative) on seeking care in a hospital, a clinic or choosing to do nothing when 
sick. Full results of all regressions are shown in Appendix C. 
 
Table 5.6 - Multinomial regression results 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -
0.0296*** -0.0213*** -0.0304*** 
Age
2 
0.000171* 0.000111*** 0.000202** 
Sex 0.281*** 0.392*** 0.194*** 
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Marital status 0.349*** 0.321*** 0.157*** 
Self reported 
health -0.633*** -0.461*** -0.670*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.596*** 0.453*** 0.159*** 
Education -0.101 0.0819*** -0.198*** 
Employed -0.120* 0.0112 -0.00659 
Urban setting 0.189*** 0.153*** -0.204*** 
Health insurance 0.658*** 0.401*** -0.222* 
Household size -0.0179 -0.0132*** 0.000331 
Log house 
expenditure 0.0423 0.106*** -0.0630* 
Log predicted 
expenditure 0.0633 0.371*** 1.306*** 
Immunisation -0.310 -0.261 -2.239*** 
Antenatal 0.268 0.441*** -1.538*** 
Family planning 0.342 0.153 -0.862** 
Childbirth 1.420*** -1.945*** -1.721*** 
Dental care -0.965*** 0.680*** -0.0805 
Arthritis 0.246 0.130** 0.413*** 
Asthma 1.173*** 0.219** 0.00351 
Heart disease 0.946*** 0.0707 -0.364** 
Bodily injury 0.855*** -0.172*** -0.761*** 
Minor surgery 0.902*** -1.302*** -1.724*** 
Other reason 0.370*** 0.0680** -0.171*** 
Bangladesh 1.243*** 2.509*** 1.324*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.168 0.522*** -2.479** 
China -0.162 -0.0887 -2.184*** 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.749*** 0.636*** -0.382 
Congo 1.742*** 0.562*** 0.272 
Comoros 1.182** -0.183 -1.495*** 
Dominican 1.284*** 1.057*** -1.233*** 
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Republic 
Ecuador 0.263 0.0136 -1.890*** 
Ethiopia -0.556 0.679*** 1.335*** 
Georgia -1.256*** -1.278*** -1.534*** 
Ghana 1.069*** 0.839*** 0.703** 
Guatemala 0.195 0.621*** -2.924*** 
India 0.482 0.937*** -1.662*** 
Kazakhstan 0.257 0.407*** -0.611 
Kenya -0.273 -0.255* 1.396*** 
Laos 1.240*** -0.726*** -1.168*** 
Sri Lanka 2.279*** 1.465*** -1.727*** 
Morocco 0.267 0.258** 1.803*** 
Mali -1.128* 0.0111 -1.156** 
Myanmar 0.0493 0.722*** 0.0611 
Mauritania 0.272 0.620*** -0.382 
Malawi 1.323*** 1.489*** 1.798*** 
Namibia 1.825*** 0.973*** -0.974*** 
Nepal -0.295 0.590*** 1.128*** 
Pakistan 0.795** 1.464*** -1.099*** 
Philippines 0.225 -0.456*** -1.010*** 
Paraguay 0.0288 1.193*** 2.466*** 
Russia 1.064*** 0.265* 0.995** 
Senegal 1.070*** 0.458*** -0.0398 
Chad 0.0255 -0.127 0.512** 
Tunisia -0.956** -0.0155 -2.056*** 
Ukraine 0.620** -0.285** -0.720** 
Vietnam 0.918*** 0.339*** -1.554*** 
Zambia 1.906*** 1.313*** 0.822*** 
Constant -3.082*** -0.860*** -1.160*** 
    
N 42,668   
Pseudo R
2
 0.1155   
Chi-sq. 9499.3***   
Log likelihood -36387.1   
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    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
All results are presented relative to not being sick. The results suggest those in 
urban settings and those with health insurance are more likely to seek care at a 
hospital or clinic. These findings suggest that the poor will have access problems 
relative to those who can afford insurance. The results also indicate that women, 
adults who are married, adults with a chronic condition are more likely to seek 
care. Adults with good self-reported health are less likely to need care.  
 
Those more educated are more likely to go to a clinic and less likely to do nothing 
when unwell. For household expenditures, the sign was positive for clinic and 
negative for those who chose to do nothing. The age variable was negative for all 
choices and close to 0 while the age-squared term was 0. These results do not give 
a clear pattern of the importance of age and appear to be specific to the sample. 
The predicted expenditure variable was significant for those who choose a clinic 
and those who choose to do nothing. These results are not easily interpretable but 
the elasticity results presented below give a clearer indication of the importance of 
this variable. 
 
The dummies that capture the reason for visit had a mix of significance depending 
on the outcome chosen. All dummies are compared relative to the base dummy 
which captures those who have high fever, cough or severe diarrhoea. Reasons for 
visit to the hospital include child birth, asthma, heart disease, bodily injury, minor 
surgery and other reasons not specified. Individuals are more likely to go to a 
clinic for antenatal care, dental care, arthritis, and asthma, while only patients with 
arthritis are more likely to do nothing when unwell. 
 
The country dummies may partly reflect the regulatory environment. Burkina 
Faso is used as the reference base and was assigned arbitrarily in the STATA 
algorithm. It should be noted that any country could be used as the reference base. 
These results should be interpreted with caution as the dummies provide a simple 
macro effect of each country. In relation to Burkina Faso, the majority of dummy 
coefficients indicate that regulation has a positive effect on seeking care in a 
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hospital or clinic setting or both. A few countries such as Kenya, Mali, 
Philippines, and Tunisia regulation had a negative effect on seeking care. 
 
Since the regression coefficients from the multinomial logit output are not easily 
interpretable, calculation of marginal effects gives a better understanding of the 
importance of the regressors. These were estimated using post estimation 
techniques. These coefficients indicate their marginal impact on the probability of 
the outcome chosen. For example, in the hospital column, the marginal effect of 
marital status increases the probability of choosing a hospital visit by 0.00373. 
 
Table 5.7 - Marginal effects from multinomial model 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -0.000386* -0.00427*** -0.000522** 
Age
2 
2.39e-06 2.13e-05** 4.02e-06* 
Sex 0.00112 0.0887*** -0.00130 
Marital status 0.00373** 0.0716*** -0.00113 
Self reported 
health -0.00825*** -0.0907*** -0.0118*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.00799*** 0.0978*** -0.00387** 
Education -0.00342** 0.0251*** -0.00750*** 
Employed -0.00304* 0.00454 -0.000308 
Urban setting 0.00253 0.0384*** -0.00894*** 
Health insurance 0.0113*** 0.0887*** -0.0129*** 
Household size -0.000243 -0.00298** 0.000260 
Log house 
expenditure -0.000424 0.0266*** -0.00386*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.00467 0.0666** 0.0332*** 
Immunisation -0.00296 -0.0436 -0.0277*** 
Antenatal 0.000194 0.113*** -0.0271*** 
Family planning 0.00724 0.0418 -0.0194*** 
Childbirth 0.150*** -0.430*** -0.0215*** 
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Dental care -0.0202*** 0.165*** -0.0128*** 
Arthritis 0.00392 0.0193 0.0115*** 
Asthma 0.0411*** 0.0246 -0.00502 
Heart disease 0.0335*** 0.00200 -0.0112*** 
Bodily injury 0.0357*** -0.0504*** -0.0162*** 
Minor surgery 0.0752*** -0.310*** -0.0225*** 
Other reason 0.00825*** 0.0144** -0.00665*** 
Bangladesh -0.0129*** 0.376*** -0.0153*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -0.00325 0.134*** -0.0304*** 
China -0.00182 -0.00219 -0.0290*** 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.00952 0.137*** -0.0176*** 
Congo 0.0650*** 0.0736** -0.00488 
Comoros 0.0606* -0.0625 -0.0241*** 
Dominican 
Republic 0.0174 0.211*** -0.0290*** 
Ecuador 0.00774 0.0151 -0.0276*** 
Ethiopia -0.0161*** 0.120*** 0.0415** 
Georgia -0.0117** -0.280*** -0.0192*** 
Ghana 0.0145 0.153*** 0.00344 
Guatemala -0.00403 0.157*** -0.0347*** 
India -0.00297 0.213*** -0.0327*** 
Kazakhstan 0.000336 0.100*** -0.0188*** 
Kenya -0.00510 -0.110*** 0.0994*** 
Laos 0.0880*** -0.199*** -0.0184*** 
Sri Lanka 0.0514*** 0.241*** -0.0332*** 
Morocco -0.000407 -0.0142 0.108*** 
Mali -0.0165*** 0.0255 -0.0215*** 
Myanmar -0.00853* 0.162*** -0.0107* 
Mauritania -0.00285 0.143*** -0.0172*** 
Malawi 0.00484 0.232*** 0.0283** 
Namibia 0.0490*** 0.170*** -0.0264*** 
Nepal -0.0130*** 0.111*** 0.0312** 
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Pakistan -0.00537 0.289*** -0.0307*** 
Philippines 0.0147 -0.105*** -0.0173*** 
Paraguay -0.0154*** 0.155*** 0.101*** 
Russia 0.0310* 0.0141 0.0352 
Senegal 0.0272* 0.0847*** -0.00952 
Chad 0.00185 -0.0435 0.0235** 
Tunisia -0.0150*** 0.0232 -0.0294*** 
Ukraine 0.0279* -0.0734** -0.0139** 
Vietnam 0.0246** 0.0750*** -0.0270*** 
Zambia 0.0354** 0.211*** -0.00499 
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results suggest that those with health insurance are more likely to seek care 
at a hospital or clinic and less likely to do nothing. Again this result highlights that 
income and having insurance are important determinants, which implies that the 
poor will have access problems.  
 
Married individuals and adults with a chronic condition are more likely to seek 
care at a hospital or clinic. Those with a chronic condition are less likely to do 
nothing when unwell. Women are more likely to seek care in a clinic. Those in 
urban settings are likely to seek care in a clinic and less likely to do nothing. 
Adults with good self- reported health are less likely to need care. The more 
educated are likely to seek care at a clinic rather than doing nothing when unwell. 
Both the educated and employed are less likely to seek care at a hospital.  
 
Households with fewer family members are less likely to seek care at a clinic 
while households with large monthly expenditures are more likely to seek care at 
a clinic and less likely to do nothing when unwell. The age variable was negative 
for all choices relative to not being sick while the age-squared term had a mix of 
significance. Again, these results do not give a clear pattern of the importance of 
age and may be specific to the sample, but suggest that age is not a driving factor 
relative to the other regressors when seeking care.  
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The reason for visit dummies are computed relative to those who have fever, 
cough or severe diarrhoea. Those more likely to choose a hospital go for reasons 
related to child birth, asthma, heart disease, bodily injury, minor surgery or other 
reason not specified. These responses seem intuitive and seem to capture the main 
types of services that hospitals provide to those with more serious health 
problems. Those visiting a clinic are more likely to go for antenatal or dental care 
reasons.  
 
The marginal effects of the regulation dummies indicate that overall, regulation 
had a positive effect on seeking care and had negative effect on doing nothing. 
Again, these results should be interpreted with caution and are relative to Burkina 
Faso as the base case. This does not imply however, that regulation had a positive 
effect on seeking care simultaneously for the countries concerned. For example, 
Namibia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam dummies suggest that regulation has a positive 
effect on seeking care in a hospital or clinic and a negative effect on doing 
nothing. The results suggest that typically most countries have a positive effect on 
seeking care in a clinic (21 out of 35) while only 10 have a positive effect on 
seeking care in a hospital as shown below. The marginal effects for the clinic 
results are overall greater in magnitude than the marginal effects for the hospital 
results.  
 
Table 5.8 - Country regulation dummy marginal effects from MNL model 
Clinic Hospital No significance or 
negative in provider 
settings 
   Bangladesh, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Côte 
d‘Ivoire, Congo, 
Dominican Republic, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, India, 
Kazakhstan , Sri Lanka, 
Myanmar, Mauritania, 
Congo, Comoros, 
Laos, Sri Lanka, 
Namibia, Russia, 
Senegal, Ukraine, 
Vietnam, Zambia 
China, Ecuador, 
Georgia, Kenya, 
Morocco, 
Mali, Philippines, 
Chad, Tunisia 
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Malawi, Namibia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Senegal, Vietnam, Zambia 
   
 
One aspect of regulation which has been systematically surveyed in a subsample 
of the countries is found in the WHO/HAI survey, which reports that procurement 
ability varies as shown in the table below. Using this descriptive information, 
countries that are inefficient procurers had mixed results on the decision to seek 
care. Some had positive effects: Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Senegal, Ukraine, and 
Vietnam, while others had negative effects: Chad, Mali, Morocco. For example, in 
the Ukraine and Vietnam, private sector prices tend be less than the public sector. 
The regression results, however, indicate that both countries had a positive effect 
on the probability of seeking care in the hospital. Others who procure efficiently 
found patients were less likely to seek care such as in Kenya and Tunisia. Branded 
drugs are not sold in the public sector in some countries which may in part explain 
the positive dummy effect found for India and Ethiopia. Mark ups that are known 
for some of these countries are not significantly higher than the average 
(WHO/HAI 2006). These findings, however, make it difficult to properly assess 
the possible within country effects. 
 
Table 5.9 - Summary of procurement efficiency 
Efficient Not efficient 
  Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, 
Kenya, Tunisia 
Chad, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mali, 
Morocco,  Pakistan, Philippines
26
, 
Senegal, Ukraine, Vietnam 
  
 
Due to lack of data on volume of health care services consumed, elasticities were 
not calculated in the usual fashion but calculated using post estimation techniques. 
The elasticity of the predicted expenditure variable was calculated. This variable 
had mixed significance in the multinomial regressions. The elasticity here is 
defined as the percentage change in the predicted probability of whether choosing 
                                                 
26
 More inefficient for generics than for branded drugs 
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to seek care at a provider as a result of a 1% increase in the expenditure of the 
same provider evaluated at the sample means. The result for hospital is -0.19 and 
0.11 for clinic. This implies that a 1% increase in expenditure at the hospital will 
reduce the probability of seeking care by 0.19%. 
 
The elasticity results are mixed. The sign of the hospital elasticity is negative 
which suggests a downward sloping demand curve but this result is not 
significant. The result for clinic is not negative but the result is significant at the 
5% level. The clinic result is counterintuitive and may be the result of model 
misspecification.  
 
Table 5.10 - Elasticity results from multinomial model 
Regressor Hospital Clinic 
   
Log predicted 
expenditure 
-0.19071 
(p-value 0.482) 
 
0.11687
** 
(p-value 0.015) 
 
   
Note: ** p<0.05  
 
The MNL model is a restrictive functional form of demand because the model 
assumes that the error terms are independent (IID property) and that the ratio of 
probabilities is independent of other choices (IIA property). The odds ratio of 
choosing say provider x over provider y is independent of the characteristics of 
any other alternative provider (Sepheri and Chernomas, 2001). Under this 
assumption, if user fees were increased by one provider, this would affect demand 
proportionately for all other alternate providers. There may, however, be 
unobserved influences that may affect the choice outcome that is different across 
the alternatives (Hensher DA, Rose JM et al. 2005).  
 
To test whether these properties are violated, a Hausman test is recommended to 
determine whether the multinomial logit is correctly specified. The standard 
Hausman test has limitations because the test for the estimator assumes the 
variance matrix V(b-B) as V(b) – V(B) is a feasible estimator only asymptotically 
(STATA, 2007). The standard Hausman test was carried out on the multinomial 
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model and was undefined which is a common result with the standard Hausman 
test.  
 
To address this problem, a generalised Hausman test is recommended. This test 
was carried out using the suest command and the output is shown in Appendix 
 C. The results indicate that the null hypothesis that the IIA property holds is 
rejected with a Chi-square of 4582.83. This result suggests that a nested model 
approach is recommended.  
 
5.4.3 NESTED LOGIT MODEL 
 
The nested logit model allows the variances to be different across the alternatives. 
The model also assumes that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing one 
alternative over the other may not be exactly independent. This implies that some 
correlation may exist across subsets of alternatives. Therefore the two 
assumptions (IID and IIA) are relaxed in the nested logit model. 
 
The nested logit model does not make any assumptions about the way in which 
alternatives are assessed in making a choice; that is, it does not define a decision 
process that links behavioural choices (Hensher et al. 2005).  
 
As a choice model, the nested model must also adhere to the rule of utility 
maximisation. Supposes that the J alternatives can be divided into B subgroups 
(branches) such that  
 
],...,()...,,...,(),,...,[(],...,[ )||12|2|11|1|11 21 BJBJJj Bcccccccc   (5-12) 
 
The choice structure may involve say B choice sets and then a specific choice 
within the chosen set. The nested model is simply a set of linked MNL models. 
The decision tree which helps in the development of applying the nested model, 
consists of conditional choices and marginal choices.  The diagram of a tree 
structure which for two branches and six choices (twigs) could be shown is as 
follows: 
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Figure 5.2 Decision Tree in a Nested Logit Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The choices modelled in this example involve the individual choosing between 
c1|1 to c3|2. These are referred to as the elemental alternatives. These choices are 
conditional on the individual either choosing Branch1 or Branch2 which are also 
referred to as composite alternatives. The calculation of the nested model 
estimates the conditional choices, which refer to the various alternatives at the 
bottom level of the tree (c1|1,…,c3|2). The marginal choices are reflected at the very 
top level of the tree even though they are the last choice modelled (Branch1 or 
Branch2). 
 
The relaxation of the two assumptions allows for some correlation to exist across 
subsets of alternatives. For example, there may be an unobserved influence A that 
affects two elemental alternatives (say c1|1 and c1|2) which implies that the error 
term for these two alternatives are likely to be correlated to a certain degree 
because of the effect of A. These two elemental alternatives may have similar 
variance or even identical. This implies that A will have a unique effect specific to 
c1|1 and a unique effect specific to  c1|2 and a common component that affects both. 
This common component engenders the correlation (Hensher et al. 2005).  
 
1|1c
Choice
Branch1 Branch2
1|2c 1|3c 2|1c 2|2c 2|3c
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Let bijx |  be the attributes of the choices and let ibz  be the attributes of the choice 
sets. The mathematical form of the model can be written as 
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The model assumes that the attributes of the elemental alternatives that are linked 
to a composite alternative influence the choice between the composite 
alternatives. This information is included in the utility expressions of each 
composite alternative through an index of expected maximum utility (EMU). This 
term is most commonly referred to as the inclusive value (IV).  
 
This is shown as for the lth branch as 
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which is the natural logarithm of the denominator of the MNL model associated 
with the elemental alternatives.  
 
The probabilities can be rewritten as 
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Here Greene (2008) uses   to refer to the scale parameter squared. The IV 
coefficients allow the model to incorporate some degree of heteroscedasticity. 
Where  =1, the model reverts to a MNL. The scale parameter is further discussed 
below. 
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The variance of the unobserved effects in the nested logit model needs to be 
formally defined and is referred to as the scale parameter or  shown below. 
 
2
2
2
6

   
 
This parameter squared explains the profile of the variance of the unobserved 
effects (Hensher et al. 2005). In the MNL, all variances are set to 1 which means 
that the scale parameter is 1.283.
27
  
 
The ratio of the scale parameter between the top and bottom level of the tree is 
also the IV parameter at the top level of the tree. This ratio must lie between 0 and 
1 to satisfy utility maximisation rules. This is because the variance at the top level 
of the tree incorporates the sources of variation from the bottom level of the tree. 
This implies that the variance at the top level of the tree will be greater than the 
variance at the bottom level. Since the scale parameter is inversely proportional to 
the variance, the scale parameter at the top level will be less than the scale 
parameter at the bottom level. Hence the ratio of the scale parameter will have to 
be less than 1. If the ratio is greater than 1, the model violates utility maximisation 
rules. When the ratio equals 0, the choice models are completely independent and 
called the degenerate outcome. When the ratio equals 1, this reverts to a MNL. 
 
In the application of the nested model to health care utilisation, there may be 
factors that could make the choices not strictly independent of one another. 
Factors such as distance to health facility may affect the patient‘s choice or the 
OOP costs may be significantly higher at one facility relative to another and may 
affect the patient‘s decision to seek care. The relaxation of this assumption allows 
for the ratio of the choice probabilities not to be strictly independent of one 
another.   
                                                 
27
 The scale parameter is 
2
2
6

  where 12   
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The nested logit model has not been frequently applied in the context of health 
care utilisation. This, in part, may be due to the complicated nature of defining a 
tree structure that meets the required assumptions of estimating a nested logit 
model. 
 
In this chapter, the dataset used for the multinomial logit model was used to 
develop a nested logit model. The nested model was set up as follows to account 
for the choices a patient faces when deciding to see a provider. The computer 
code used for this analysis is found in Appendix C. 
 
In the first level of the tree, the patient is either sick or not sick. Those who are 
sick have a choice to seek care, either at a hospital or a clinic or do nothing. Those 
who are not sick remain not sick for the entire modelling exercise. A total of 
42,668 observations were used. Approximately 63% of individuals reported being 
sick in the past year. Out of the total sample, about 58% sought care, with the 
majority visiting a clinic. A little over a third reported not being sick in the past 
year. The sample of observations in each of the k categories is shown in the table 
below. For estimation purposes, the model creates duplicate observations that are 
equivalent to the number of possible choices. In this model, four outcomes are 
possible for each individual. STATA creates 42,668 * 4 observations for each 
individual for estimations purposes, which results in a sample size of 170,672 
observations. 
 
Table 5.11 - Sample size of choice categories 
Choices N k  % 
Branch 1 - Sick    
Hospital 42,668 1,477 3.46 
Clinic 42,668 23,196 54.36 
Do Nothing 42,668 2,106 4.94 
Branch 2 -Not sick    
Not sick 42,668 15,889 37.24 
Total 170,672 42,668 100 
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Figure 5.3 - Nested Tree Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The variables were regressed as done in the multinomial logit. The nested logit 
calculation computes coefficients for variables that are common across all 
alternatives relative to the base case of not being sick because these values do not 
vary among the elemental alternatives. These variables were age, age squared, 
sex, marital status, self reported health, chronic condition, education, employed, 
urban setting, health insurance, household size, log household expenditure. The 
predicted OOP expenditure was computed separately for hospitals and clinics 
relative to the base case of do nothing. The coefficient results are presented in 
Appendix C.  
 
The results indicate that the IIA property is violated and the likelihood ratio test 
rejects the null that the model is IIA , which follows from the error terms being 
IID. The test shows that Chi-sq of 149.88 is significant and the null is rejected 
with a P-value of 0.0000. A drawback of this test, however, is that it is specific to 
the tree structure which implies that different specifications could give different 
results. The parameter which measures independence between choices is 
0.459299, is the ratio of the scale parameter and satisfies utility maximisation 
rule. This parameter should lie between 0 and 1. The nested logit results appear to 
be fairly consistent with the multinomial results and are shown below.  
Hospital Clinic Do nothing Not sick
Patient
Not sickSick
N=1475 N=23253 N=253 N=15937
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Table 5.12 - Nested logit results 
Regressor Coefficient 
  Age -0.0307*** 
Age
2 
0.000200*** 
Sex 0.359*** 
Marital status 0.323*** 
Self reported 
health -0.511*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.434*** 
Education 0.0475* 
Employed 0.00478 
Urban setting 0.161*** 
Health insurance 0.386*** 
Household size -0.0133*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.0526*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
hospital 
 
0.0768*** 
 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
clinic 
 
1.186*** 
 
Bangladesh 1.756*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.284** 
China 0.188 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.374*** 
Congo 0.670*** 
Comoros 0.0979 
Dominican 0.396*** 
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Republic 
Ecuador 0.111 
Ethiopia 0.118 
Georgia -1.171*** 
Ghana 0.221** 
Guatemala 0.593*** 
India 0.931*** 
Kazakhstan -0.222** 
Kenya -0.529*** 
Laos -0.563*** 
Sri Lanka 1.287*** 
Morocco -0.0905 
Mali -0.669*** 
Myanmar 0.00879 
Mauritania 0.375*** 
Malawi 0.866*** 
Namibia 0.765*** 
Nepal 0.00926 
Pakistan 1.504*** 
Philippines -0.359*** 
Paraguay 0.718*** 
Russia -0.228* 
Senegal 0.0526 
Chad -0.289*** 
Tunisia 0.0985 
Ukraine -0.0911 
Vietnam 0.0912 
Zambia 0.667*** 
Immunisation -0.401** 
Antenatal 0.298*** 
Family planning 0.0954 
Childbirth -1.249*** 
Dental care 0.577*** 
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Arthritis 0.163*** 
Asthma 0.253*** 
Heart disease 0.0886 
Bodily injury -0.172*** 
Minor surgery -1.064*** 
Other reason 0.0513* 
Constant  
  
N 170,672 
Chi-sq. 17487*** 
Log likelihood -46271 
Ratio scale 
parameter
 
 
0.459*** 
 
LR test IIA 149.88*** 
 
  Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Those more likely to seek care include those who have insurance and households 
with high expenditures. Household expenditure is a useful proxy for income in 
developing country settings. These findings indicate that the poor will have access 
problems relative to the wealthy. Other important determinants include women, 
being married, having a chronic condition present, the educated, and those who 
live in urban settings. Those with good health and small households are less likely 
to seek care. Those more likely to seek care include reasons related to antenatal, 
dental care, arthritis, asthma, bodily injury, minor surgery and other reason not 
specified. 
 
The country level regulation dummies produced mixed results. As mentioned 
previously, dummy effects should be interpreted with caution. About half of the 
dummies have a positive effect on seeking care relative to doing nothing (15 out 
of 35) whereas 8 country dummies have a negative effect as shown below. Fewer 
countries had positive significance in the nested model compared with the MNL 
model. These include Comoros, Ethiopia, Laos, Myanmar, Russia, Senegal, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan. Negative or not significant country dummies 
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in the MNL model were consistent with the results in the nested model. The 
dummy coefficients are also greater in magnitude than those found with the MNL 
model.  
 
The results of the country dummies were more in line with the WHO/HAI 
descriptive survey findings related to procurement efficiency. India and Ghana 
which are efficient procurers had a positive effect on the decision to seek care. 
Pakistan, however, which is relatively inefficient, had a positive effect while all 
other inefficient procurers either had a negative effect or were not significant.  
 
Table 5.13 - Country regulation dummy effects from nested model 
Positive Negative  Not significant 
   Bangladesh, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Côte d‘Ivoire, 
Congo, Dominican Republic, 
Ghana, Guatemala, India, 
Mauritania, Malawi, Namibia, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, 
Zambia  
Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Laos, Mali, 
Philippines, Russia, 
Chad 
China, Comoros, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Morocco, 
Myanmar, Nepal, 
Senegal, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, Vietnam 
   
 
Variations of the model were run to include the perceived level of quality of 
services received and the time allotted for travel to the facility and produced 
similar results. These results are shown in Appendix C.  
 
Measuring price responsiveness was carried out using a post estimation technique 
(Greene, 2008). Elasticities and marginal effects were calculated for patients that 
sought care at a hospital or clinic setting. STATA does not have a written post 
estimation command to generate these calculations. This code was written to carry 
out these calculations. Please see Appendix C for details on the calculations. 
 
In a discrete choice model, the price elasticity is defined as the percentage change 
in the predicted probability of seeking care from a health care provider j as a 
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result of a 1% increase in the average expenditure of the same provider j evaluated 
at the sample means (Asfaw et al. 2004).  
 
Price elasticity and marginal effects were calculated for the hospital and clinic 
setting. The results are shown in the table below.  
 
Table 5.14 – Price elasticity and Marginal Effect Results from Nested Model 
Provider Hospital Clinic 
   Price elasticity .0360931            .6388549            
Marginal effect .0190891            .2948294            
   
 
The results indicate the patient‘s expenditure in a hospital or clinic setting is 
inelastic. These results are not negative but are not significant. The marginal 
effect of seeking care in a clinic is larger than in a hospital setting based on the 
predicted probabilities of seeking care.  
 
The hospital result (0.03) is fairly close to zero and falls in line with results in the 
literature whereas the clinic result (0.63) is counterintuitive. One possible 
explanation is model misspecification. Another reason could be that other factors 
matter more in explaining health seeking behaviour to a clinic such as 
informational and cultural factors which are not captured in the model.  
 
These estimates indicate the percentage change in the predicted probability of 
seeking care from a health care provider j as a result of a 1% increase in the 
average expenditure of the same provider j evaluated at the sample means is 
inelastic. This indicates that patient‘s demand for health care is generally inelastic. 
For example a 1% increase in hospital expenditure results in a 0.03% change in 
the probability of seeking care.  
 
In summary the price elasticity results computed thus far are shown in the table 
below. 
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Table 5.15 – Summary of elasticity results 
Model Key 
Assumptions 
Sample Description Elasticity 
     MNL IIA and IID 
hold 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.19 (hospital) 
 0.11
**
 (clinic) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.03 (hospital) 
 0.63 (clinic) 
 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.4.4 LIMITATIONS 
 
While the modelling approaches aimed to properly adjust for the data used in the 
analysis, the limitations with the analytical approach used in this chapter should 
be highlighted.   
 
The estimation of price elasticities was based on health expenditure information. 
This information was limited in the survey to include information only on one 
episode and in one health setting which was either in a clinic or in a hospital. An 
important estimation issue between utilisation and health expenditure is the 
direction of causality. That is, an important distinction is whether utilisation 
explains high levels of utilisation or, conversely, whether high expenditures 
explain utilisation levels. The endogenous relationship between these two 
variables requires some method to correct for the bias in the estimated 
coefficients. The method used in this chapter was to estimate predicted health 
expenditure rather than using actual health expenditure. This approach aimed to 
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purge the disease and socioeconomic effects in the generated price variable. While 
this technique aims to eliminate some of the potential bias and is a common 
method used in the literature, not all of the potentially endogeneity could be 
accounted for. Furthermore, the expenditure information related to only direct 
health care costs. Indirect costs of seeking care were not collected such as travel, 
waiting at health care facilities or providing care to family members (McIntyre D 
et al. 2006). The estimates of predicted health expenditure are therefore lower 
than the true costs of health care.  
 
While the World Health Survey contains useful information on health systems 
(Ustun et al. 2003), a study on the reliability and validity of the expenditure 
variables were mixed (Xu et al. 2009). The authors computed the intra-class 
coefficient (ICC) index of total household expenditure and household health 
expenditures. The greater attention to health expenditures has resulted in a higher 
estimate of health expenditures compared with other household surveys (Living 
Standards Measurements Surveys, Household Income and Expenditure Surveys, 
Household Budget Surveys and Socio-Economic Surveys) and a lower estimate in 
the other household expenditures. The recall period for expenditure information in 
this survey was one month while the other surveys had various recall periods. 
While longer recall periods may increase recall bias, it could capture more 
infrequent spending. The overall effect is not clear. In the case of WHS, while the 
recall period is one month, the respondent may include spending that took place 
earlier than the past month which could cause upward bias. 
 
Despite using a large dataset, the analysis is based on one wave of cross-sectional 
data. The data do not permit a time series analysis, which would shed light on the 
factors that would affect demand for health care over time or the cumulative 
effects of illness, access to care and health care spending over time.  
This information is important because understanding the dynamic effects between 
these and other factors (e.g. the loss of income from illness) is particularly 
important as chronic illness prevalence increases globally (Wagner et al. 2011). 
 
While, the modelling approach assumed additive effects or their equivalent within 
the logged equation, there could be interactions between certain regressors such as 
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gender and health problem (e.g. childbirth, antenatal planning). This information 
could provide more information on health seeking behaviour. There was 
incomplete information on whether the patient was treated in a public or private 
setting, or for those treated at home so this information could not be included in 
the analysis. This information would have provided useful information on health 
seeking behaviour and how the relative importance of factors varies between 
provider settings and would have given a more comprehensive picture on health 
seeking behaviour. 
 
The household survey does not adequately capture those with unmet need 
including those who needed care but did not avail themselves of services and 
those who sought care but did not find their needs were properly met. Information 
on their circumstances and the factors that affected this sub-sample of patients 
would provide useful information on those who chose not to present themselves to 
the health care system, which is of important policy relevance in these settings 
where traditional medicine practices are widely followed.  
 
Information on traditional medicine practices and their relationship with the 
uptake of western medicines would have provided a more nuanced discussion on 
medicine consumption in these settings.  For instance, it would have been useful 
to have information on whether western medicines are viewed more as 
complements than substitutes, and whether that varies depending on the patient‘s 
health condition, socioeconomic circumstances, etc. The data are also not able to 
adequately capture information on adherence which would give a more complete 
picture on access. The data do not collect information on all members of the 
household and thus may misclassify households with respect to need and access 
(Wagner et al. 2011).  
 
While household surveys provide important information for analysis from the 
patient‘s perspective, data on supply side information is limited for analysis. More 
information on supply/provider information would better control the supply 
factors on demand for medicines. At a disaggregated level, these could include 
density measures of health professionals, and number of hospital beds, number of 
health facilities per capita, or number of traditional healers per capita. 
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Finally, while the importance of the regulatory environment is tested using 
dummies, this approach is limited as it cannot account for country differences in 
greater detail such as procurement efficiency.  This could potentially mask 
important information within and across countries. Furthermore, non-
governmental actors play an important role in procurement in these settings which 
are not explicitly accounted for in the model and could confound the findings. 
There could be differences for diseases areas or due to differences in private 
sector providers or international organisations which could affect the price 
elasticity of demand. The role of the regulatory environment in these settings 
would have to be supplemented with more qualitative information so clearer links 
could be made with the quantitative findings and the policy setting environment.  
 
5.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter aimed to identify determinants of access to medicines and health care 
at the patient level and to estimate price responsiveness. The dataset covers a large 
cross section of countries and includes urban and rural settings. The large 
household survey dataset allowed for more robust estimates to contribute to the 
evidence base, which is typically drawn from smaller sample sizes and selected 
rural or urban regions. The additional feature of the data set was that it included 
information on medicine costs because current empirical work is limited with this 
data. The empirical methods also corrected for endogeneity between the cost of 
the care and the decision to seek care. 
 
The findings indicate that certain variables affect the decision to seek care and 
these include gender, marital status, health status, insurance, urban settings, being 
education, employment, and households with large monthly expenditures. These 
findings are consistent with the literature and suggest that the poor will have 
access problems relative to those who can afford insurance. This is consistent with 
the survey findings which indicates that among the 7% that could not get care, 
46% reported they could not afford it. Furthermore, among those patients that 
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received a prescription, 13% were not able to get all the medicines required and 
about half of them could not afford it. 
 
Medicines costs accounted for the largest share of OOP costs for the patient, 
which suggests that the price elasticities also capture information on medicine 
costs. The results suggest that the predicted probability of seeking care from a 
health care provider j as a result of a 1% increase in the average expenditure of the 
same provider j evaluated at the sample means is inelastic. Elasticities were -0.19 
(hospital), 0.03 (clinic) under the MNL model and 0.03 (hospital) and 0.63 (clinic) 
in the nested model. The results for hospital are fairly close to estimates in the 
literature even though the MNL result was not significant. The clinic results were 
counterintuitive and could be result of model misspecification or other factors, 
which were not captured in the modelling approach. While this range includes 
counterintuitive estimates as well, the empirical analysis in the subsequent 
chapters builds on this analysis to improve estimation techniques. 
 
The counterintuitive price elasticity estimate suggests that price elasticities could 
be not strictly negative and inelastic. This could in part be due to model 
misspecification such as the missing indirect expenditure information or bias in 
the recall period. Respondents were asked to provide information on their most 
recent visit which could have occurred within the past year. The potential bias 
should be low as most of the respondents indicated that their most recent visit 
occurred within the past month. Other reasons for these counterintuitive results 
could relate to factors that affect the patient‘s decision to spend money once they 
decide to visit a health facility. These could be due to cultural factors relating to 
the relationship between health professionals and patients (e.g. expression of 
gratitude), the potential demand for additional fees once the patient is at the 
facility by the health professional, or perceptions of improved quality of care if 
the patient pays more money once they are at the facility.  
 
While perceived health status is an important factor, there could be elements of 
perceived health status that this variable failed to capture in the sense that for a 
given perceived health status, those with lower incomes (proxy using household 
expenditures) are less likely to seek care. Direct price and volume information 
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would have provided a clearer picture on the determinants of health seeking 
behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, while household expenditures are the common proxy for income in 
these settings, this variable may not appropriately capture differences in true 
income between households. This variable will also be biased by the data sample 
for those with unmet need that were not included in the analysis which could bias 
this proxy of income variable. Such factors could therefore be masking a clear 
negative relationship between price and the health visit as is commonly reported 
in the literature.  
 
Another approach would be to estimate price elasticities for each country and to 
include interaction effects rather than computing one overall estimate. Since a 
large number of observations had to be dropped for the regression analysis, the 
approach taken in this chapter and in this thesis was to draw on larger datasets for 
analysis as the country samples were quite small and ranged from a few hundred 
to a couple of thousand observations.  
 
At the household level, expenditure on medicines is a significant proportion of 
total health expenditure, which indicates that demand for medicines is a necessity. 
The policy implication is that if OOP are likely for patients, low price setting of 
medicine prices could have a positive welfare impact on patient access to care. 
 
The findings from both the MNL and nested logit model indicate that regulation 
has an effect on seeking care. In the MNL model, the results suggest that typically 
most countries have a positive effect on seeking care in a clinic (21 out of 35) 
while only 10 have a positive effect on seeking care in a hospital.  
 
Similarly in the nested model, 15 out of the 35 countries indicate a positive effect 
on seeking care relative to doing nothing whereas 8 country dummies have a 
negative effect. The remaining 8 country dummies were insignificant. The dummy 
coefficients are also greater in magnitude than those found with the MNL model.  
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While the results of the country dummies appeared to be somewhat consistent 
with the descriptive analysis of country procurement efficiency, the data cannot 
provide more disaggregate information which could better explain country 
differences. For instance, there could be differences within countries which are 
masked with an aggregate country dummy measure. 
 
 Another key issue in these settings is that governments are not the only procurers 
of medicines in low and middle-income settings. For instance, some countries 
could have very high procurement prices and therefore it would be useful to 
understand the factors which underpin high procurement prices. Procurement 
efficiency could be an important predictor in the model but since this information 
was not available at a more disaggregate measure, the dummy variable could 
confound the results. While the descriptive information on procurement efficiency 
provides some contextual information, it cannot capture the private sector actors 
which are also key procurers in these settings (Russo and McPake 2010). The 
country dummy results are therefore limited in their interpretation and would have 
to be supplemented with more in country analysis. The subsequent chapters 
extend the analysis at the country level. These chapters study the policy context 
and determinants of access to medicines in outpatient and inpatient care at the 
patient level using India as a country case study. 
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6 Chapter 6 A case-study of India and the pharmaceutical policy 
context in India 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As a precursor to the Indian case study analysis, this chapter presents information 
on the policy context and regulation in India. This will provide a useful policy 
backdrop to inform the empirical analysis in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
The case study on India is due to four main reasons. First, India tends to publicly 
procure medicines efficiently relative to other low and middle-income countries 
based on international reference prices (WHO/HAI 2006). This is useful 
information because efficient procurement should have a positive effect on patient 
access to medicines.  
 
Second, health financing in India places a disproportionate burden on households: 
it has one of the highest levels of household expenditure as a share of total health 
expenditure (72%) among developing and developed countries (Garg CC and 
Karan AK 2005). High OOP are found to be regressive and so will have negative 
implications for access. 
 
Third, the empirical findings from the thesis analysis in chapter 5 indicate that 
dummy for the regulatory environment in India, had a positive effect on the 
probability of seeing a provider in the nested model and positive effect on seeking 
care in a clinic in the MNL model.  
 
Fourth, the data set from India comes from a well-developed health survey 
questionnaire for analysis, which is not always available in developing country 
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settings.
28
 Since the current evidence base is limited, this large dataset allows us 
to extend the analysis by using a large household survey from India.  
This chapter sets out to discuss the main features of the Indian health system and 
policy environment relevant to this thesis. This discussion is useful as it provides 
context to the empirical analysis that follows from it. This chapter is organised as 
follows: section 6.2 presents an overview of the Indian health system and policy 
context; section 6.3 discusses pharmaceutical regulation; 6.4 provides an 
overview of the pharmaceutical industry in India which is a major player in 
medicine production and distribution in India, as well as other developing 
countries and more recently in high income countries. Section 6.5 provides 
evidence from the literature on drug utilisation in India and implications for 
access before moving onto the empirical findings in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
6.2 INDIAN POLICY CONTEXT  
 
6.2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE INDIAN HEALTH SYSTEM 
 
India gained her independence in 1947. During a time of nation building 
activities, the government came out with a policy document on health care, found 
in the Bhore Committee Report (Bhore JR 1946). The Committee focussed on 
primary health care which was seen as simple curative and preventive care that 
could be provided in a clinic or home setting. Access to primary care was a basic 
right and not contingent on ability to pay. Health policy in India paid little 
attention to the private sector which continued to grow. India adopted its first 
national health policy in 1983 and it was the first time that the central government 
recognised that it should work with the private sector (Peters 2002).   
 
Under the Indian constitution, health system delivery is a shared responsibility 
between the central, state and local governments (Peters 2002). Today, India has 
                                                 
28
 Most health surveys in developing countries do not include health expenditure which separates 
consumption on medicines separately from other items of health expenditure. 
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twenty eight states and seven union territories. Delivery is effectively a state 
responsibility but decentralisation of state authority varies by state. State and local 
governments account for about 75% of public spending on health, but the size of 
state budgets vary widely (Peters 2002). India‘s health care delivery system is 
divided into four levels of care: rural health centres, district hospitals, tertiary care 
hospitals and teaching hospitals (Roy Chaudhury, Parameswar et al. 2005). 
 
6.2.2 EXPENDITURE 
 
Total health expenditure in India is 5% of GDP, which is higher than most lower 
middle income countries such as China, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Pakistan as shown in the table below (Roy K and Howard DH 2007; WHO 2009). 
Health expenditure per capita, however, is in the middle relative to these countries 
at $US 30.40. 
 
Table 6.1 - Health expenditure as a share of GDP for select countries 2005 
 Total health 
expenditure as % 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
income ($US) 
Total health 
expenditure per 
capita ($US) 
    India 5.0 740.15 30.40 
China 4.7 1715.03 76.49 
Sri Lanka 4.1 1240.89 50.20 
Thailand 3.5 2674.20 94.90 
Indonesia 2.1 1304.08 25.4 
Pakistan 2.1 703.59 18.46 
    Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005).Note: Lower middle income 
economies as defined by the World Bank.(World Bank 2005)  
 
Public spending as a percentage of total health expenditure in India is one of the 
lowest relative to the same countries as shown in the figure below (close to 20%). 
Latest figures of public spending in India for 2008 were 1.1% of GDP (WHO 
2009). 
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Figure 6.1 - Share of public expenditure in select countries 2005 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005) 
 
Furthermore the pattern of expenditure across states varies. According to the 
WHO National Health Account data, public health expenditure across the larger 
states, ranges from 42% (58% private expenditure) in Himachal Pradesh to 9% 
(91% private expenditure) in Kerala (WHO 2005). This does not necessarily 
imply that health outcomes in Kerala are worse than other states. Kerala has 
historically had better health indicators relative to most states on infant mortality, 
birth rate, proportion of institutional birth and life expectancy (NSSO 1998).   
 
Households account for the majority of health expenditure (Garg CC and Karan 
AK 2005; O'Donnell O 2005). In 2004-05, households accounted for 71% of total 
health expenditure (3% of GDP), followed by state (12%), central (6.8%), private 
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insurance (5.7%), external aid (2.3%) (bilateral or multilateral) and social 
insurance (1.1%) (WHO 2009). Patients finance much of their care and the 
majority of patient expenditure is on medicines. In rural inpatient settings 
expenditure on medicines ranges from 38% to 66% followed by doctor fees (26% 
to 27%). In urban inpatient settings expenditure on medicines ranges from to 62% 
to 66% in urban settings, followed by costs related to diagnostic tests (12% to 
15%) (WHO 2005). 
 
Less than 10% have some form of health insurance (Garg CC and Karan AK 
2005; O'Donnell O 2005). This is illustrated by the low level of household 
expenditure on premiums of 1.5% (US$ 231 million) of total household 
expenditure (US$ 15 billion) (WHO 2005).  Health insurance schemes run by 
public sector bodies and private companies are in operation but have problems 
with coverage (Tripathi, Dey et al. 2004).  
 
6.2.3 PROVISION AND UTILISATION 
 
India has public and private provision in health system delivery. In both sectors, 
the main area of expenditure is on curative services (74%), with the remaining 
spent on other services (e.g. family planning and maternal care) (Peters 2002). 
The public system is characterised as being under funded, not large enough to 
meet the health needs of the country, and poorly managed (Peters 2002).  
 
In the private sector, provision ranges in primary care and secondary care from 
solo practices and small inpatient facilities to large corporate hospitals and 
includes ancillary services (e.g. diagnostic centers, ambulance services and 
pharmacies).  The private sector provides western medicine treatment (allopathic), 
which is the dominant form of provision, as well Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine (CAM) such as Ayurveda and Unani.
29
 Reliable estimates on the 
                                                 
29
 There are six systems of Indian medicine: Ayurvedic, Siddha, Yoga, Unani, Homeopathy, and 
Nature Cure (AYUSH. (2007). "Department of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha 
and Homoeopathy."   Retrieved June 2007, from http://indianmedicine.nic.in/.   
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number of CAM practitioners are not available, however, CAM is believed to be 
widely practised among patients (Kumar, Bajaj et al. 2006).  
 
The private sector is growing quickly but is undirected and unregulated (Peters 
2002). In 1947, the private sector was less than 10% in size; estimates between 
1981-1998 suggest it is the dominant source of provision: the majority of doctors 
(80-85%), hospitals (93%) and the percentage of beds (63%) were found in the 
private sector (Peters 2002). Data on health care providers indicate that 70% of all 
funds flow to health care providers in the for profit private sector while 23% was 
spent on public providers (WHO 2005).
30
 
 
Compared with other low-income countries, the per capita number of health 
professionals (per 1,000) in India is low which will affect access. Physicians per 
capita, however, is about average (1.0) whereas the ratios for nurses (0.9), 
midwives (0.2) and hospital beds (0.7) are below average as shown in the table 
below. Similarly, the data suggest that inpatient utilisation in the public and 
private sectors combined is lower than in low-income countries but outpatient is 
close to the average.
31
  
 
Table 6.2 - Figures on health care work force and health service utilisation, 1990-1998 in 
India 
Country Physicians Nurses Midwives Hospital 
Beds 
 Inpatient Outpatient 
        India public 
sector 
0.2 - 0.2 0.4  0.7 0.7 
India total 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.7  1.7 3.9 
Low income 
countries 
 
0.7 
 
1.6 
 
0.3 
 
1.5 
  
5 
 
3 
        Note: Figures for physicians, nurses, midwives, and hospital beds is per 1,000 
Note: Inpatient and outpatient figures are on a per capita basis, per year (percent). 
Source: (Peters 2002) 
 
                                                 
30
 Data on NGO providers is incomplete but work is underway to fill this gap (WHO 2005). 
31
 It is important to treat these figures with caution because data on outpatient visits and 
hospitalisations do not necessarily capture disease levels accurately and differences in definitions 
and data collection methods in countries vary. (Peters, 2002). 
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6.2.4 INSURANCE 
 
The affluent urban population have employer-based coverage and unconstrained 
access to needed care whereas those in rural areas and those working in the 
informal sector depend on tax-based public facilities for free or subsidised care 
(Roy K and Howard DH 2007). Recent studies suggest that the declining quality 
and inaccessibility of the public health system combined with the growing private 
sector have forced the poor to resort to private care (Gwatkin DR 2000b). 
 
Some recent policies have been introduced to address inadequate insurance 
coverage. The National Rural Health Initiative, launched in 2005 by the health 
ministry provides an insurance mechanism to rural areas. Goals of the scheme 
involve outreach delivery of services, integrated access to primary care, reduction 
in high infant and maternal mortality rates, and coverage of medicine expenditure 
but the effects are too early to tell (Deolalikar, Jamison et al. 2007). 
 
A national health insurance scheme came into effect on 1 April 2008. The 
Ministry of Labour implemented this policy with support from the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). The scheme targets the unorganised sector and 
families receive Rs. 30,000 on an annual basis. Three quarters is subsidised by the 
central government and 25% from the state government. The government plans to 
roll out the programme across the country over a five year period (ILO 2010). 
 
 
6.3 PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION 
 
Regulation of pharmaceuticals in India is found in the India Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act (1940).  There are many actors in the pharmaceutical system. The main 
authorities involved at the central level are the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MOHFW), the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Other ministries include the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests, and Ministry of Science and Technology. 
The main areas of regulation are shown in the table below and figure below. 
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Table 6.3 - Key areas of pharmaceutical regulation 
Area Authority responsible 
  
  Financing of pharmaceuticals 
and procurement in public 
facilities 
 MOHFW national programmes 
 State health authorities  
Pricing Policy  
Price controls 
Customs duty and taxes 
 NPPA (Ministry of Chemicals and 
Fertilizers)  
 Department of Revenue (Ministry of 
Finance) 
 
Licensing and quality control  
Market authorisation  Central Drug Controller (MOHFW) 
 Department of Biotechnology (Ministry of 
Science and Technology) 
 Department of Environment (Ministry of 
Environment and Forests) 
 
License to manufacture approved 
drugs and quality control 
 
 State Drug Controller 
Industrial policy  
Patent regulation  Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry) 
Drug Export  Directorate General of Foreign Trade 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry) 
Government support to the industry  Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers 
 Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
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Figure 6.2 - Pharmaceutical regulatory framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: At the state level drug procurement and licensing is carried out. State level drug controllers 
license drugs approved by the Central Drug Controller. They issue licenses for manufacture and 
regulate quality control. Dotted lines are shown to illustrate that the State Health authority is the 
counterpart body responsible at the state level. 
 
 
In India, the objectives of the national medicines policy (NMP) were set out in 
1986 and revised as the Pharmaceutical Policy of 2002 to take account of changes 
for when India would become compliant to the agreement on TRIPS in 2005 
(Patel, Thawani et al. 2004). A NMP outlines a country‘s goals and provides a 
framework for achieving them, setting out roles and responsibilities of the main 
actors in both public and sectors in pharmaceutical regulation (WHO 2004a). The 
policy document was prepared by the Department of Chemicals and 
Petrochemicals which is mainly responsible for industrial policy. 
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The policy‘s main objectives are the following (NPPA 2002): 
 ensure availability of medicines at reasonable prices,  
 strengthen domestic capability in production and exports of 
pharmaceuticals by reducing barriers to trade,  
 ensure quality control, promote rational use of pharmaceuticals,  
 encourage R&D in the pharmaceutical sector and with a focus on diseases 
prevalent in India. 
 
6.3.1 PHARMACEUTICAL FINANCING AND SOURCES OF FUNDING 
 
This section discusses pharmaceutical expenditure, the different sources of 
funding and government procurement. The diagram below provides an overview 
of financial flows relating to expenditure on pharmaceuticals. 
 
Figure 6.3 - Financial flows of pharmaceuticals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For ease of exposition, public facilities include government run facilities for government 
employees. A primary health centre (PHC) is supplied medicines directly from the government 
central store. Retail pharmacies are reported to dispense medicines without a doctor‘s prescription. 
Public facilities and external donors may charge a nominal fee. 
Government
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In India, private expenditure accounts for the largest share of total health 
expenditure (78.05) while public accounts for 19.7% and external aid 2.3% as 
shown in the figure below 2004-05 from the National Health Accounts (NHA) for 
India 2004-05 (WHO, 2009). 
 
Figure 6.4 - Distribution of total health expenditure in India 2004-05 
 
After household expenditure, the remaining sources of expenditure is smaller: 
state expenditure is 12%, followed by central (6.8%), private insurance (5.7%) 
and external aid (2.3%) (bilateral or multilateral), and social insurance (1.1%) 
(WHO 2009). A breakdown is provided in the tables below. These shares have 
remained similar to the previous release of NHA from India 2001-02. 
 
Table 6.4 - Health expenditure components in India 2004-2005 
Source % of THE $US Billions  $US per capita 
    
P rivate
78%
Public
20%
External
2%
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    Private    
Households 71.1 21.1 18.9 
Firms 5.7 1.7 1.5 
Social insurance 1.1 0.3 0.30 
NGOs 0.07 0.02 0.02 
Subtotal 78.05 23.2 20.8 
    
Public    
State 12.0 3.6 3.2 
Central 6.8 2.0 1.8 
Local bodies 0.92 0.3 0.24 
Subtotal 19.7 5.8 5.2 
    
External support    
Central  1.6 0.5 0.42 
NGO 0.5 0.1 0.13 
State 0.2 0.07 0.07 
Subtotal 2.3 0.7 0.61 
    
TOTAL 100.0 29.7 26.60 
    
Source: NHA, India 2004-05 (WHO, 2009) 
 
Data on household expenditure indicate that individuals spent the largest share on 
outpatient care (66.1%), 23.5% was spent on inpatient care, 3.4% on delivery care 
and 2.8% on family planning services (WHO 2009). Rural households account for 
a larger share of household expenditure than urban households: 62% versus 38% 
(WHO 2009).  
 
Data from inpatient care show that in both public and private settings, medicines 
accounted for the largest share of household expenditure (38% to 66%) as shown 
below. Doctor‘s fees were the next largest share in private settings whereas 
diagnostic tests were the next largest component in public settings. 
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Table 6.5 - Distribution of household expenditure (%) 
Hospital 
 
Sector 
 
Medicine 
 
Doctor 
fee 
Bed 
 
Diagnostic 
test 
Blood 
 
Food 
 
Total 
 
         
Private Rural 40 26 17 9 3 5 100 
 Urban 38 27 17 11 4 3 100 
Public Rural 66 4 4 12 4 9 100 
 Urban 62 5 6 15 5 8 100 
         
Source: NHA, India 2004-05 (WHO, 2009) 
 
Government spending on medicines indicates that a small proportion of public 
budgets is spent is medicines. In the MOHFW‘s budgets, it accounts for 1.4% (Rs. 
392 million, or US$ 8 million) out of Rs. 28,463.7 million (US$ 598 million) 
(WHO 2005).  At the state level it accounts for 1.7%, Rs. 2,832.4 million (US$ 59 
million) out of Rs. 166,757.2 million (US$ 3.5 billion) (WHO 2005). The NHA 
system of classification estimates overall expenditure to be Rs. 4,585 million 
(US$ 96 million) or 0.4% out of total health expenditure, Rs. 1,057,341 million 
(US$ 22 billion) (WHO 2005). 
 
In West Bengal, Tripathi (2004) reports that co-payments/fees for medicines vary. 
In some states primary health care is offered free of cost. In some states, a 
nominal fee is charged. Treatment cost is borne by patients, although this may be 
subsidised at referral hospitals. In hospitals, medicines are free in public hospitals. 
Public facilities freely supply only drugs from the NEML (Tripathi, Dey et al. 
2004).  
 
Patel et al. (2004) reports that in the state of Maharashtra, freedom fighters, and 
those that have a card indicating their income is below poverty level are exempt. 
These authors report that it is official policy to supply all medicines for free at the 
primary health care level.  
 
Patel et al. (2004) and Tripathi et al. (2004) report the following medicines are 
freely provided in public facilities: TB, malaria, oral rehydration salts, family 
planning in both Maharashtra and West Bengal. Tripathi (2004) also reports that 
vaccines covered by the Universal Immunization Programme, iron, folic acid, 
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simple antibiotics (e.g. amoxicillin, metronidazole); simple analgesics like 
paracetamol are freely provided in West Bengal. 
 
6.3.2 PROCUREMENT 
 
The government is responsible for drug procurement in public facilities where 
medicines are (for most states) free of charge. The central government procures 
medicines for its national programmes (e.g. HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria) that are 
delivered in public facilities. At the state level, medicines are typically procured 
by central tender and supplied for health care delivery (Patel, Thawani et al. 
2004).  
 
The recent WHO/HAI survey found that among Indian states surveyed all 
typically procured medicines prices lower than international procurement prices. 
These states were Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and 
West Bengal (WHO/HAI 2006).  
 
6.3.3 LICENSING OF MEDICINES AND QUALITY CONTROL 
 
Under the MOHFW, the DCGI is responsible for licensing and standards 
according to the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. There is a division of 
authority between the central drug controller and the state level drug controllers.  
 
The central authority is responsible for approval of new drugs, provision of 
standards, clinical trials in the country, quality control over imported drugs, 
coordination of activities of state drug authorities and supplying advice over the 
uniformity of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (WHO 2004a).  
 
States have their own system of licensure for the manufacture, sale, and 
distribution of approved drugs and are responsible for the approved drug‘s quality. 
For domestic consumption, states issue a license to manufacture a drug that has 
already been granted market authorisation by the central drug controller. The 
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quality of production is not uniform and some state controllers are lax in adhering 
to GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) guidelines (World Bank 2002). The 
diagram below describes the separation in responsibility. 
 
Figure 6.5 - Licensing of pharmaceuticals 
 
 
 
The Central Drug Controller grants market authorisation to three categories of 
drugs: investigative new drug; new drug and follow-on products.  Market 
authorisation grants a license but there is no explicit policy on the length of time 
to approve a drug. Decision times can be short (in less than a year) or range from 
1 to 3 years. There is also no explicit policy on periodic reviews. 
 
As the figure illustrates, an investigative new drug, a new drug that is not a 
biological product or a follow-on product is approved only by the DCGI. For a 
biological drug, the Ministry of Environment and Forests reviews the 
environmental impact assessment of the production process to ensure that safety 
procedures are in place for a biological drug.  The Genetic Engineering Approval 
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Committee is responsible to review applications that involve medicines using 
biotechnology. 
 
For a drug that uses recombinant DNA technology, the Department of 
Biotechnology within the Ministry of Science and Technology is involved. The 
Department of Biotechnology is approves pre-clinical studies and recommends 
human clinical trials to the DCGI. This is carried out on case-by-case basis.  
 
Once the drug is on the market, phase IV (pharmacovigilance) studies are 
mandatory but it is not well enforced. Post marketing surveillance is a challenge 
in high and low-income settings, but in developing countries there tends to be 
little post-marketing safety monitoring (Edwards 1997; Lindquist and Edwards 
2001). 
 
The DCGI located in Delhi manages the aspect of drug quality in India. Actual 
administration, however, is handled by state controllers. Processes vary across 
states and efficiency of state level operations varies. For example, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Southern states have stronger regulatory authorities than the north 
and eastern states (e.g. Himalchal, Uttranchal, Sikhim) where regulatory systems 
are lax (World Bank 2002). 
 
The two main problems with quality control relate to regulatory capacity and 
laboratory capacity (World Bank 2002). First, most of the state quality control 
agencies have a shortage of staff and lack well trained staff. Second, quality 
testing takes place in government laboratories but facilities are not well equipped 
to conduct tests. The World Bank reported that out of the 19 state drug testing 
laboratories, only 7 could perform the full range of tests (World Bank 2002).  
 
GMP came into force in June 2006 (Schedule M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 
1940), but it has not been applied consistently to pharmaceutical firms. For 
domestic consumption, quality control is not enforced. In practice, a small to 
medium sized company may receive a license to manufacture without having to 
meet the required quality standards, which exacerbates the problem of counterfeit 
medicines and appropriate packaging standards in the Indian market. This 
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incentive may encourage the states to offer tenders to firms that do not produce 
quality medicines but offer a low price.  
 
In contrast, drugs for export to more regulated markets such as the US and Europe 
are required to meet the importing country‘s standards, which are likely to be 
higher than domestic quality standards. 
 
6.3.4 PRICING POLICY 
 
The NMP policy document‘s main focus is on pricing policy. The guiding 
principle for price regulation is based on two components: whether the medicine 
has mass consumption and whether there is absence of sufficient competition for 
the medicine (NPPA 2002). Drugs with high sales and a market share of more 
than 50% are targeted.
32
 Competition in the pharmaceutical market can be defined 
in different ways. The Indian pharmaceutical market is characterised as having a 
high volume generic drugs, which implies that competition is largely between 
medicines with identical active ingredients. 
 
The NPPA regulates prices of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), also 
referred to as bulk drugs, which are used for consumption as or as an ingredient  
in any formulation. Currently, the NPPA regulates the prices of 74 APIs that are 
commonly used according to a standard formula (please see Appendix D). These 
are referred to as scheduled medicines. The NPPA sets the maximum retail price 
(exclusive of local taxes). These medicines constitute less than 20% of the market 
and include imports or domestically manufactured products. Please see Appendix 
D for a complete list. Just under half of these (30) are not on India‘s list of 
essential medicines.   
 
                                                 
32
 The drugs considered for price regulation from the basket of drugs for selection will be chose if 
the annual value is more than Rs. 250 million and the percentage share is 50% or more; or if the 
drug‘s annual value is more than Rs. 100 million but less than Rs. 250 million with a percentage 
share of 90% or more. (NPPA, 2002).  
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Margins are fixed only for scheduled medicines: the wholesale margin is 8% and 
the retail margin is 16% (NPPA 2002). An NPPA study, however, showed much 
higher margins. The study found that retailer margins could be as high as 300% 
for scheduled and non-schedule medicines (NPPA, 2002). Three medicines were 
surveyed and margins varied from 100-500%. 
 
There had been lobbying efforts to reduce government tariffs on drugs because 
studies show that taxes, duties, and markups contributed more to the final retail 
price than the manufacturer‘s price (Levison and Laing 2003; WHO/HAI 2006). 
In the government‘s 2008 budget, the government responded to these efforts. The 
countervailing duty applied to pharmaceutical imported products for retail 
purposes dropped from 16% to 8%. The effective reduction is not as high as 8% 
but actually around 4-5% (Corporate Law Group 2008). There is a 4% VAT 
charged on all medicines in the public and private sector (Kotwani and Levison 
2007). 
 
For drugs not under price control, firms are free to set the maximum retail price 
(MRP). The NPPA will intervene if drugs have significant sales and where the 
annual price increases by more than 10%.This level was changed in April 1, 2007 
from 20% to 10%. About 10,000-20,000 manufacturers are monitored (NPPA 
2002). 
 
When price increases occur beyond the allowable limit, the NPPA will issue 
notices and if required, fix a price. The law permits NPPA to step in, but this 
action was infrequent during the first nine years of the NPPA‘s existence. As of 
November 2007, about 54,000 medicine packs were being monitored. Prices are 
based on information given in the monthly retail store audit report from 4000 
stockists (NPPA 2002). 
 
6.3.5 INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
 
There is considerable government support for the pharmaceutical industry in 
India. Industrial policy development is led by the Department of Chemicals and 
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Petrochemicals and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The Department of 
Chemicals and Petrochemicals is responsible to develop policies to stimulate 
industry growth. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry supports the industry on 
issues concerning exports, trade and patents.  
 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry set up the Pharmaceutical Export 
Promotion Council (Pharmexcil) having its headquarters in Hyderabad and 
Regional Offices in Mumbai and Delhi in 2004. The Council‘s objectives are to 
extend assistance to the industry which involves delegations to various countries, 
business meetings, and funding support for export activities. 
 
To export a drug from India, a firm is required to show the order form to the 
Directorate General of Foreign Trade. A license is not required for export. The 
firm, however, is required to follow the importing country‘s conditions. 
 
India became TRIPS compliant on January 1, 2005 and research suggests that this 
will have implications for industry growth and patient access to medicines (Grace 
2005). The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion is the agency 
responsible for IPRs and issues relating to patents. TRIPS will apply to patents 
from January 1, 2005 but not before 1995. The contentious area is for patents 
granted between 1995 and 2005. In this case, a firm that produced a generic 
version can continue to produce its drug as long as it made significant 
investments. If this occurs, the generic firm is required to pay reasonable royalties 
to the originator firm. Alternatively, if a generic firm did not wish to pay the 
royalties, it could challenge the patent application under review (pre-grant 
opposition). The main issue of contention relates to a reasonable level of royalty 
payments because this is not defined (Corporate Law Group, 2008; Grace 2005).  
 
The extent to which patents will affect access to affordable medicines is matter of 
ongoing debate. Some estimates show that medicines that account for 10-15% of 
value share will be affected; whereas as cardiovascular and pain relief drugs are 
less likely to be affected because there is a high level of therapeutic competition 
and substitution (Grace 2005). Diseases such as HIV/AIDS and resistant strains of 
TB and malaria will require new drugs and as a result patents will have 
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implications for their affordability in developing countries including India (Grace 
2005). 
 
6.4 PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
6.4.1 MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
 
Patented drugs are more widely consumed in wealthy countries (about two thirds) 
and account for one third in low income countries (WHO 2004a). The WHO 
(2004) notes that generic sales accounted for 60% in low and middle income 
countries and branded generics were more widely sold than unbranded generics. 
This is the case in the Indian market where branded generics dominate the market. 
 
The Indian pharmaceutical market experienced significant growth at the start of 
the 1990s as a major supplier to the global generics market. India‘s 
pharmaceutical market is characterised by branded generics, unbranded generics 
and patented originator products. The market consists of 20,000 companies which 
is higher than in the U.S (Kripalani 2008).  
 
In 2006, the total market by value was US$ 13 billion (domestic was US$ 7.9 
billion and exports were US$ 5.3 billion) (OPPI 2007). The government figure for 
exports was estimated to be a higher at US$ 6.3 billion (Department of Chemicals 
and Petrochemicals 2008). According to OPPI, in 2006, the industry registered a 
growth of about 18%, which was the first time in 5 years that the industry 
registered double digit growth (OPPI 2007). 
 
The success of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is mainly due to the absence of 
product patent protection before 2005 when process patents were in place (Shah 
2007). India had abolished product patents in 1971. This was prompted by the 
dominance of foreign companies that were charging very high prices and would 
not part with their technology or significantly lower prices for public health 
concerns (Shah 2007). 
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A policy of process patents came into effect in the 1970s when the government 
provided significant public sector support to establish government facilities for the 
production of APIs. Many of the known Indian pharmaceutical companies today 
were started by personnel that first worked in government facilities. The 
government pushed a cost-based price control system which encouraged firms to 
improve their efficiency (Shah, 2007).  This system created conditions for the 
industry to develop strong skills in patenting processes (i.e. reverse-engineering) 
in pharmaceutical production.  
 
These policies affected the speed at which the market developed. In the 1980s, the 
industry attracted a number of entrepreneurs. The industry was characterised as 
having little barriers to entry. Development financial institutions had special 
schemes for funding start up investments (Chaudhuri 2005). 
 
Recent trends show Indian companies are becoming increasingly export oriented. 
The growth of the industry has followed from production for the domestic market 
to export production. Most firms export to markets with little regulation. Most of 
the Indian companies operate at the lower end of the market where products are at 
the later stages of the product cycle. Barriers are less and the number of 
competitors is more. 
 
Almost half of the increase in exports between 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 was 
attributed to the exports of the top three exporters, Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy‘s and 
Cipla. Indian companies export formulations in their own brands (branded 
generics) (Chaudhuri, 2005).  
 
India‘s exports to Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe accounted for 50% in 2004-05 
(Shah, 2007). The majority of exporters focus on these markets which have little 
regulation (i.e. with little registration and inspection requirements).  The majority 
of exports comes from formulations 71% (Chaudhuri 2005). Exports to regulated 
markets (North America and West Europe) have grown and in 2004-05, they 
accounted for 40% of total exports. Please see table below. 
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Table 6.6 - Pharmaceutical exports by region, 2003-2005 
 2003-2004 2004-2005 Share in % Real annual 
growth% 
Market US$ (millions) US$ 
(millions) 
2004-2005  
     Asia  1010.2 1062.6 28.7 5.2 
West Europe  759.7 805.8 21.8 6.1 
North America  594.3 681.7 18.4 14.7 
Africa  405.6 443.6 12.0 9.4 
East Europe  309.4 399.9 10.8 29.3 
Latin America 294.4 303 8.2 2.9 
     
Total 3373.4 3696.6 100.0  
     
Source: Shah (2007)) 
Note: Annual data expressed in constant dollars. (Ex. Rate $1=INR 45).  
 
 
The top Indian companies have also developed partnerships with western 
pharmaceutical companies. Targeting regulated markets also resulted in 
opportunities for strategic alliances such as Ranbaxy-GlaxoSimthKline, Dr. 
Reddy‘s Laboratories-Novartis, Torrent-AstraZeneca (Shah, 2007). 
 
Most Indian companies have opted for safer strategies which involve forming 
alliances and partnerships with the multinational companies (MNCs) (e.g. by 
being a supplier in the export market and a marketing partner in the domestic 
market).  
 
6.4.2 PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES 
 
The Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act of 1954 lists 
disease categories for which advertisements cannot target consumers. The Act 
does not distinguish whether the drug is over-the-counter (OTC) or a prescription 
drug. Advertising to a registered medical practitioner is permitted if it is carried 
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out in a confidential manner according to the Act. The MOHFW is responsible for 
monitoring industry marketing activities but enforcement is weak. 
 
There is intense competition to gain market share. A study on drug marketing 
found that firms sometimes engage in aggressive marketing tactics, including 
showering physicians, pharmacists, and wholesale distributors with expensive 
gifts (Roy N, Madhiwalla N et al. 2007). Gifts range from jewellery and consumer 
electronics goods to automobiles. Physicians in small towns are also targeted and 
receive more expensive gifts the more tablets they prescribe (e.g. 1,000 tablets per 
month will give the doctor a cell phone; 5,000 tablets are worth an air-conditioner; 
10,000 tablets are worth a motorcycle). This implies that doctors may prescribe 
drugs based on company incentives rather than the needs of patients and are 
targeted very early in their careers (Kripalani 2008). 
 
The industry recognises that more effective self-regulation is necessary. In 
January 2008, the OPPI published a Voluntary Code on Marketing Practices. The 
code calls for maintaining strict ethical standards. That is, no financial benefit or 
benefit-in-kind should have an inappropriate influence on the professional‘s 
prescribing practices (OPPI. 2007). OPPI received only two complaints about 
aggressive marketing practices in the past year—partly because doctors and 
patients were generally reluctant to speak out, but OPPI would like the code 
turned into law (Kripalani 2008).  
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the Indian health system. A number of 
policy issues were raised to provide context for the empirical work. The policy 
issues are important because they have implications for patient access to 
medicines; these are discussed in more detail as they relate to this thesis in 
Chapter 9. We now turn to the empirical work carried out in outpatient and 
inpatient care settings in India to inform this area of analysis. 
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7 Chapter 7 Analysis of determinants of patient access to 
medicines in outpatient care in India 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The next two chapters now turn to the empirical work of the Indian country case 
study to better understand demand for medicines and health seeking behaviour. 
There is currently limited evidence on how and why individuals in India and more 
broadly in developing countries choose prescriptions drugs for treatment. The lack 
of data on this topic makes it difficult for empirical work to be carried out. 
Previous research typically comes from small datasets. The Indian country case 
study aims to contribute to the evidence base and is drawn from a large household 
survey for analysis. 
 
Two modelling approaches are taken to study the decision to seek care in both 
outpatient and inpatient care. This chapter focuses on outpatient care and sets out 
the theoretical framework and presents the findings from this analysis. The 
theoretical specification uses the MNL and nested approach as already seen in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 8 takes draws on the theory of count models to study the 
decision to seek care in inpatient settings. While different modelling approaches 
are taken, the analysis in both chapters estimates prices responsiveness and 
examines whether price responsiveness in India follows a similar pattern to the 
findings from the previous chapters. We now turn to the analysis in this chapter 
which aims to address the following research questions: 
 
Table 7.1 - Chapter 7 Research question and objective 
Chapter 7 Research Objective 
Determine the factors which affect access 
to medicines and outpatient care in India 
Research questions for analysis 
using household level data 
1) Is income a driver in India? 
2) Does regulation affect access 
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to medicines in India? 
3) What is the price elasticity in 
India? 
 
 
In this chapter, the data did not contain volume information for direct computation 
of price elasticities. Therefore, price elasticities were imputed by using health 
expenditure data which contained medicine expenditure data. As medicine 
expenditure data account for the largest share of health expenditure in the data set, 
the price elasticity estimates have implications for patient access to medicines and 
health seeking behaviour. The findings from the empirical analysis are based on 
the MNL and nested approaches. The results indicate that determinants to seek 
outpatient care include health status, marital status, urban/rural setting, log 
household expenditure, log predicted expenditure and regional dummies. Price 
elasticities for outpatient care range from -0.17 to -0.16 (1% significance), and 
0.16 (10% significance) with overall range from -0.17 to 0.43. The most 
significant results are intuitive with a negative sign but are at the lower of the 
range found in the literature. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents existing evidence from 
India, sections 7.3 and 7.4 present the theoretical framework, and data sources, 
section 7.5 provides the results, and 7.6 presents the conclusion. 
 
7.2 LITERATURE SUMMARY 
 
While the findings from the literature review in Chapter 3 are relevant to the 
Indian context, this section extends this discussion by focussing on evidence from 
India. This discussion highlights that common themes relating to patient access to 
medicines such as financial barriers are present in the Indian setting as well. 
 
7.2.1 ACCESS TO CARE 
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Evidence on patient access to medicines is limited. One study found that financial 
constraints in urban areas were a major determinant in the partial purchase of 
prescribed drugs (Dineshkumar, Raghuram et al. 1995). A study that surveyed a 
village in Northern India examined the patient‘s decision to seek medicine 
treatment for vaccination; it found that informational constraints played an 
important role and that learning about vaccinations through observation did not 
necessarily lead to seeking treatment (Das and Das 2003). In rural areas, 
expenditures on medicines increase with income and are higher than for other 
services (Garg CC and Karan AK 2005). Among the urban poor, however, the 
share spent on drugs is as much as their richer counterparts (Garg CC and Karan 
AK 2005). 
 
Research more broadly on access to care shows that some of the main factors that 
affect utilisation are cost, and distance (Nair, Thankappan et al. 2004; Ranson, 
Sinha et al. 2006); while another found that the reputation/trust of the health 
provider was a determining factor (Ager and Pepper 2005).The literature also 
emphasises that the poor and uneducated are less likely to use services 
(Pallikadavath, Foss et al. 2004; Roy K and Howard DH 2007) and have a higher 
price elasticity of demand (Borah 2006). There are differences by sex and by 
region. One study found differences in utilisation according to sex: in a rural 
community in Bengal; boys were fives time more likely to be taken for early 
medical care compared with girls (Pandey, Sengupta et al. 2002). Studies also 
show that there are high levels of utilisation in the private sector but that this 
varies for the poor from state to state (Ager and Pepper 2005; Levesque, Haddad 
et al. 2006).  
 
The WHO/HAI survey collected price information of medicines from selected 
India states. The study found that typically generics are exclusively available in 
the public sector and that procurement prices are efficient (Kotwani et al. 2007). 
The study found that availability of medicines, however, is poor in the public 
sector which implies that patients are forced to turn to the private sector (Kotwani 
A, Gurbani N et al. 2009a; Kotwani A 2009b; Kotwani A 2010).  
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Borah (2006) and Sarma (2009) studied household choice for rural India. This 
was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Both studies came to similar results 
and found that price, income, poor health, distance, education, household 
composition mattered. Borah (2006) found that social caste mattered while Sarma 
(2009) found that sex was also a determinant. Estimates ranged from 0.00 to -
1.68. Previous studies from India found smaller sized elasticities (Gupta I and 
Dasgupta P 2000). 
 
7.2.2 PRESCRIBING AND QUALITY OF CARE 
 
This section now turns to more descriptive analysis of prescribing practices and 
more generally quality of care. A large number of studies on drug utilisation in 
India have focussed on prescribing trends and whether medicines are prescribed 
rationally. This information is important to understand the supply chain of 
medicine distribution, how it affects patient access and whether they receive 
appropriate medicine treatment.  
 
Findings suggest that there are inappropriate levels of prescribing. Many studies 
show inappropriate prescribing in primary and secondary care (Bapna, Tekur et al. 
1992; Dharnidharka and Kandoth 1999; Das, Sarkar et al. 2006; Kotwani A 
2010). Furthermore, there are high levels of self-medication and inadequate 
compliance of over the counter (OTC) sale of antibiotics (Ray, Mukhopadhyay et 
al. 2003). Other studies have shown inappropriate use in the prescribing of 
antihyperintensives (Tiwari, Kumar et al. 2004) and for patients with unstable 
angina (Malhotra, Grover et al. 2000). One study showed higher levels of 
inappropriate prescribing in rural areas than in urban settings (Dineshkumar, 
Raghuram et al. 1995). Another study that used a random sample of private and 
public section practitioners found that there was over-prescription of drugs by 
private practitioners (Bhatia and Cleland 2004). 
 
Studies suggest that improvements in provider education and regulation of 
unregistered medical practitioners could lead to reduced levels of inappropriate 
prescribing (Malhotra, Jain et al. 2001a; Rehan and Lal 2002). The Delhi Society 
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for Promotion of Rational Use of Drugs (DSPRUD) Special Committee has used a 
form of prequalification since 1995 and has achieved savings of approximately 
30-35% in the purchases of essential drugs (Chaudhury RR, Parameswar R et al. 
2005). Delhi was the first state to develop a comprehensive Drug Policy, an 
essential drugs list (EDL), a centralised pooled procurement system, and activities 
to promote the rational use of drugs (Roy Chaudhury, Parameswar et al. 2005). 
Training programmes of providers led to a positive change in prescribing 
behaviour. Other studies show that the use of guidelines lead to improved rational 
prescribing in the use of antihyperintensives (Malhotra, Karan et al. 2001b) and 
among sexually transmitted diseases (Rewari, Tekur et al. 2000).  
 
Quality of provision varies and affects patient‘s decision to access care. One study 
found that utilisation tends to be higher in teaching hospitals (Sinhababu, 
Mahapatra et al. 2006). In a survey in two rural and urban populations, 
respondents were less likely to use a government facility because they cited poor 
quality of services (Griffiths and Stephenson 2001). Utilisation appeared to be 
higher if a health worker visited households during pregnancy and not necessarily 
higher by the mere presence of a private health care facility (Sunil, Rajaram et al. 
2006).  
 
The findings indicate that financial factors are an important determinant of 
utilisation. Furthermore, perceptions of quality of care, level of literacy/ability to 
communicate symptoms, and trust in the provider could encourage or undermine 
access to care.  
 
7.2.3 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH 
 
The aim of the Indian case study is to contribute to the evidence base on 
determinants related to health seeking behaviour and price responsiveness to 
medicines because the evidence base is limited. To address these knowledge gaps, 
this chapter uses information on medicines because this is not usually available in 
developing country surveys. Second, existing studies from India rely on small 
sample sizes of a small district, region or city rather than using a national datasets 
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or confined to either specific settings (e.g. rural). This chapter aims to fill the 
knowledge gap by carrying out analysis using a national dataset across rural and 
urban settings. Third, this chapter also addresses endogeneity issues related to 
health expenditure and health seeking behaviour. Fourth this empirical work has 
implications for policy and contributes to this topic by considering the 
pharmaceutical policy making environment in India and implications for price 
setting.  
 
7.3 THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The modelling approach taken in this chapter is a function of the data available for 
analysis. In the national household survey, data on outpatient care data was only 
collected for one visit in the past 15 days preceding the survey. Therefore the 
theoretical framework models the probability to seek care for one visit. This 
analysis applies choice models as those used in Chapter 5. Two types of choice 
models are used: first a MNL model is used and then the data are applied to a 
nested framework to model the decision to seek care. 
 
It is useful to recall the equation for a multinomial logit model. The probabilities 
sum to one so this implies that J parameter vectors are needed to determine J = 1 
probabilities. In this case, 00  . The equation can be rewritten as 
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In this analysis the choice model had five possible outcomes: public facility, 
private facility, self-treatment, do nothing, not sick. The coefficients are estimated 
as follows: 
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The computed coefficients, )5()4()3()2( ,,,   measure the change relative to 
y=1. Any of the five outcomes could be set to one. The difference is that the 
coefficients will have different interpretations but the predicted probabilities for 
y=1, 2, 3, 4, 5 will be the same.  
 
It is important to recall that in the MNL model, two assumptions should hold: the 
error terms are independent and identically distributed (IID) and that the ratio of 
the choice probabilities is independent, referred to as independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). These properties are tested and relaxed and are further 
discussed in the nested estimation in section 7.5.3.  
 
7.4 DATA AND METHODS 
7.4.1 DATA SOURCES 
 
Two waves (1995-96 and 2004) of data come from the National Sampling Survey 
Organisation of India dataset (NSSO).  Both surveys included information on 
socio demographic information of the household. The decision to seek care for 
one outpatient visit had five possible responses: visit to a public facility, private 
facility, self-treatment, do nothing when sick or not sick. This was the dependent 
variable. Expenditure information on one outpatient visit collected the costs for 
public facility, private facility, and self-treatment.  
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Two years of cross section data were available for analysis because the 
households surveyed in 1995-96 were not the same households surveyed in 2004. 
The sample includes children and adults. In 1995-96, 32 states were surveyed and 
included in the sample for analysis. In the 2004, the geographical boundaries were 
altered and 35 states were surveyed. For purposes of analysis, only 23 out of the 
35 states had complete observations. The list of the states is provided in the table 
below. 
 
Table 7.2 - State sample for outpatient analysis 
State 1995/96(Obs) 1995-96 (%) 2004 (Obs) 2004 (%) 
     Uttar Pradesh 79,827 12.65 55,925 14.65 
Bihar 52,081 8.25 NA NA 
Maharashtra 50,370 7.98 26,526 6.95 
Madhya Pradesh 46,649 7.39 19,932 5.22 
West Bengal 41,647 6.6 NA NA 
Andra Pradesh 40,290 6.39 22,345 5.85 
Tamil Nadu 38,508 6.1 21,279 5.57 
Rajasthan 28,314 4.49 19,242 5.04 
Gujarat 27,614 4.38 14,563 3.81 
Karnataka 27,163 4.3 16,972 4.44 
Kerala 24,384 3.86 16,502 4.32 
Punjab 22,451 3.56 1,242 0.33 
Orissa 21,770 3.45 NA NA 
Assam 21,646 3.43 NA NA 
Jammu Kashmir 15,824 2.51 101,778 26.65 
Himachal 11,246 1.78 20,087 5.26 
Haryana 10,246 1.62 7,763 2.03 
Tripura 9,276 1.47 NA NA 
Manipur 8,419 1.33 NA NA 
Meghalaya 7,658 1.21 NA NA 
Mizoram 7,275 1.15 NA NA 
Nagaland 7,260 1.15 NA NA 
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Sikkim 7,049 1.12 NA NA 
Delhi 6,556 1.04 5,206 1.36 
Arunchal 6,010 0.95 NA NA 
Andaman 
Nicobar Islands 4,498 0.71 NA NA 
Goa 2,332 0.37 900 0.24 
Chandigarh 1,154 0.18 1,803 0.47 
Pondicherry 1,073 0.17 1,182 0.31 
Lakshadweep 908 0.14 5,667 1.48 
Dadra 747 0.12 783 0.21 
Daman 738 0.12 728 0.19 
Jharkhand NA NA 10,915 2.86 
Chhattisgarh NA NA 7,885 2.06 
Uttranachal NA NA 2,642 0.69 
     Note: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttranchal only appear in the 2004 wave due to a change in geographical state boundaries.  
 
The regressors used in the analysis include age, sex and marital status were used. 
Two measures of the patient‘s health status were collected. The patient was asked 
to report whether he/she had been unwell in the last 15 days and the number of 
days ill. A variable on the reason for the visit was included on whether it was for 
an infectious condition or a non-infectious condition. The number of days ill was 
found to have more predictive power relative to the other measure of health status 
and was included in the model regression. The reason for visit was used in the 
regression to correct for endogeneity. 
 
Socioeconomic information included whether the patient had education, was 
employed, whether the patient lived in a rural or urban setting, whether the patient 
had private health insurance and the number of members living in the household. 
An indicator for wealth or income was drawn from the households‘ expenditure as 
no direct income information was collected.  
  
OOP costs were collected for public and private facilities and for patients who 
self-treated. In public and private facilities, medical expenditure included doctor‘s 
fees, medicines, diagnostic tests, attendant charges, physiotherapy, personal 
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medical appliances. Non-medical related expenditure was collected and included 
transport and lodging charges for the patient and escorts. Medical and non-
medical related expenditure were summed together for the outpatient visit. For 
patients who self-treated, they consulted themselves/family member/friend, a 
medicine shop or other. Only the total cost paid was collected. This expenditure 
information was transformed into logs to account for non linearities in the data. 
All expenditure and income variables were converted to US$PPP. The 1995-96 
expenditure data was converted into 2004 US$PPP. 
 
The same approach used in Chapter 5 was employed to address potential 
endogeneity issues concerning health expenditure data and the decision to seek 
care. The log predicted expenditure was used as a regressor. The variable was 
calculated by regressing the log outpatient expenditure against age, sex, 
employed, education, urban or rural setting, insurance, log household expenditure, 
state dummy and the reason for the visit. The reason for the visit was divided into 
whether it concerned a chronic condition or related to an infectious condition. 
7.4.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
The empirical specification models the probability of seeking care. There are five 
potential responses: visit public facility, visit private facility, self-treatment, do 
nothing, not sick. A multinomial logit model is used to model the choice to seek 
care. The regression model is defined as follows for individual i: 
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)5(Pr iYob where the individual was not sick was set as the base outcome. The 
following regression model was run for the ith individual across j alternatives 
where j= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The variables that were chosen were based on health 
economic theory, findings from the literature and variables available in the 
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dataset. The regressors were chosen to capture information on the patient‘s health 
status, utilisation, and socioeconomic information.  
 
ijij
ijijijijij
ijijijijijijijijij
XyeardummymyXregiondum
enditurepredictedXenditurehouseholdXuranceXhealthinsXurbansizeXhousehold
atusXmaritalstXemployedXeducationXdaysillXsexXageXageY



explogexplog
2
 
 
The expected relationships of the regressors are set out in the table below and 
consistent with Chapter 5.  
Table 7.3 - Expected signs of regressors 
Variable Expected Sign 
  Age + 
Sex +/- 
Days ill + 
Education + 
Employed + 
Marital status +/- 
Insurance + 
Urban +/- 
Household size +/- 
Household expenditure + 
Predicted expenditure - 
Regional dummy +/- 
Year dummy +/- 
  
 
The decision to seek care should increase with age. The age term was squared to 
address potential non linearities in the data. Those with poor health as measured 
by the number of days ill should be more likely to seek care.  
 
Education and employment should have a positive effect on the probability of 
seeking care. The insurance variable is treated as exogenous given the 
characteristics of the health care market as discussed in Chapter 2 and so we 
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would expect insurance to have a positive effect. The literature suggests that high 
OOP expenditures have a negative effect on the probability to seek care while 
household expenditures (e.g. a measure of household wealth) have a positive 
effect on the probability to seek care 
 
Women should be more likely seek care due to their health needs in particular 
relating to child health and child delivery, however the literature points to mixed 
evidence suggesting that men are more likely to seek care. Similarly, the effect of 
marital status is ambiguous on the probability of seeking care. Household size is 
ambiguous and may be a proxy for capturing wealth of a household. Larger 
households may have lower wealth and are more likely to seek care. Alternatively, 
smaller households could reflect greater wealth and suggest that the wealthy are 
more likely to seek care because they can afford it. The effect of the urban dummy 
variable is ambiguous as well. Patients living in urban settings may be more likely 
to seek care because there are likely to be more facilities available in urban 
settings. Alternatively, rural patients may be more likely to seek care if this 
variable is also a proxy for need: poor rural patients may struggle with health 
conditions and could be more likely to seek care.  
 
The state dummies were grouped together by region: north, south, east, west and 
union territories because the initial model run found very large standard errors so 
to improve model specification, the state dummies were grouped together by 
regions. This allowed the two waves to be pooled together. The regional dummies 
aim to account for the heterogeneity in the cross sectional dataset so the direction 
of the sign of these dummies a priori is ambiguous. The regional dummies reflect 
regulatory differences as well as the average level of wealth. North and eastern 
states tend to have less developed regulation while, the west, south and some of 
the union territories are on average wealthier and have stronger regulatory 
practices. The model requires one regional dummy to be its reference base which 
is assigned arbitrarily. The year dummy is inserted in the model to account for the 
two waves of cross section data and its effect a priori is also ambiguous. 
Estimations were run with and without sampling weights but the results were 
consistent. Estimates without sampling weights are presented below. 
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7.5 RESULTS 
7.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The dataset for the 1995-96 wave contained 630,590 observations and the 2004 
wave contained 385,607 observations. The proportion of patients reporting being 
sick in each wave is as follows 5.6% (35,341 observations) in the first wave and 
8.7% in the second wave (33,175 observations). The regressions were run using 
STATA software. 
 
Table 7.4 - Summary of data sample 
 1995 2004 
   Sick 35,341 (5.6%) 33,175 (8.7%) 
Not sick 630,983 381,867 
   
 
Of those who reported being sick, about two thirds visited a private facility for 
treatment as shown in the table below.  
 
Table 7.5 - Distribution of patients reported sick 
Reported Sick 1995 2004 
      Number sick  
(% Sick) 
% Sample Number sick 
(% Sick) 
% Sample 
Public visit 6,037 (17%) 0.9% 8,103 (24.4%)   2.1% 
Private visit 22,192 (63%) 3.5% 20,663 
(62.2%) 
5.4% 
Self-treatment 787 (2.2%) 0.1% 2,381 (7.1%) 0.6% 
Do nothing 6,325 (18%) 1% 2,028 (6.1%) 0.5% 
     
 
The average cost of treatment was lower in public facility than in a private facility 
by a small amount in both waves. Only a small proportion (roughly 3 to 4%) had 
expenditure that was greater than US$PPP 100. For about two thirds of patients, 
expenditure was less than US$PPP 20 which explains for a low average amount of 
around US$PPP 1.00 in each wave. The average cost of treatment was around 
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$USPPP 1 in the 1995-96 wave and ranged from $USPPP 1.00 to US$PPP 3.00 
for the 2004 wave. 
 
Table 7.6 - Summary of average OOP expenditure for outpatient care 
 1995 (US$PPP 2004) 2004 (US$PPP) 
   Public $19.60  $22.68 
Private $23.24 $25.64 
Self-treatment $12.65 $5.55 
Average OOP $1.05 $1.90 
   
 
The table below provides a descriptive summary of the variables used. 
Table 7.7 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  1995 
(Mean) 
2004 
(Mean) 
    Age Age of adult patient 24.7 27.3 
Sex 1 if patient is female and 0 otherwise 0.51 0.51 
Marital 
status 
1 if married or cohabitating and 0 otherwise 0.49 0.51 
Reason for 
visit 
1 if non-infectious ailment, 0 if for infectious 
ailment 
0.41 0.66 
Days ill Number of days ill 8.9 10.4 
Education 1 if patient has primary education or a higher 
and 0 otherwise 
0.39 0.45 
Employed 1 if patient is working and 0 otherwise 0.35 0.35 
Urban 
setting 
1 if patient lives in an urban or semi urban 
setting and 0 otherwise 
0.40 0.35 
 
Health 
insurance 
1 if patient has health insurance and 0 
otherwise 
0.009 0.004 
Household 
size 
Number of members living in the household 6.6 6.5 
Household 
expenditure 
Previous month‘s household expenditure 
(US$PPP) 
$270.61 $270.67 
OOP OOP expenditure (US$PPP) $1.05 $1.90 
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expenditure 
    
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that the adult population average age is around 
25 years for the 1995 wave and 27 years for the 2004 wave. The sample has 
relatively even split between men and women and between married and non-
married individuals. Among those reported being sick, the average number of 
days ill is around 10 days. In the 1995-96 wave, the majority reported the reason 
for the visit was related to an infectious ailment (59%) while in the 2004 wave the 
majority (66%) reported the ailment was related to a chronic condition. Between 
35 to 45% of individuals in the sample are employed, live in urban settings and 
have at least primary education. A very small proportion of the population has 
insurance. The OOP expenditure averaged about US$PPP 1.0. Data on medicine 
expenditure was disaggregated only for the 2004 wave and accounted for 55% of 
total expenditure. 
 
7.5.2 MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
 
The two waves were run together and after incomplete and missing observations 
were dropped, a total of 61,225 observations were available for analysis. The 
results from the MNL model to determine the probability to seek care are 
presented below. The coefficients are presented relative to not being sick which is 
the base outcome. 
 
The coefficients of the logit model are not easily interpretable. The signs of the 
coefficients indicate whether the variable of interest has a positive or negative 
effect on the choice probabilities (Hensher et al. 2005).  
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Table 7.8 - Multinomial regression results of outpatient care 
Regressor Public Private Self-treatment Do Nothing 
     Age 0.005 -0.0222*** 0.003 0.004 
Age
2 
-0.0001* 0.0001* -0.000 0.000 
Sex -0.006 -0.0787 -0.120* -0.228*** 
Marital status 0.317** 0.613*** 0.174 -0.137 
Days ill 0.051*** 0.039*** -0.065*** 0.020*** 
Education 0.317*** 0.430*** 0.289*** 0.062 
Employed 0.041 0.088 0.092 -0.092 
Urban setting 0.007 0.115* -0.128* -0.220*** 
Health insurance 0.007 0.337 0.157 0.192 
Household size 0.007 -0.011 0.008 0.064*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.545*** 0.940*** 
0.292*** 
-0.291*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -1.27*** -1.27*** 
-0.934*** 
-0.360** 
Region dummy1 0.467*** 0.318*** 0.167** 0.899*** 
Region dummy2 0.916*** 0.461*** 0.356*** 1.686*** 
Region dummy3 0.422*** 0.337** -0.279* 0.153 
Region dummy4 1.33** -0.069 -0.195 0.866 
Year dummy -1.50*** -1.86*** -0.765*** -3.177*** 
Constant 1.74*** 1.546*** 1.698*** 4.168*** 
     
N 61,225    
Pseudo R
2
 0.0741    
Chi-sq. 9969.20***    
Log likelihood -62290.45    
     
 
The marginal effects are used to better understand the impact of each regressor. 
The marginal effect reflects the change in probability for one of the choice 
alternatives given a unit change of the regressor on that choice alternative. These 
effects were estimated using post estimation techniques and are presented below. 
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Table 7.9 - Marginal effects of multinomial model of outpatient care 
Regressor Public Private Self-treatment Do Nothing 
     Age 0.0007*** -0.002*** 0.0002*** 0.001*** 
Age
2 
    
Sex 0.014*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.015*** 
Marital status -0.019** 0.104*** -0.010** -0.064*** 
Days ill 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.001*** 
Education -0.006 0.048*** -0.002 -0.029*** 
Employed -0.002 0.017*** 0.001 -0.015*** 
Urban setting -0.006* 0.042*** -0.007*** -0.028*** 
Health insurance -0.042** 0.054** -0.003 -0.005 
Household size 0.0008 -0.008*** 0.0002 0.006 
Log house 
expenditure -0.024*** 0.162*** 
-0.015*** 
-0.103*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.025*** -0.100*** 
0.007* 
0.082*** 
Region dummy1 0.013*** -0.056*** -0.010*** 0.052*** 
Region dummy2 0.0417*** -0.145*** -0.014*** 0.125*** 
Region dummy3 0.023*** 0.015* -0.022*** -0.011** 
Region dummy4 0.254*** -0.266*** -0.024** 0.041*** 
Year dummy 0.071*** -0.002 0.044*** -0.135*** 
     
N 61,225    
Pseudo R
2
 0.0741    
Chi-sq. 9969.20***    
Log likelihood -62290.45    
     
 
 
The results suggest that marital status, ill health, urban/rural setting, log household 
expenditure, log predicted expenditure and regional dummies have an effect 
(positive or negative) on the decision to seek care relative to those who are not 
sick. Those who are married are more likely to seek care at a public facility, self-
treat or do nothing while those who are not married are more likely to seek private 
care. Those who are ill are more likely to seek care in public or private facilities. 
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Those who live in urban settings are more likely to seek private care.  A proxy 
measure for a family‘s wealth, the log of household expenditure indicates that this 
variable reduces the probability of seeking care in a public facility, self-treat or 
doing nothing while it increases the chances of seeking care in a private facility. 
The log predicted expenditure increases the probability of seeking care in a public 
or private facility while having the opposite effect for self-treatment or doing 
nothing. 
 
The regional dummies also affect the decision to seek care. All dummies have a 
positive effect to seek care in a public setting while their impact in the other 
settings is mixed. The year dummy is also significant which account for 
differences across the two waves of cross sectional data. 
 
Own price elasticities and cross price elasticities were computed for the log 
predicted expenditure variable. The elasticities were calculated using post 
estimation techniques. This variable had mixed significance in the results. The 
elasticities for public and private facility are inelastic and significant: -0.16 and -
0.17 respectively, while self-treatment is 0.16 and significant only at the 10% 
level. The results indicate that a 1% increase in expenditure is associated with a 
drop in the probability of seeking care in a public facility and private facility by 
0.16% and 0.17% respectively but a 0.16% increase in the probability for self-
treatment. The probability of using both public and private facility is negatively 
associated with an 1% increase in expenditure. The elasticity for self-treatment is 
positive but is only significant at the 10% level.  
 
Cross price elasticities suggest that a public facility, private facility and self-
treatment are substitutes. These numbers range from 0.24 for public facility, 0.76 
for private and 0.05 for self-treatment. The results indicate that for a 1% increase 
in expenditure for public facility results in a 0.24% increase in the probability of 
visiting a private facility or self-treatment. Similarly, an increase in expenditure in 
a private facility results in a 0.74% increase in probability of visiting a public 
facility or self-treatment, while an increase in self-treatment has small effect on 
the probability of visiting a public or private facility (0.05%). Even though these 
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cross price elasticities make intuitive sense, the estimates are not statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 7.10 - Elasticity calculation MNL model 
 
Own price 
elasticity 
Cross 
price 
elasticity 
    
Public facility -0.16*** 0.24 
Private facility -0.17*** 0.76 
Self treatment 0.16* 0.05 
    
Note: 1%***; 5%**, 10%* 
 
The MNL model assumes that the error terms are independently distributed and 
that the ratio of probabilities is independent of other choices. These two 
conditions refer to the IID property and the IIA property respectively. 
 
A generalised Hausman test was run to test whether these properties were 
violated. The results indicate that they were with a Chi-square statistic of 209.75 
and a p-value of 0.000. The nested model is developed and tested in the following 
section. The computer code is shown in Appendix E. 
 
7.5.3 NESTED MODEL 
 
We now turn to the nested logit model analysis of outpatient care. The same five 
choices are modelled. Four choices were nested together: public facility, private 
facility, self-treatment and do nothing. Nesting aims to control for the potential 
correlation between these choices not being strictly independent of not being sick. 
Once these four choices are nested together, the theoretical framework of the 
model assumes that the IID and IIA properties hold among the four alternatives: 
that is between public visit, private visit, self-treatment and doing nothing. The 
tree is shown below along with the sample size in each of the categories. The 
computer code is shown in Appendix E. 
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Table 7.11 - Sample size and choice categories 
Choices N k  % 
Branch 1 - Sick    
Public 27,784 6,575 23.66 
Private 27,784 16,703 60.11 
Self-treatment 27,784 1,835 6.6 
Do Nothing 27,784 1,622 5.8 
Branch 2 -Not sick    
Not sick 27,784 1,049 3.7 
Total 138,920 27,784 100 
    
 
Figure 7.1 - Nested tree structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The important distinction with the nested approach is that variables common to all 
choices were computed. The one variable which varied across the elemental 
alternatives was the log predicted expenditure and was computed separately for 
each. The choice of doing nothing was used as the base case.  
 
The nested logit results are somewhat consistent with the results under the MNL 
model but not as many variables are significant in the nested approach. The 
coefficients are shown below. The standard error computation was adjusted for 
Public Private Self Not sick
Patient
Not sickSick
N=6575 N=16703 N=1835 N=1049
Do nothing 
N=1622
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possible intra-correlation across regions. As a result regional dummies were not 
included as a separate regressor. The year dummy was not included either. 
 
The results show that those more likely to seek care include those who are 
married, educated, come from small households, high household expenditure and 
OOP expenditure. The marginal effects of the regressors, however are not 
significant. Overall the results under the nested model are not as strong in 
statistical significance as those found under the MNL model. The computer code 
is shown in Appendix E. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 - Nested logit results 
Regressor Coefficient 
  Age -0.009 
Age
2 
-0.000 
Sex -0.111 
Marital status 0.419** 
Days ill 0.006 
Education 0.269*** 
Employed -0.020 
Urban setting 0.102 
Health insurance 0.256 
Household size -0.055*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.749*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
public 0.411*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
private 0.677*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure self 0.020* 
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treatment 
  
Constant  
  
N 138,920 
Chi-sq. 30194*** 
Log likelihood -30876 
Ratio scale 
parameter
 
 
0.707*** 
 
LR test IIA 3.81* 
  Note: 1%888, 5%**,  10%* 
 
Table 7.12 - Elasticity results nested model 
 
Own price 
elasticity 
Cross 
price 
elasticity 
    
Public facility 0.26 -0.21 
Private facility 0.43 -0.34 
Self treatment 0.01 -0.01 
    
Note: 1%***; 5%**, 10%* 
 
Table 7.13 - Marginal effects nested model 
Regressor Coefficient 
  Age -0.000 
Age
2 
-0.000 
Sex -0.012 
Marital status 0.041 
Days ill 0.000 
Education 0.030 
Employed -0.001 
Urban setting 0.015 
Health insurance 0.033 
Household size -0.005 
Log house 
expenditure 0.069 
Log predicted 0.046 
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expenditure 
public 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
private 0.076 
Log predicted 
expenditure self 
treatment 0.002 
  
Constant  
  
  
 
Price elasticities and cross price elasticities were calculated. The elasticities for 
public facility is 0.26, private is 0.43 and self-treatment is 0.01. These numbers 
give suggest that a 1% increase in expenditure for each of these alternatives 
increases the probability of seeking treatment by 0.26% for public facility, 0.43% 
for private and 0.01% for self-treatment. These results are not intuitive to the 
previous model‘s findings but are also not statistically significant. The cross price 
elasticities are -0.21 for public facility, -0.34 for private and -0.01 for self-
treatment, which suggest that these alternatives are complements rather than 
substitutes as found in the MNL model. These numbers suggest that for 1% 
increase in expenditure for public facility reduces the probability of visiting a 
private facility or self-treatment by 0.21%, 0.34% for private facility and 0.01% 
for self-treatment. These numbers suggest the opposite relationship as that found 
in the MNL model of each alternative being a substitute but these numbers are 
also not statistically significant. A summary of the estimates computed thus far in 
the empirical chapters are shown below. 
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Table 7.14 - Summary of elasticity results 
Model Key 
Assumptions 
Sample Description Elasticity 
     MNL IIA and IID 
hold 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.19 (hospital) 
 0.11
**
 (clinic) 
 
MNL IIA IID hold India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.16*** (public)  
-0.17***(private)  
0.16* (self) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.03 (hospital) 
 0.63 (clinic) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.26 (public) 
0.43(private) 
 0.01(self ) 
 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The sensitivity tests of the model indicate that the IIA property and IID property 
in the MNL model do not hold. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null that the 
IIA property holds with a Chi-sq of 3.81 at the 10% level (0.0509). This may in 
part explain the lack of robust findings in the nested model. The parameter which 
measures the independence between choices is 0.707 and is the ratio of the scale 
parameter. This parameter lies between 0 and 1 and satisfies utility maximisation 
rules. Even though the limitation with this test is that it is specific to the tree 
structure which means that different specifications could give different results, the 
results from the generalised Hausman test found that the null hypothesis of the 
IIA property does not hold as was discussed in chapter 5. 
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7.5.4 LIMITATIONS 
 
There are limitations with the analysis that should be highlighted. First, the same 
technique to estimate price elasticities in chapter 5 was used in this chapter: the 
estimation of price elasticities was based on health expenditure information. This 
information was limited in the survey to include information only on one episode 
and in one health setting which was either in a public or private facility. An 
important estimation issue involves a distinction between utilisation and health 
expenditure. The endogenous relationship between these two variables requires 
some method to correct for the bias in the estimated coefficients. The method used 
in this chapter was to estimate predicted health expenditure rather than using 
actual health expenditure. This approach aimed to purge the disease and 
socioeconomic effects in the generated price variable. While this technique is a 
common method used in the literature not all of the potentially endogeneity could 
be accounted for. Furthermore, the expenditure information related to only direct 
health care costs. Indirect costs of seeking care were not collected such as due to 
ill health, travel, waiting at health care facilities or providing care to family 
members (McIntyre D et al. 2006). The estimates of predicted health expenditure 
are therefore lower than the true costs of health care.  
 
Despite using a large dataset, the analysis is based on two waves of cross sectional 
data. The data do not permit a time series analysis, which would shed light on the 
factors that would affect demand for health care over time or the cumulative 
effects of illness, access to care and health care spending over time.  
This information is important because understanding the dynamic effects between 
these and other factors (e.g. the loss of income from illness) is particularly 
important as chronic illness prevalence increases globally (Wagner et al. 2011). 
 
The household survey does not adequately capture those with unmet need 
including those who needed care but did not avail themselves of services and 
those who sought care but did not find their needs were properly met. The data are 
also not able to adequately capture information on adherence which would give a 
more complete picture on access. The data do not collect information on all 
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members of the household and thus may misclassify households with respect to 
need and access (Wagner et al. 2011). 
 
The data did not allow for further analysis of individuals who chose to do nothing 
or for those who opted for self-treatment. Among those who chose not to take 
treatment based on medical advice (about 15% in both waves) the majority cited 
the ailment was not very serious (52% in 1995-96; 41% in 2004). Furthermore 
about half of the 15%  sought alternate care (e.g. medicine shop). Information on 
their circumstances and the factors that affected this sub-sample of patients would 
provide useful information on those who chose not to present themselves to the 
health care system, which is of important policy relevance in these settings where 
alternate treatment practices (e.g. Ayurveda) are widely followed.  
 
Information on traditional medicine practices and their relationship with the 
uptake of western medicines would have provided a more nuanced discussion on 
medicine consumption in these settings.  For instance, it would have been useful 
to have information on whether western medicines are viewed more as 
complements than substitutes, and whether that varies depending on the patient‘s 
health condition, socioeconomic circumstances, etc. 
 
While household surveys provide important information for analysis from the 
patient‘s perspective, data on supply side information is limited for analysis. Even 
though outpatient care was able to distinguish whether the visit was in a private or 
public setting, more information on supply/provider characteristics would better 
control the supply factors on demand for medicines. At a disaggregated level, 
these could include density measures of health professionals, number of hospital 
beds, number of health facilities per capita, and number of traditional healers per 
capita. 
 
Quality information was partly available for government facilities but not 
collected for the other choice settings and therefore could not be used in the 
analysis. Quality information is potentially an important determinant of health 
seeking behaviour but its effect could be partly masked in other variables then this 
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will affect the estimation of the decision to seek care and the relationship between 
price and quality.  
 
Finally, while the importance of the regulatory environment is tested using 
dummies, this approach is limited as it cannot account for states differences in 
greater detail. State information was grouped together on a regional basis because 
the log likelihood model could not be estimated due to large standard errors in the 
state coefficients. This approach is limited as it cannot account for state 
differences in greater detail such as procurement efficiency.  State level dummies 
could have provided better estimates.  
 
Furthermore, non-governmental actors play an important role in procurement in 
these settings which are not explicitly accounted for in the model and could 
confound the findings. There could be differences for diseases areas or due to 
differences in private sector providers or international organisations which could 
affect the price elasticity of demand. The role of the regulatory environment in 
these settings would have to be supplemented with more qualitative information 
so clearer links could be made with the quantitative findings and the policy setting 
environment. More information on the regulatory environment would shed light 
on the policy context to better understand patient access to medicines and health 
care.  
 
7.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter used household level data from India to better understand the 
demand structure for health care at the patient level in outpatient care. The 
household level data from India contained cross sectional data from two waves 
which draws information from a larger dataset than previous empirical work. The 
additional feature of this dataset is that it included expenditure information on 
medicines.  
 
The findings from the MNL model indicate that determinants of health seeking 
behaviour include poor ill, marital status, urban/rural setting, log household 
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expenditure, log predicted expenditure and regional dummies. Those who are ill 
are more likely to seek care in public or private facilities. Those who live in urban 
settings are more likely to seek private care.  A proxy measure for a family‘s 
wealth, indicates that this variable reduces the probability of seeking care in a 
public facility, self-treat or doing nothing while it increases the chances of seeking 
care in a private facility. 
 
The elasticities for public and private facility are inelastic and significant: -0.16 
and -0.17, respectively. These measures are within the range of elasticities found 
in the literature. Own price elasticity for self-treatment is 0.16 but it is only 
significant at the 10% level. The findings also suggest that the choice between 
public, private and self-treatment are substitutes with estimates consistent with 
literature findings ranging from 0.05 to 0.76 but were not statistically significant. 
 
While the MNL results are more intuitive and significant the nested model is a 
more robust technique since the IID and IIA properties do not hold. The nested 
results, however, are not as strong in statistical significance and the marginal 
effects are smaller in magnitude. This may in part explain the lower level of 
significance of the likelihood ratio test that that IIA property is violated (10% 
significance level). The model finds that less regressors are significant but these 
are consistent with the MNL and include marital status, education, household and 
OOP expenditure except for household size which was only an important 
determinant in the nested model. In magnitude, price effects ranged from 0.01 to 
0.43 and cross price effects suggest that the health choices are complements rather 
than substitutes but these none of these were significant. 
 
There are similar implications for the counterintuitive price elasticity estimates 
found in this chapter as raised in chapter 5. These results could in part be due to 
model misspecification such as the missing indirect expenditure information or 
bias in the recall period. The recall period, however, specifies the past 15 days so 
this variable should be subject to less bias. Other reasons could relate to factors 
that affect the patient‘s decision to spend money once they decide to visit a health 
facility. These could be due to cultural factors relating to the relationship between 
health professionals and patients (e.g. expression of gratitude), the potential 
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demand for additional fees once the patient is at the facility by the health 
professional, or perceptions of improved quality of care if the patient pays more 
money once they are at the facility.  
 
While perceived health status is an important factor, there could be elements of 
perceived health status that this variable failed to capture in the sense that for a 
given perceived health status, those with lower incomes (proxy using household 
expenditures) are less likely to seek care. Direct price and volume information 
would have provided a clearer picture on the determinants of health seeking 
behaviour.  
 
Furthermore, while household expenditures are the common proxy for income in 
these settings, this variable may not appropriately capture true income differences 
between households. This variable will also be biased by the data sample for those 
with unmet need that were not included in the analysis. Such factors could 
therefore be masking the true relationship between price and the health visit.  
 
Another approach would be to estimate price elasticities for each wave separately 
and to include interaction effects rather than computing one overall estimate. The 
approach taken in this chapter and in this thesis was to draw on larger datasets for 
analysis as previous studies have typically relied on smaller data samples for 
analysis. The large dataset potentially provides a more robust estimate but the 
limitation with this approach is that it takes data from two cross-sections which 
are 9 years apart. While a year dummy was included in the analysis, the gap 
between these two waves may not account for differences in the variables across 
both waves. One potential confounding factor could be greater error in estimating 
an ‗average elasticity‘ across the two waves given that many contextual and other 
factors could have changed. 
 
Some of the econometric results are consistent with the survey findings that 
income is an important determinant. In both waves households reported a loss to 
household income with an average loss of US$PPP 25.00 (US$PPP 28.00 in 
1995-96 and US$PPP 20.00 in 2004). In both waves, about 15% did not seek 
treatment based on medical advice and about one fifth of these respondents cited 
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financial reasons (18% in 1995-96; 26% in 2004). The significance of visiting a 
private facility is also consistent with survey findings which suggest that patients 
prefer a private facility because it was closer and because from past experience 
were not satisfied with treatment in a public facility. 
 
The results of the regional dummies indicated that the regulatory environment is 
an important factor. The data do not provide more disaggregate information which 
would better explain state differences. There could be differences in how well 
states procure medicines as found among some Indian states in the WHO/HAI 
(2006) survey. Thus, there could be differences within states and across states 
which are masked with an aggregate dummy measure.  
 
Another key issue in these settings is that governments are not the only procurers 
of medicines in low and middle-income settings because the private sector is also 
an active procurer. For instance, some states could have very high procurement 
prices and therefore it would be useful to understand the factors which underpin 
high procurement prices. Procurement efficiency could be an important predictor 
in the model but since this information was not available at a more disaggregate 
measure, the dummy variable could confound the results. The regional dummy 
results are therefore limited in their interpretation and would have to be 
supplemented with more state-level analysis. The subsequent chapter partly 
address this issue by creating state dummies in the study of inpatient care in India. 
 
The method used in this chapter was to first understand the determinants that 
affect the likelihood of seeking care and the implication for price responsiveness 
for price elasticities related to OOP for treatment. Unlike the 2004 wave, medicine 
expenditure was not separated from total expenditure reported in the 1995-96 
wave but evidence from the literature suggests that medicines account for the 
largest share of household medical expenditure in India. The price elasticity 
information is useful in capturing patient price responsiveness to their OOP 
medicine costs. This is useful to inform price setting. For policy purposes, 
inelastic demand should not imply that an increase in prices would result in 
potential increase in revenues. This has found to be counterproductive as the 
literature shows that the demand for care drops and vulnerable groups are more 
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likely to be adversely affected. The policy response should consider low price 
setting to improve and increase welfare on patient access to care and to medicines. 
The next section further extends this analysis to understand health seeking 
behaviour in inpatient care in India. 
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8 Chapter 8 Analysis of determinants of patient access to 
medicines in inpatient care in India  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter continues with the Indian case study analysis and now moves to 
inpatient care. The analysis in this chapter is useful as it complements the research 
on outpatient care. A key difference in this chapter‘s analysis is that the modelling 
approach is different from the choice models used in both Chapter 5 and 7 (MNL 
and nested). While these models are used when data on one health care visit are 
available, this chapter employs models applied to count data. Even though the 
models used in chapter 5 and 7 provide useful results, the data are limited for 
analysis because they are based on one visit. In contrast, in this chapter, data on 
inpatient care captured information for the numbers of visits over a 1 year period. 
This larger dataset of information on utilisation should in principle, provide more 
robust estimates of determinants of health seek behaviour and price elasticities. 
This chapter‘s research objective and questions are presented below. 
 
Table 8.1- Chapter 8 Research question and objective 
Chapter 8 Research Objective 
Determine the factors which affect access 
to medicines and inpatient care in India 
Research questions for analysis 
using household level data 
4) Is income a driver in India? 
5) Does regulation affect access 
to medicines in India? 
6) What is the price elasticity in 
India? 
 
 
It is important to note that because of large data constraints, there is limited 
information on patient‘s decisions to choose prescription drugs in developing 
country settings. In this chapter, volume information on medicines was not 
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available. Health expenditure data, which includes expenditure on medicines was 
used to impute price elasticities. As medicine expenditure data account for a large 
share of health expenditure in the data set, the price elasticity estimates have 
implications for patient access to medicines and health seeking behaviour.  
 
The results indicate that for the inpatient setting, households with high 
expenditure have a positive effect on the probability of having a hospitalisation. 
This indicates that income is an important determinant. Being male, married, and 
also in poor health are more likely to have a hospitalisation. Insurance is an 
important predictor of hospitalisation. Those with education, the employed, living 
in urban areas and from small households have a negative effect on visiting the 
hospital.  
 
Conditional on having a hospitalisation, the expected number of hospitalisations 
increases with high household expenditure, poor health, and being male, while the 
urban setting has a negative effect. Regulation also plays an important role on 
hospitalisations. States can have a positive or negative effect on the number of 
hospitalisations. Price elasticities range from -0.13 to -0.10 (1% significance), -
0.11 (5% significance) and 0.03 (10% significance) with an overall range of -0.13 
to 0.03 for inpatient care. The significant results are intuitive with a negative sign 
but are at the lower of the range found in the literature. While the results are 
inelastic and negative, the results should not be interpreted to mean there is 
revenue raising opportunity. The policy implications of these results are discussed 
at the end of this chapter. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 presents the theoretical 
framework;  sections 8.3 and 8.4 presents the analysis and discussion of inpatient 
care followed by the conclusion in 8.5. 
 
8.2 THEORETICAL MODEL 
8.2.1 SIMPLE COUNT MODELS 
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The data used in this section on inpatient care are count data, unlike the previous 
chapters where information on only one health care visit was recorded. In the 
literature, count data can be drawn from the number of visits, hospitalisations and 
these data are regressed in two stages. Examples include visits to GP, visits to 
specialists (Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995; Hakkinen, Rosenqvist et al. 1996; Santos 
Silva and Windmeijer 2001), weeks in hospital (Gerdtham 1997), emergency 
room visits, hospital stays, number of drug prescriptions (Deb and Trivedi 1997) 
and number of outpatient visits (Deb and Trivedi 2002). 
 
Count data on health care use typically contain a large proportion of zeros because 
the majority do not consume health care services while generally a small number 
of individuals tend to be high users of health care services, resulting in a skewed 
distribution of utilisation (Jones et al. 2007).  
 
The nature of health utilisation data has given rise to applying the Poisson 
distribution to model health utilisation. The starting point for a standard count 
data model uses a Poisson distribution. The count dependent variable yi, follows a 
Poisson distribution with mean i  and covariates xi as shown below (Jones et al., 
2007):  
 
P(yi) = e
i yi
i /yi        (8-1) 
 
The conditional mean i is defined as 
i =E(yi|xi)= exp(xi )        (8-2) 
 
The literature, however, has shown that the Poisson model is too restrictive. 
Cameron and Trivedi (1998) note that one of the problems with a Poisson model 
is that of unobserved heterogeneity. This can lead to over dispersion and excess of 
zeros (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Cameron and Trivedi (1998) list the most 
common departures from the assumptions of the Poisson model. These include the 
equidispersion property, higher observed zeros than is consistent with Poisson and 
multimodality where observations are drawn from different populations (Cameron 
and Trivedi 1998).   
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Techniques have employed the negative binomial model, and zero inflated models 
to overcome the limitations with the Poisson model. A negative binomial (NB) 
model is proposed as an alternative because the heterogeneity can be modelled. In 
the Poisson model, the dependent variable is assumed to have the following 
distribution (yi|xi).  
 
In the NB, the distribution is (yi|xi, i ) where i  follows a gamma distribution and 
E(y) =  and Var(y) =  k2  (Jones et al., 2007). The NB nests the Poisson 
model which occurs when 0  (please see Cameron and Trivedi 1998 for the 
derivation). 
 
Even though the NB accounts for over dispersion, Gurmu (1997) notes that 
regression estimation does not adequately capture long-tailed distributions with 
excess zeros. The zero-inflated Poisson model ZIP is proposed to give more 
weight to the probability that the count variable equals zero. This estimation 
approach divides the population into users and non-users. 
 
The probability of non-users is q(x1i )1 and the probability of users is 1- 
q(x1i )1 (Jones et al. 2007). The probability function for the zero-inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) model is a mixture of the standard Poisson model and a degenerate 
distribution concentrated at zero (Jones et al. 2007) as shown below: 
 
P
ZIP
(y|x) = 1 (y=0)q + (1-q)P
P
(y|x)      (8-3) 
 
The zero-inflated model can be estimated using the Poisson or for a more general 
specification the NB is applied (Jones et al. 2007). 
 
8.2.2 TWO STAGE MODELLING 
 
A further extension to model health utilisation has drawn on improved empirical 
specification using a technique referred to as the Hurdle model. This approach 
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models the decision to seek care in two stages. Mullahy (1986) developed the 
Hurdle model as a response to improving the empirical specification of count data 
models.  
 
In the application to health care utilisation, the two stage approach aims to capture 
the principal-agent relationship used to commonly characterise the physician-
patient relationship. In the two stage approach, the first part specifies the decision 
to seek care which is taken by the patient (principal). The second part models the 
positive values of the variable for those individuals who receive some care (Jones 
et al 2007). The second part aims to capture the role of the physician (agent) who 
determines the level of utilisation once initial contact is made (Jones et al 2007). 
This modelling approach aims to account for supply factors that affect the level of 
care. 
 
Mullahy addresses the issue of whether the binary outcome of the count being 
either zero or positive might differ from that determining the magnitude of the 
positive counts (Mullahy 1986). He shows that two processes should not be 
constrained to be identical thus giving rise to estimation in two stages. The 
participation decision is determined by P1(.) and the positive counts are 
determined by P2(.). The log-likelihood is given by (Jones et al. 2007): 
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In the application to health care utilisation, the first stage, the decision to seek care 
(participation decision) is usually modelled as a logit, probit, Poisson or negative 
binomial (NB). The most common approaches for the second stage include 
Poisson or NB. The literature has shown that the Hurdle approach is a better 
starting point to model count data when there is a high proportion of zeros 
(Grootendorst 1995; Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995; Gerdtham 1997). Limitation 
with household data is that supply information is not well captured. 
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Further extensions to modelling health care utilisation include finite mixture/latent 
class model develop by Deb and Trivedi (1997) and the latent class Hurdle model 
(Bago d'Uva 2006). Both these approaches assume some sort of count data but 
require panel data for analysis which was not available in the Indian dataset. 
 
The following sections apply the techniques of Poisson, NB, ZIP, ZINB and two 
stage modelling to the household data from India to study price responsiveness of 
patients and the implications for access to inpatient care. 
 
8.3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter aims to further refine the analysis on price responsiveness using 
household survey from India as a case study. This section presents the data and 
methods used to estimate the factors that affect health care utilisation, and the 
empirical estimation of patient‘s price responsiveness to the price of health care 
services consumed. 
8.3.1  DATA SOURCES 
 
The data used for analysis come from two waves of household survey data from 
India. The data source is the National Sampling Survey Organisation of India 
(NSSO). Two waves of household surveys that focussed on health care use were 
conducted for 1995-96 and 2004. The survey included socio demographic 
information of the household, health care utilisation of hospital visits, and 
expenditure incurred for using health services. All states in India were surveyed. 
Two years of cross section data were available for analysis because the 
households surveyed in 1995-96 were not the same households surveyed in 2004. 
The 1995-95 wave contained 32 states for analysis. The 2004 wave contained a 
total of 35 states due to a change in geographical boundaries. The table is below. 
 
Table 8.2 - State sample for inpatient analysis 
State 
1995-96 
(Obs) 1995-96 (%) 2004 (Obs) 2004 (%) 
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Andaman 
NicobarIslands 4,514 0.71 1,263 0.33 
Andra Pradesh 40,337 6.37 22,651 5.85 
Arunchal 6,032 0.95 5,599 1.45 
Assam 21,646 3.42 14,121 3.65 
Bihar 52,135 8.23 23,945 6.19 
Chandigarh 1,164 0.18 1,829 0.47 
Chhattisgarh NA NA 7,956 2.06 
Dadra 753 0.12 791 0.2 
Daman 741 0.12 737 0.19 
Delhi 6,584 1.04 5,212 1.35 
Goa 2,344 0.37 917 0.24 
Gujarat 27,764 4.38 14,760 3.81 
Haryana 10,351 1.63 7,881 2.04 
Himachal 11,193 1.77 7,231 1.87 
Jharkhand NA NA 6,816 1.76 
Jammu 
Kashmir 15,877 2.51 11,005 2.84 
Karnataka 27,276 4.31 17,114 4.42 
Kerala 24,600 3.88 13,719 3.55 
Lakshadweep 921 0.15 978 0.25 
Madhya 
Pradesh 46,824 7.39 20,158 5.21 
Maharashtra 50,771 8.01 26,959 6.97 
Manipur 8,424 1.33 8,644 2.23 
Meghalaya 7,669 1.21 4,074 1.05 
Mizoram 7,284 1.15 5,384 1.39 
Nagaland 7,313 1.15 1,813 0.47 
Orissa 21,839 3.45 13,135 3.39 
Pondicherry 1,072 0.17 1,208 0.31 
Punjab 22,537 3.56 8,107 2.1 
Rajasthan 28,445 4.49 19,467 5.03 
Sikkim 7,066 1.12 2,570 0.66 
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Tamil Nadu 38,749 6.12 21,568 5.57 
Tripura 9,304 1.47 4,840 1.25 
Uttar Pradesh 80,224 12.66 56,613 14.63 
Uttranachal NA NA 2,661 0.69 
West Bengal 41,821 6.6 25,169 6.51 
     Note: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttranchal only appear in the 2004 wave due to a change in geographical state boundaries. 
In the 2004 wave, Andaman Nicobar Islands, Jammu Kashmir, Pondicherry did not have complete observations for 
analysis. 
 
The data available for this chapter‘s analysis recorded the total number of hospital 
visits for each household member over a one-year period. The 1995-96 wave 
collected total expenditure incurred for hospitalisation while the 2004 wave 
collected a breakdown of expenditure information which included doctor‘s fees, 
diagnostic tests, medicine costs, other hospital expenditure, transport and lodging 
costs. 
 
The sample selection included all states in both waves. The household respondent 
was asked to report all hospitalisations that took place in the past year and to 
provide health care utilisation information related to each visit. The sample 
included adults and children. The dependent variable was total number of 
hospitalisations for each member of the household. 
 
The following variables were used in the analysis. The age, sex and marital status 
were used. Two measures of the patient‘s health status were used. The patient was 
asked to report whether he/she had been unwell in the last 15 days as a proxy 
measure of the patient‘s health status and a variable on the reason for the visit was 
included. The measure on whether the patient had been unwell had relatively 
stronger predictive power in the model runs and was used for the regression 
analysis. The reason for visit variable was used in the regression to correct for 
endogeneity. 
 
Socioeconomic information included whether the patient had education, was 
employed, whether the patient lived in a rural or urban setting, whether the patient 
had private health insurance and the number of members living in the household. 
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An indicator for wealth or income was drawn from the households‘ expenditure as 
no direct income information was collected.  
  
Patients reported on their OOP costs related to the hospitalisation. All non-
hospital related expenditure was also collected and included transport (other than 
ambulance) and lodging charges of escorts. Hospital and non-hospital related 
expenditure were summed together for each hospital visit. This expenditure 
information was transformed into logs to account for non linearities in the data. 
Data on whether the patient was treated in a public or private setting was 
incomplete and was excluded from the analysis. All expenditure and income 
variables were converted to US$PPP. The 1995-96 expenditure data was 
converted into 2004 US$PPP. 
 
To address potential endogeneity issues the predicted hospital expenditure per 
visit was averaged across each state in India. This measure was used because it 
was the most robust to the model specification. The predicted hospital expenditure 
was calculated by regressing log hospital expenditure against age, sex, employed, 
education, urban or rural setting, insurance, log household expenditure and the 
reason for the visit. The reason for the visit was divided into whether it concerned 
a chronic condition or related to an infectious condition. 
 
8.3.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
The first stage of analysis involved running the regressions of total 
hospitalisations against the following regressors using the count data models. 
 
The regression model is defined as follows for individual i: 
 
i
iii
iiiii
iiiiii
yXstatedumm
enditurepredictedXenditurehouseholdXuranceXhealthins
XurbansizeXhouseholdatusXmaritalstXemployedXeducation
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The variables chosen for analysis had two aims. First, the selection was intended 
to be consistent with the previous chapter‘s analysis for comparative purposes. 
Second the variables identified were in part based on health economic theory and 
in part based on determinants found to be significant from the literature. Empirical 
analysis was also dependent on variables available in the data set and included 
information on the patient‘s health status, utilisation and socioeconomic 
information.  
 
The expected relationship between the dependent variable of total hospitalisations 
and the regressors draws from literature findings. These are also set out in the 
table below. 
 
Table 8.3 - Expected signs of regressors 
Variable Expected Sign 
  Age + 
Sex +/- 
Ailing in the past 15 days + 
Education + 
Employed + 
Marital status +/- 
Insurance + 
Urban +/- 
Household expenditure + 
Predicted expenditure - 
State dummy +/- 
Reason for visit +/- 
  
 
 
Utilisation of hospital care should increase with age. The age term was also 
squared to address potential non-linearities in the data. Those with poor health 
status (variable of those ailing) would suggest that those patients would be more 
likely to be hospitalised. The effect of education and employed is expected to be 
positive on the probability of seeking care. Health insurance should have a 
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positive effect on the probability of seeking care. The effect of household 
expenditures should have a positive effect while high OOP should have a negative 
effect. 
 
Women are more likely to seek care due to child related health needs but the 
evidence in the literature is mixed. Similarly the effect of marital status is 
ambiguous on the probability of seeking care. Household size is ambiguous and 
may be a proxy for capturing wealth of a household. The effect of the urban 
dummy variable is ambiguous as well. 
 
In the inpatient data set the state dummies were not grouped together because 
their standard errors were reasonable. This did not allow for the waves to be 
pooled together because the geographical boundaries changed in the 2004 wave, 
resulting in three newly created states. For this reason, the regressions were run 
separately for each wave. The state dummies aim to account for the heterogeneity 
in the cross sectional dataset so the direction of the sign of these dummies a priori 
is ambiguous. The dummy that captures the reason for visit (chronic or infectious) 
was included but the direction of the sign of this dummy a priori is ambiguous. 
Estimations were run with and without sampling weights but the results were 
consistent. Estimates without sampling weights are presented below. 
 
8.4 RESULTS 
8.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The data set for the 1995-96 wave consisted of 630,590 observations and the 2004 
wave consisted of 385,607 observations. The regressions were run using STATA 
software.  
 
The table below provides the descriptive summaries of the variables used.  
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Table 8.4 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description  1995-
96 
Mean 
2004 
Mean 
    Age Age of adult patient 24.8 27.4 
Sex 1 if patient is male and 0 otherwise 0.51 0.51 
Marital status 1 if married or cohabitating and 0 otherwise 0.49 0.51 
Ailing15days  1 if ailing in the last 15 days leading up to 
survey and 0 otherwise 
0.06 0.09 
Reason for 
visit 
1 if non-infectious ailment, 0 if infectious 
ailment 
0.68 0.65 
Hospital stay Number of days in hospital 1.28 1.23 
Education 1 if patient has primary education or a 
higher and 0 otherwise 
0.39 0.45 
Employed 1 if patient is working and 0 otherwise 0.35 0.35 
Urban setting 1 if patient lives in an urban setting and 0 
otherwise 
0.40 0.35 
Health 
insurance 
1 if patient has health insurance and 0 
otherwise 
0.01 0.004 
Household 
size 
Number of members living in the household 6.55 6.52 
Household 
expenditure 
Previous month‘s household expenditure 
(US$PPP) 
213.48 270.28 
Predicted 
OOP 
expenditure 
Predicted hospital expenditure (US$PPP) 16.62 57.47 
    
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that the adult population average age is around 
25 years. The sample has relatively even split between men and women and 
between married and non-married individuals. Between 35 to 45% of individuals 
in the sample are employed, live in urban settings and have at least primary 
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education. A small proportion have insurance and were unwell in the past 15 days 
before the survey was taken. About two thirds sought care due to a non-infectious 
condition. Patients averaged around a 1 day stay in the hospital to a maximum of 
11 days (1995-96 wave) and 9 days in the 2004 wave. Information on medicine 
expenditure was available only for the 2004 wave which shows that the average 
cost related to medicines was greater than all other medical expenditure incurred 
in the hospital.  
 
Average expenditure in 1995-6 was around US$PPP 16.00 and around US$PPP 
57.00 in 2004. Across states average inpatient expenditure varied from US$PPP 
15.71 (Arunchal) to US$PPP 148.21 in Chandigarh in 2004; and from US$PPP 
2.00 (Andaman Nicobar Islands) to US$PPP 32.00 (Delhi) in 1995-96 as shown 
below.  
 
Figure 8.1 - Average inpatient expenditure (US$PPP), 2004 
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Figure 8.2 - Average inpatient expenditure (US$PPP in 2004 dollars), 1995-96 
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8.4.2 COUNT DATA MODELS 
 
Count data models are a useful starting point for this analysis. Regression results 
from four types of count models are presented: Poisson, negative binomial (NB), 
zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB). The 
results from the count data models are presented below.  
 
Table 8.5 - Count data regression results for 2004 wave 
Regressor Poisson NB ZIP ZINB 
     Age 0.02188*** 0.01872*** 0.01807*** 0.02629*** 
Age
2 
-0.00021*** -0.00016*** -0.00016*** -0.00031*** 
Sex 0.29887*** 0.28156*** 0.26140*** 0.38794*** 
Marital status 0.49478*** 0.50342*** 0.48508*** 0.38047*** 
Ailment past 
15 days 1.57002*** 1.56167*** 
1.52163*** 
1.07421*** 
Education -0.04743*** -0.04316*** -0.04253*** 0.04008** 
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Employed -0.30098*** -0.29854*** -0.28203*** -0.27300*** 
Urban setting -0.06043*** -0.04612*** -0.04580*** -0.04949*** 
Health 
insurance 0.29671*** 0.35904*** 
0.29091*** 
0.15703** 
Household size -0.06108*** -0.06272*** -0.05998*** -0.03930*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.19910*** 0.17365*** 
0.17541*** 
0.28662*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.13044*** -0.13852*** 
-0.12984*** 
-0.10676*** 
Constant -3.31622*** -3.09877*** -2.46496*** -3.49796*** 
     
N 385607 385607 385607 385607 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1094 0.0840   
Chi-sq. 29608.00 21625.25 21698.65 3828.20 
Log likelihood -120484.62 -117955.54 -118774.8 -117087.9 
Alpha  1.47494   
LR test alpha  5058.15***   
Vuong test   22.52*** 20.24*** 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, most of the coefficients are generally consistent across the various 
models. Those who have insurance are more likely to seek inpatient care which 
implies that income is an important determinant. Other factors include gender, 
those who are married, and unwell. Those who are educated, employed, living in 
urban areas and come from small households are less likely to seek inpatient care. 
The age variable was close to zero and positive but the age square term was 
negative. These results do not give a clear pattern of the effect of age when 
controlling for other factors and appear to be specific to the sample.  
 
The price elasticity estimates are roughly similar in magnitude and range from -
0.13 to -0.10. These findings are consistent with results found in the literature and 
suggest that demand for inpatient care is inelastic.  
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The specification of the Poisson model is assessed using the RESET command in 
STATA with the following calculation: chi-sq of 43.94 with a p-value of 0.00. 
The result shows strong evidence of rejecting the null hypothesis of the Poisson 
model. Overall the standard Poisson model is rejected for a more robust modelling 
approach.  
 
The negative binomial (NB) regression assumes a Poisson-like process but this 
model allows for greater variation than found in a Poisson model, which is 
referred to as over dispersion. The likelihood-ratio test of the over dispersion 
parameter, alpha, rejects the null hypothesis of the Poisson model with a chi-sq of 
5058.15 and a p-value of 0.00.  
 
The zero-inflated poisson (ZIP) regression aims to adjust for the zero observations 
in the data by giving more weight to the probability that the count variable equals 
zero. This estimation approach divides the population into users and non-users. In 
this model, the ZIP is preferred over the standard Poisson. The Vuong test shows 
a z score of 22.52 with a p-value of 0.00. 
 
The zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model combines the features of the 
negative binomial with the zero-inflated model. The Vuong test prefers the ZINB 
over the NB with a z score of 20.24 on all the regressors. Similar results are 
shown for 1995-96 in appendix F. 
 
These regressions are a useful starting to point to assess model specification of 
count data. The results suggest that a more developed model should be applied to 
the data. The next section uses the two part hurdle model to model the decision to 
seek inpatient care. 
 
8.4.3 TWO PART HURDLE MODEL 
 
In a two stage model for analysing health care use, the first stage of the Hurdle 
model regression determines the probability of hospitalisation occurring. The 
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dependent variable is 1 if the patient had a hospitalisation and 0 otherwise. The 
same regressors were used in both stages of the model.  
 
The first stage regression was run and these results are presented in the first 
column. The second stage regression truncates the data for those with only 
positive values for hospitalisations. The dependent variable is the total number of 
hospitalisations, the same variable as that used in the count data models in the 
previous section. These results are shown in the second column. 
 
The elasticity results are shown in the third column. The results are presented in 
the table below for the 2004. Appendix F contains results for the 1995-96 wave. 
  
Table 8.6 - Results Two Part Hurdle Model 2004 
Regressor First stage 
Y=1,0 
hospitalisation 
2004  
Second stage 
Y= number of 
hospitalisations 
2004 
Elasticities 
 
 
2004 
    Age 0.02335*** 0.00265** 0.00265** 
Age
2 
-0.00021*** -0.00002* -0.00002* 
Sex 0.32148*** 0.03512*** 0.03512** 
Marital status 0.4475*** 0.00453 0.00453 
Ailment past 15 
days 1.61468*** 0.18364*** 
 
0.18364*** 
Education -0.06321*** -0.00988 -0.00988 
Employed -0.33745*** -0.05312*** -0.05312*** 
Urban setting -0.07538*** -0.00852 -0.00852 
Health insurance 0.36386*** 0.00594 0.00594 
Household size -0.06323*** -0.00369* -0.00369* 
Log house 
expenditure 0.16374*** 0.05416*** 
0.05416*** 
Log predicted -0.15057*** -0.11461** -0.11461** 
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expenditure 
Himalchal 0.23435** 0.13107** 0.13107** 
Punjab 0.03283 0.12056 0.12056 
Chandigarh 0.14846 0.05319 0.05319 
Uttranachal 0.26707* 0.10512 0.10512 
Haryana 0.18274** 0.21061*** 0.21061*** 
Delhi -0.38681*** -0.05593 -0.05593 
Rajasthan 0.15262** 0.15643** 0.15643** 
Uttar Pradesh 0.02294 0.09825* 0.09825* 
Bihar 0.05600 0.02130 0.02130 
Sikkim 0.15328* 0.00208 0.00208 
Arunchal -0.09262 -0.12629* -0.12629* 
Nagaland 0.21987** -0.06966 -0.06966 
Manipur 0.12680* -0.00979 -0.00979 
Mizoram 0.10327 -0.11567* -0.11567* 
Tripura 0.02398 -0.17314** -0.17314** 
Meghalaya -0.11265 0.01150 0.01150 
Assam -0.17452*** -0.10559** -0.10559** 
West Bengal 0.07806 0.03950 0.03950 
Jharkhand -0.13015** -0.00629 -0.00629 
Orissa 0.22229*** 0.07071 0.07071 
Chhattisgarh 0.06979 0.12478** 0.12478** 
Madhya Pradesh 0.17967*** 0.09511** 0.09511** 
Gujarat 0.20293*** 0.11528** 0.11528** 
Daman 0.40709*** 0.24809** 0.24809** 
Dadra 0.33269** 0.03062 0.03062 
Maharashtra 0.25404*** 0.13920*** 0.13920*** 
Andra Pradesh 0.22013*** 0.10843** 0.10843** 
Karnataka 0.19306*** -0.00836 -0.00836 
Goa 0.23299* 0.11742 0.11742 
Lakshadweep 0.08981 0.09096 0.09065 
Kerala 0.20700*** 0.21271*** 0.21271*** 
Tamil Nadu 0.30075*** 0.02277 0.02277 
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Andaman 
Nicobar 0.22911* -0.09777 
-0.09777 
Constant -3.23445*** 0.37558  
    
N 385607 31860  
Pseudo R
2
 0.0974 0.0092  
Chi-sq. 21421.55 686.26  
Log likelihood -99237.087 -37054.45  
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: State dummies are relative to the state of Jammu Kashmir 
Note: STATA dropped observations from the state of Pondicherry (1,208 observations) due to 
collinearity. 
Note: Three new states were created when the 2004 wave was conducted. In the 1995-96 wave 
these states belonged to the following: Chhattisgarh was part of Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand part 
of Bihar, Uttranchal was part of Uttar Pradesh. 
 
Column two shows a positive effect of being male, married, poor health, having 
insurance and household expenditure on the probability of having a 
hospitalisation. Those with education, the employed, living in urban areas and 
from small households have a negative effect on the probability of visiting the 
hospital. Column three shows that conditional on having at least one 
hospitalisation, the expected number of hospitalisations increases with being male 
and household expenditure, while the effect of being employed and small 
household size has a negative effect. The effect of age is unclear as the coefficient 
is positive but quite close to zero while the age squared term is negative and close 
to zero. The predicted hospital expenditure is negative in both regressions. The 
elasticity result is presented in the fourth column and shows the elasticity is –0.11, 
which is negative and inelastic.  
 
The regulation dummies for the states show mixed results. The dummy effects 
should be interpreted with caution. The majority of the states (21 out of 35) have a 
positive effect on seeking inpatient care, 6 out of 35 have a negative effect and the 
remaining were not significant as shown below. The states with a positive effect 
on hospitalisation consist of (but not exclusively) wealthier states such as Kerala, 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu while some of the smaller states 
were negative or not significant. 
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Table 8.7 - State regulation dummy effects of two part hurdle model 
Positive Negative  Not significant 
   Himalchal, Uttranchal, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, 
Sikkim, Nagaland, Manipur, 
Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Daman, 
Dadra, Maharashtra, Andra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Goa, 
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Adaman 
Nicobar Islands 
Delhi, Arunchal, 
Mizoram, Tripura, 
Assam, Jharkhand 
Punjab, 
Chandigarh, Bihar, 
Meghalaya, West 
Bengal, 
Lakshadweep 
   
 
 
The results for 1995-96 are similar to 2004 wave (Appendix F). The results show 
that in column two, being male, married, poor health, and household expenditure 
have a positive effect on the probability of having a hospitalisation. Those with 
education, employed, living in urban settings, having insurance and small 
households have a negative effect on hospitalisation. 
 
Conditional on having at least one hospitalisation, as shown in column three, the 
expected number of hospitalisations increases with poor health and household 
expenditure, while the effect of living in an urban setting has a negative effect. 
The effect of age is unclear as the coefficient is positive but quite close to zero 
while the age squared term is negative and close to zero in the first stage 
regression and insignificant in the second state. The predicted hospital 
expenditure is negative in the first regression and positive in the second 
regression. The elasticity result is presented in the third column and shows the 
elasticity is 0.03 which is positive and inelastic (significant at the 10% level).  
 
The elasticity results from the simple count and two part models are broadly 
consistent with literature findings (-0.13 to 0.03). The results from the MNL and 
nested model are mixed (-0.19 to 0.63). In particular the results for clinic and self-
treatment are counterintuitive which could be due to misspecification or other 
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factors not captured in the model. A review of the computed elasticities from the 
empirical analysis in this thesis is presented below.  
 
 
Table 8.8 – Summary of elasticity results 
Model Key 
Assumptions 
Sample Description Elasticity 
     MNL IIA and IID 
hold 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.19 (hospital) 
 0.11
**
 (clinic) 
 
MNL IIA IID hold India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.16*** (public)  
-0.17***(private)  
0.16* (self) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.03 (hospital) 
 0.63 (clinic) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.26 (public) 
0.43(private) 
 0.01(self ) 
 
Simple 
count 
models 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
due to over 
dispersion of 
excess of zeros 
 
India 
(inpatient) 
(Chapter 8)  
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.13
***
 to -0.10
*** 
Two part 
hurdle 
Address some 
of the 
heterogeneity 
India 
(inpatient) 
(Chapter 8) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.11
**
 (2004) 
 0.03
*
 (1995-96) 
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with two part 
estimation 
using count 
models 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
8.4.4 LIMITATIONS 
 
There are limitations with the analysis that should be highlighted. First, there 
could be a problem with causal ordering. The empirical specification used health 
status based on the previous 15 days while inpatient service use refers to the past 
year. The measure of health which is used as a predictor post-dates the measure 
used for the dependent variable. While the use of predicted health expenditure 
variable aimed to correct part of the endogeneity, not all of the endogeneity could 
be accounted for. The two-part hurdle model results aimed to partly address this 
issue by separating the decision to seek care with the frequency of visit. The 
coefficient sizes of the health status variable, while significant were smaller in 
magnitude in this model than under the count models presented earlier in this 
chapter.  
 
Second, the same technique to estimate price elasticities as done in chapter 5 and 
chapter 7 was used in this chapter: the estimation of price elasticities was based on 
health expenditure information. Unlike the two earlier chapters which were based 
on one health visit, the health expenditure information related to all 
hospitalisations in the past year.  An important estimation issue involves a 
distinction between utilisation and health expenditure. The endogenous 
relationship between these two variables requires some method to correct for the 
bias in the estimated coefficients. The method used in this chapter was to estimate 
predicted health expenditure rather than using actual health expenditure. This 
approach aimed to purge the disease and socioeconomic effects in the generated 
price variable. Chapter 7 studied outpatient care and chapter 8 studied inpatient 
care. Health seeking behaviour in these two settings could be inter-correlated 
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which cannot be properly captured in the models employed with the predicted 
health expenditure variable.  
 
While the predicted health expenditure variable is commonly used to eliminate 
some of the potential bias, not all of the potentially endogeneity could be 
accounted for. Furthermore, the expenditure information related to only direct 
health care costs. Indirect costs of seeking care were not collected such as due to 
ill health, travel, waiting at health care facilities or providing care to family 
members (McIntyre D et al. 2006). The estimates of predicted health expenditure 
are therefore lower than the true costs of health care.  
 
Despite using a large dataset, the analysis is based on two waves of cross sectional 
data which were run separately. The data do not permit a time series analysis, 
which would shed light on the factors that would affect demand for health care 
over time or the cumulative effects of illness, access to care and health care 
spending over time. Panel data, which collects information over time, would have 
complemented this analysis. This information is important because understanding 
the dynamic effects between these and other factors (e.g. the loss of income from 
illness) is particularly important as chronic illness prevalence increases globally 
(Wagner et al. 2011). 
 
There was incomplete information on whether the patient was treated in a public 
or private setting due to a large number of missing observations in the inpatient 
dataset so this information could not be included in the analysis. This information 
would have provided useful information on health seeking behaviour and how the 
relative importance of factors varies between provider settings. 
 
The household survey does not adequately capture those with unmet need 
including those who needed care but did not avail themselves of services and 
those who sought care but did not find their needs were properly met. The data are 
also not able to adequately capture information on adherence which would give a 
more complete picture on access. The data do not collect information on all 
members of the household and thus may misclassify households with respect to 
need and access (Wagner et al. 2011). 
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The data only capture those who presented themselves to the hospital for 
treatment. Information on the reasons why those who sought care but did not get it 
or those who chose not to visit a hospital was not collected. Therefore these 
aspects of unmet need were not captured. Information on their circumstances and 
the factors that affected this sub-sample of patients would provide useful 
information on those who chose not to present themselves to the health care 
system, which is of important policy relevance in these settings where alternate 
treatment practices (e.g. Ayurveda) are widely followed. Information on 
traditional medicine practices and their relationship with the uptake of western 
medicines would have provided a more nuanced discussion on medicine 
consumption in these settings.  For instance, it would have been useful to have 
information on whether western medicines are viewed more as complements than 
substitutes, and whether that varies depending on the patient‘s health condition, 
socioeconomic circumstances, etc. 
 
The nature of household data provides information from the patient‘s perspective. 
This captures useful demand information, but these surveys are limited to capture 
supply information so these effects cannot be appropriately modelled without the 
use of administrative data. More information on supply/provider information 
would better control the supply factors on demand for medicines. At a 
disaggregated level, these could include density measures of health professionals, 
number of hospital beds per capita, and number of traditional healers per capita. 
 
The analysis could not capture quality effects because this information was not 
collected. Quality information is potentially an important determinant of health 
seeking behaviour but its effect could be partly masked in other variables then this 
will affect the estimation of the decision to seek care and the relationship between 
price and quality.  
 
Finally, while the importance of the regulatory environment is tested using 
dummies, this approach is limited as it cannot account for states differences in 
greater detail.  Even though regulation is accounted for as a dummy variable, 
discrete policy changes at the state level cannot be adequately captured in the data 
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such as there are differences in how well states procure medicines according to 
the WHO/HAI survey (2006). This could potentially mask important information 
within and across states. Furthermore, non-governmental actors play an important 
role in procurement in these settings which are not explicitly accounted for in the 
model and could confound the findings. There could be differences for diseases 
areas or due to differences in private sector providers or international 
organisations which could affect the price elasticity of demand. The role of the 
regulatory environment in these settings would have to be supplemented with 
more qualitative information so clearer links could be made with the quantitative 
findings and the policy setting environment. More information on the regulatory 
environment would shed light on the policy context to better understand patient 
access to medicines and health care within and across Indian states.  
 
8.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, findings from inpatient care show that gender, marital status, poor 
health, education, employment, urban setting, and household size are determinants 
of seeking inpatient care. The expected number of hospitalisations increases with 
being male and high household expenditure, while the effect of being employed 
and small household size has a negative effect. As medicine expenditure accounts 
for a proportion of total health expenditure, these results have implications for 
patient access to medicines. OOP expenditure has a negative relationship with the 
probability of seeking inpatient care. The elasticity result is –0.11, which is 
negative and inelastic. Income is an important determinant for those who sought 
inpatient care. This is borne out in the survey findings which indicate households 
experience a loss of income due to inpatient treatment (US$PPP 113 in 1995-6 
and US$PPP 72.00 in 2004). The role of regulation at the state level show that 
state dummies are significant and that state regulation plays an important role in 
accessing inpatient care.  
 
These findings identify similar determinants for outpatient care from the previous 
chapter but the significance and size of these coefficients are less when a nested 
model specification was used. Estimates of price responsiveness in both settings 
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are inelastic and negative but the findings for inpatient care are more robust than 
the findings from outpatient care. 
 
It is important to note that two different modelling approaches were used in the 
Indian case study. This will in part explain the different level of robustness in the 
results. The modelling approach in this chapter is preferred over the MNL and 
nested approach in Chapters 5 and 7. This is because a key limitation with these 
results is that they are based on only one visit. The approach taken in this chapter 
was to capture multiple visits in inpatient care over the 1 year period and as a 
result permitted more robust analysis. 
 
This chapter aimed to study the determinants of inpatient care and to measure 
price responsiveness. Across larger datasets, determinants of demand are 
consistent with literature findings. The case study on India indicates that patient‘s 
demand for care is inelastic and the estimates are within the range of results found 
in recent literature from India (Borah 2006; Sarma 2009).  
 
While the elasticity estimate for the 2004 was negative and inelastic, there are 
similar implications for the counterintuitive price elasticity estimate of 0.03 found 
for the 1995-96  wave as raised in the earlier chapters.  This result could in part be 
due to model misspecification such as the missing indirect expenditure 
information or bias in the recall period. The recall period, is over a year and could 
be subject to greater bias than in the earlier chapters. Other reasons could relate to 
factors that affect the patient‘s decision to spend money once they decide to visit a 
health facility. These could be due to cultural factors relating to the relationship 
between health professionals and patients (e.g. expression of gratitude), the 
potential demand for additional fees once the patient is at the facility by the health 
professional, or perceptions of improved quality of care if the patient pays more 
money once they are at the facility.  
 
While perceived health status is an important factor, there could be elements of 
perceived health status that this variable failed to capture in the sense that for a 
given perceived health status, those with lower incomes (proxy using household 
expenditures) are less likely to seek care. The use of the predicted expenditure 
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variable may not have corrected for the endogeneity between hospitalisations and 
the health status measure which post-dates the dependent variable. Another 
approach would be to examine the effect of hospitalisations over a one-year 
period on health at the end of the year (a form of health production function).  
 
Furthermore, while household expenditures are the common proxy for income in 
these settings, this variable may not appropriately capture differences in true 
income between households. This variable will also be biased by the data sample 
for those with unmet need that were not included in the analysis which could bias 
this proxy of the income variable. Such factors could therefore mask the true 
relationship between price and the health visit.  
 
Another approach would be to estimate price elasticities for each state separately 
and include interaction effects rather than computing one overall estimate for each 
wave. The approach taken in this chapter and in this thesis was to draw on larger 
datasets for analysis as previous studies have typically relied on smaller data 
samples for analysis.  
 
The results of the state dummies indicated that the regulatory environment is an 
important factor with the majority of dummies having a positive effect on the 
decision to seek inpatient care. The WHO/HAI dataset indicated that Haryana, 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal were efficient 
procurers by international standards.  There were variations across states with 
Tamil Nadu typically being the most efficient. Compared with the regression 
results, the dummy for West Bengal was insignificant while are others had 
positive significance. The data do not provide more disaggregate information 
which would better explain state differences. There could be differences within 
states and across states which are masked with an aggregate dummy measure.  
 
For instance, another key issue in these settings is that governments are not the 
only procurers of medicines in low and middle-income settings because the 
private sector is also an active procurer. Some states could have very high 
procurement prices and therefore it would be useful to understand the factors 
which underpin high procurement prices. Procurement efficiency could be an 
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important predictor in the model but since this information was not available at a 
more disaggregate measure, the dummy variable could confound the results. 
While the descriptive information on procurement efficiency provides some 
contextual information, the state-level dummy results are therefore limited in their 
interpretation and would have to be supplemented with more state-level analysis. 
 
The discussion on the policy context in India shows that states vary in their 
budgets and in capacity to provide health services and to subsidise the cost of 
medicines. Examples of improving access to medicines indicate that a 
multipronged policy such as efficient procurement, and training providers reduced 
the cost of the drugs budget while improving access to medicines. 
 
These findings suggest that government policies could be play an important role 
such as government drug procurement and price setting in increasing access to 
medicines. The key challenge for state governments is to address the role and 
impact of the private sector on access. The private sector is not regulated and 
patients experience high levels of OOP expenditure in this setting. These issues 
are further explored in the policy discussion in Chapter 9. 
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9 Chapter 9 Conclusion, policy discussion, thesis limitations and 
future research 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explored the issue of access to medicines in developing countries. The 
analytical approach studied the determinants of health seeking behaviour and 
price responsiveness. The aim of this thesis was to contribute to the evidence base 
by drawing on larger and new data sources for empirical estimation. The 
empirical work set out in this thesis met the thesis research objectives. The thesis 
findings and contribution are summarised below. 
 
The first stage of analysis considered price responsiveness of government 
procurement across a cross section of low and middle income countries. The next 
stage of analysis estimated the determinants of health seeking behaviour and price 
responsiveness across a sample of households in developing countries. The final 
stage of empirical work explored the same issues using India as a case study. This 
thesis hypothesised income is an important determinant of access to medicines 
and health care at the individual level which suggests that the poor will have 
access problems relative to the wealthy. Furthermore, the expectation of a high 
level of expenditure reduces the propensity to consume (which implies a negative 
price elasticity). The findings confirm this hypothesis. There are three key 
findings from the analysis to highlight: income is a determinant of health seeking 
behaviour at the patient level; patient demand for health care gives a mixed 
picture and is inelastic in some cases and suggests that other factors affect health 
seeking behaviour due to the counter-intuitive results; and  that regulation could 
have a positive effect on access. A summary of the computed elasticities is 
presented below and discussed in the subsequent sections. 
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Table 9.1 - Summary of elasticity results 
Model Key 
Assumptions 
Sample Description Elasticity 
     MNL IIA and IID 
hold 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.19 (hospital) 
 0.11
**
 (clinic) 
 
MNL IIA IID hold India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.16*** (public)  
-0.17***(private)  
0.16* (self) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
Cross 
country 
(Chapter 5) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.03 (hospital) 
 0.63 (clinic) 
 
Nested
 
IIA and IID do 
not hold within 
nests. IIA and 
IID hold across 
nests 
India 
(outpatient) 
(Chapter 7) 
Patient 
expenditure 
0.26 (public) 
0.43(private) 
 0.01(self ) 
 
Simple 
count 
models 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
due to over 
dispersion of 
excess of zeros 
 
India 
(inpatient) 
(Chapter 8)  
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.13
***
 to -0.10
*** 
Two part 
hurdle 
Address some 
of the 
heterogeneity 
with two part 
estimation 
using count 
India 
(inpatient) 
(Chapter 8) 
Patient 
expenditure 
-0.11
**
 (2004) 
 0.03
*
 (1995-96) 
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models 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Before moving onto the summary of the empirical findings, it is useful to provide 
a summary of the contribution of this thesis. First, this thesis used information on 
medicine expenditure in its analysis of health seeking behaviour because 
empirical work on medicine related information is limited. Second, existing 
studies are largely drawn from small sample sizes of regions or districts, confined 
to either specific rural or urban areas. This thesis carried out analysis over country 
level data sets to understand health seeking behaviour and price responsiveness 
across rural and urban settings. Third, this thesis contributes to the evidence base 
to address endogeneity issues related to health expenditure and health seeking 
behaviour. The findings provide empirical estimates of price elasticities and 
identify the main determinants of health seeking behaviour.  
 
We now turn to a summary of the thesis findings from each of the analytical 
chapters in sections 9.2 to 9.4. Section 9.5 moves to a discussion on the policy 
implications and recommendations of each of the analytical chapters and finally 
section 9.6 provides a discussion on the limitations of the analysis in this thesis 
and implications for future research. 
 
9.2 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 4 – ANALYSIS OF PRICES PAID BY 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Chapter 4 took a first step to study prices of medicines in low and middle-income 
countries. This was an exploratory exercise and so the results should be viewed as 
suggestive. More robust data on prices and volume would be required to carry out 
sophisticate analysis of price elasticities based on government procurement data.  
Due to data constraints, a different approach was used for measuring elasticities 
than the common approach in the literature drawing on the Ramsey pricing rule 
because volume information was not available. The dataset was the first of its 
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kind to provide comparable pricing information on medicines across a sample of 
developing countries.  
 
Estimates on price elasticities suggest that governments in developing countries 
are responsive to the prices of medicines. Price elasticities range from -1 to -2 
across therapeutic products and countries. This implies that if the procurement 
price increases by 1%, demand for the drug could drop by 1% to 2%. This implies 
that developing countries are fairly responsive to changes in the price of 
medicines and if these estimates represent a good first approximation, as 
expected, certainly more so than high income countries (Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye 
2004; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2007). There is weak evidence, however, that price 
elasticities are correlated with income (GDP as a proxy). 
 
9.3 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 5 – CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
OF PATIENT ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND HEALTH CARE 
 
Chapter 5 began the analysis at the patient level to study determinants of access to 
medicines and health care. This chapter used household level data from the World 
Health Organization World Health Survey. The dataset contained one wave of 
household information from 35 developing countries. This dataset provides a 
more comprehensive picture of demand for care than previous studies, which 
relied on smaller data set samples from specific countries or regions within a 
country. Expenditure data contained useful information about the costs individuals 
incurred for inpatient or outpatient care. Typically, costs of medicine expenditure 
accounted for the majority of costs incurred so the estimate of price elasticity also 
captures the effect of medicine expenditure on the demand for seeking care. The 
endogenous nature of expenditure data was first regressed against socio-economic 
variables and the reason for visit. The predicted expenditure estimates were then 
averaged over rural and urban settings within each country and then this variable 
was used in the regression analysis. 
 
Two econometric approaches were applied to the data. First the MNL model was 
applied. The results suggest that households with high expenditure (i.e. a proxy 
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for income) and insurance are more likely to seek care.  These results suggest that 
the poor will have greater access problems relative to the wealthy. Furthermore, 
women, married adults, poor health status, those in urban settings, and the 
educated are more likely to seek care if they are ill. Those with better health and 
living in smaller households are less likely to seek care. These results seem 
intuitive and highlight that the poor and the sick will have greater access problems 
than the wealthy. 
 
Hospital visits attracted those with asthma, heart disease, bodily injury, minor 
surgery, for child birth or other reason not specified. Those visiting clinics were 
for antenatal or dental care reasons. These results seem to capture the main types 
of services that hospitals and clinics provide. Price elasticity‘s ranged from –0.19 
(hospitals) to 0.11 (clinic, 5% significance). The price elasticity estimate for 
hospitals, however, had an insignificant p-value. 
 
The second modeling approach used a nested logit analysis. This approach was 
used to address the IID (error terms are independent) assumption and the IIA 
(ratio of probabilities are independent of other choices) property, both of which 
were violated in the MNL model. The regression results were consistent with the 
MNL, which indicated similar determinants for seeking health care demand. Price 
elasticities were 0.03 (hospital) and 0.63 (clinic) but were statistically 
insignificant.  
 
The price elasticity estimates provide some evidence of inelastic demand. The 
price elasticity result for hospitals in both modeling approaches is inelastic and 
within the range found in the literature (-0.11 to 0.03). The estimate from the 
MNL model, however, does not have a significant p-value. The estimates for 
clinic are counterintuitive as they are positive (which suggests that patients 
increase use of services as costs increase). These results are not conclusive. Two 
possible reasons for this result are either due to estimation problems with the data 
used or patients are not sensitive to price but face other access problems that are 
not captured in the model due to a variety of other factors not captured in the 
model such as informational constraints and cultural factors. 
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The country dummies which aimed to capture the effect of regulation had an 
effect on the likelihood of seeking care for those that are ill. Results of the 
following countries showed positive effects on seeking care: Bangladesh, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Côte d‘Ivoire, Congo, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, 
India, Mauritania, Malawi, Namibia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and Zambia. 
Research into understanding the regulatory environment in these countries is a 
potential area of future research to provide evidence on best practices. 
Furthermore the countries which had negative or non-significant effects offer 
other potential areas of future research as they would provide insight into their 
policy challenges and potential areas for reform. 
 
9.4 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 7 AND CHAPTER 8 – ANALYSIS OF 
PATIENT ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND HEALTH CARE IN 
INDIA 
 
The Indian country case study extended the analysis at the patient level. India 
provided a useful case study for four mean reasons. First India procures medicines 
relatively efficiently according to international procurement prices which may 
imply that medicine prices are affordable to patients. Second households incur 
high OOP health care costs which could create problems for patient access to 
medicines and health care. Third, analysis from Chapter 5 indicated that the 
Indian dummy for regulation had a positive effect on access. Finally data for India 
come from a well-developed national household survey questionnaire consisting 
of two waves of data from 1995-96 and 2004. Separate analysis was carried out 
for outpatient care and inpatient care. 
 
In Chapter 7, the analysis on outpatient care consisted of utilisation data for one 
visit. The first stage of analysis applied a MNL model.  The findings from the 
MNL model indicate that determinants of health seeking behaviour include poor 
ill, marital status, urban/rural setting, log household expenditure, log predicted 
expenditure and regional dummies. Next a nested model was run. The model 
found that fewer regressors are significant but these are consistent with the MNL 
and include marital status, education, household and OOP expenditure except for 
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household size which was only an important determinant in the nested model. 
Price elasticity estimates ranged from -0.17 to -0.16 (1% significance), and 0.16 
(10% significance) with overall range from -0.17 to 0.43. 
 
In chapter 8, the analysis on inpatient care consisted of count data. The nature of 
count data resulted in two different modelling approaches from the previous 
empirical chapters. As a first stage of analysis, simple count models were used 
and included the Poisson, negative binomial (NB), zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) and 
zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB). The second approach applied the Hurdle 
model, which separately models the decision to seek care from the frequency of 
care.  
  
The regression results from the simple count models indicated that those who 
have insurance are more likely to be hospitalised. The educated, employed, and 
those from small households are less likely to be hospitalised. These finding 
suggests that the poor will have access problems relative to the wealthy. 
Individuals who already have an existing ailment, married individuals, men and 
those living in urban areas are more likely to be hospitalised. State level dummies 
indicate that regulation has an effect on the demand for inpatient care. Elasticity 
estimates range from -0.13 to -0.10 (1% significance). These estimates are 
consistent with literature findings and indicate that demand is inelastic.  
 
The two-part model showed similar results. The determinants for inpatient care 
indicate that, those with insurance and high household expenditure are more likely 
to have a hospitalisation. The educated, the employed, those in urban areas and 
from small households are less likely to have a hospitalisation. Similar to the 
previous models, these findings suggest that the poor will have access problems to 
inpatient care. Those who already have an existing ailment, men, and those who 
are married, are more likely to have a hospitalisation. Conditional on having a 
hospitalisation, the expected number of hospitalisations increases with high 
household expenditure and being male, while the effect of being employed and 
coming from a small household has a negative effect. The price elasticity 
estimates range from –0.11, at 5% significance (2004 wave) to 0.03 at 10% 
significance (1995-96 wave) which are similar to the results found in the 
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literature. The most significant results are intuitive with a negative sign but are at 
the lower of the range found in the literature. The results indicate that demand for 
inpatient care in India is inelastic. The state dummies aim to account for 
heterogeneity and in part reflect the regulatory environment. The results indicate 
that regulation plays a role on the decision to seek inpatient care. 
 
Most states showed positive effects on seeking care. Some of these states in 
particular have shown strong regulatory practices (Kerala, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu). The WHO/HAI survey found that the 
state of Tamil Nadu in particular have very efficient procurement practices 
relative to the others (WHO/HAI 2006). Qualitative research into understanding 
the regulatory environment in these states is a potential area of future research to 
provide evidence on best practices. Furthermore the states which had negative or 
non-significant effects offer other potential areas of future research to identify 
areas for policy reform. 
 
The Indian case study was an important aspect of the empirical work of this thesis 
because these findings provide implications for the policy context in India. While 
India has very high OOP relative to other developing countries, some elements of 
its pharmaceutical environment are developed (e.g. procure medicines at 
relatively low prices). The findings from this analysis identify policy 
recommendations which could be relevant to other developing countries because 
they all face similar pharmaceutical policy challenges. These issues are further 
explored in section 9.5. 
 
9.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ANALYTICAL CHAPTERS 
 
The policy implications that arise from the analysis are now discussed. First the 
discussion considers the high level macro and micro level issues in 9.5.1, then a 
discussion of pharmaceutical regulation from the demand and supply side is 
presented in 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 and then specific policy proposals for the Indian case 
study are presented in 9.5.4. 
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9.5.1 HIGH LEVEL ISSUES 
 
The empirical findings have important policy implications. The most significant 
price elasticity results are intuitive with a negative sign but are relatively inelastic 
and are at the lower range of the literature. These inelastic estimates do not 
suggest that high user fees could be a policy response for revenue generation. 
Rather, they suggest that the already high level of OOP indicate that any policies 
to increase OOP are regressive for households as demand for health care is a 
necessity. The implication for government is that policies to lessen the burden on 
households should be pursued.  
 
In this section we first turn to address the high level issues relating to patient 
access to medicines and the design of pharmaceutical polices. The empirical work 
of this thesis helps to identify three principles that should underpin the policy 
design.  
 
First, from a policy perspective, the design of pharmaceutical regulation should be 
done within the context of overall health system goals. There are always trade-
offs with cross-cutting policy goals such as efficiency and equity.  
 
Second, a key challenge with pharmaceutical regulation is to balance health policy 
objectives with industry goals. A government‘s main pharmaceutical policy 
objectives include obtaining a reasonable price for medicines, or maximising 
static-efficiency, which in the health context means minimising costs for a given 
level of health outcomes, ensuring their availability to their citizens and offering 
an environment to the pharmaceutical industry that provides incentives for R&D 
and investment in drugs that their populations may require. Equity in this context 
involves fairness with respect to patient access to medicines. As already 
discussed, access to medicines is a multidimensional concept and many factors 
influence it. 
 
A firm‘s main objective is profitability. Two key constraints that affect a firm‘s 
profitability are the range of demand side measures in place which include pricing 
 253 
and reimbursement policies by the public buyer and the threat of international 
leakages which include reference pricing constraints and the threat of parallel 
trade. 
 
Third, pricing policies are an integral part of overall pharmaceutical regulation. 
The value of the medicine with respect to the health benefits they bring to patients 
should inform pricing decisions. Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) is an 
important policy lever in this respect. CEA determines value for money of the 
new treatment relative to an appropriate comparator. This method aims to capture 
the health benefits of a new treatment that is the value they bring to patients, 
relative to an appropriate comparator. Value-based pricing (VBP) sends the right 
signals to firms to invest in areas of patient need and unmet need (OFTb, 2007). 
VBP rewards firms with socially efficient dynamic incentives. Furthermore, 
correct price signals would target areas of unmet need addressing equity and 
fairness concerns. It has recently been announced that the UK aims to use VBP to 
reward innovation by sending price signals to firms based on therapeutic value 
(Boseley 2010). 
 
9.5.2 DEMAND SIDE PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION 
 
There are a number of demand side policy levers relating to pharmaceutical 
regulation which will have an impact on access to medicines. Furthermore there 
are also cultural factors including use of traditional forms of medicines. This 
section, however, discusses the main government policies as they relate to the 
findings of this thesis: pricing and reimbursement, procurement by the public 
buyer, and prescribing in primary and secondary care. 
 
The findings indicate that government demand for medicines is elastic and that 
governments are responsive to the prices of medicines. Evidence suggests that 
developing countries show varied levels of efficiency with respect to procurement 
based on international reference prices (WHO/HAI 2006). Pricing and 
reimbursement decisions are integral to pharmaceutical regulation. There is 
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currently insufficient information on how developing countries procure and the 
factors that inform their pricing decisions.  
 
While a number of regulatory hurdles exist, low and middle-income country 
settings lack the resources to control their markets and enforce their laws, which 
results in regulatory failure to varying degrees. These include the following: 
inconsistent enforcement of good manufacturing practices, and good distribution 
practices could lead to quality problems with drugs that are legally in circulation; 
and the presence of counterfeit or substandard drugs. There could also be delays 
in licensing and potential corruption of officials (e.g. officials may ask for a bribe 
to provide a license); easy purchase of drugs without a prescription; non-existent 
or insufficient reporting practices creating an inability to recall a faulty product 
through the distribution system. Informational constraints could result in no easily 
accessible source for validated information on drugs for professionals, no 
translation for imported drugs into local languages; and no monitoring or 
sanctions for unethical practices and clinical trials performed in violation of 
standards (e.g. without obtaining informed consent from patients) (Seiter 2010). 
 
Furthermore, there could be the issue of corruption around the misuse of funds. In 
countries with weak public sector governance, funds could be diverted for private 
gain or used in inefficient ways such as the funds may be spent on overpriced 
drugs because of rigged procurement processes (Seiter 2010). Low salaries in the 
public sector may increase vulnerability of the presence of corruption. Weak 
points include officials who make decisions on registration, licensing, pricing, 
procurement, and inclusion of drugs on reimbursement lists. For instance corrupt 
officials could try to leverage their decision-making power for personal gain and 
as a result, more drug shortages could occur, and quality problems are possible if 
the procurement process is rigged (Seiter 2010).  
 
Two important regulatory hurdles for governments are the system of pricing and 
reimbursement (P&R) and procurement practices. Explicit pricing policies are not 
common place in developing countries. Such policies are involved and incur 
administration costs (WHO 2004b). The WHO report noted that such costs 
contribute to the low uptake of adopting pricing policies with only half of all 
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developing countries have any pricing policy in place (WHO 2004b). Pricing 
policies, however, affect how well governments procure affordable and quality 
medicines for their population. 
 
Policy options exist to improve buying power of countries. The short term 
solution involves the emergence of more international bodies to procure on behalf 
of countries via bulk purchasing arrangements for a number of countries. In the 
past, organisations such as UNICEF were a large player in drug procurement 
particularly in the area of medicines for maternal and child health (WTO WHO 
2001). Now there is the emergence of organisations such as the Clinton 
Foundation which aim to aggressively negotiate drug purchases for HIV/AIDS 
and malaria on behalf of countries (Clinton Foundation 2010). 
 
Analysis of global antiretroviral prices between 2005 and 2008 found that whether 
a drug is generic, the socioeconomic status of the country and whether the country 
is a member of the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative influenced the country‘s ARV 
prices (Wirtz, Forsythe et al. 2009). Factors which did not influence procurement 
were HIV prevalence, procurement volume, whether the country is a least 
developed country or a focus of the United States President‘s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS relief (PEPFAR). The authors conclude that a useful strategy to improve 
procurement efficiency is to benchmark prices (Wirtz et al. 2009). These efforts 
may go some way to improving procurement practices and are an important aspect 
of pharmaceutical policy design.  
 
There are long term implications of global procurement efforts. A study which 
looked at multiple data sources of antiretroviral price transactions found that 
global initiatives have created efficient markets for older antiretroviral therapies 
but newer products are less competitive (Waning, Kyle et al. 2010). These authors 
find that large scale initiatives for procurement may decrease the number of 
buyers and sellers rendering the market less competitive in the long run.  
 
Therefore an important policy question is whether such short term solutions are 
sustainable in the long run. The short term solution for in house country 
procurement is to have adequate knowledge of price information. Developing 
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countries could benefit from improving their knowledge on price information. 
Presently a variety of sources of price data exist for countries to draw on this 
knowledge such as WHO, UNICEF, MSH, IDA Foundation. Formalised 
agreements with these institutions could assist developing countries to improve 
their knowledge on prices. Developing countries could benefit from using this 
information as they improve their skills in demand forecasting for medicines for 
their populations.  
 
In the long run, it is argued that countries should improve their institutional 
arrangements so that they exert their own buying power rather than solely relying 
on international organisations (Danzon 2003; Tetteh 2009). Price discounts can 
result in low prices but not all countries realise this potential saving (Grace 2003). 
One policy response is regional buying to secure low prices (Quick JD, Boohene 
NA et al. 2005). Such an approach calls for aggressive purchasing to maximise 
price discounts. Policy options include the implementation of confidential tenders 
so that countries do not know the outcome of other countries‘ price negotiations 
for the same drug (Danzon and Towse 2003; Tetteh 2009). Some suggest keeping 
prices confidential, publishing relative prices, lagged prices or aggregate prices to 
balance transparency and accountability concerns (Tetteh 2009; Danzon and 
Towse 2003) rather than publicly disclosing prices which could undermine active 
industry participation for threat of leakage and parallel trade. These proposals aim 
to encourage developing countries to exert their own influence on pricing 
decisions.  
 
An important aspect which is absent in these policy proposals is to include the 
value of the drug in pricing decisions. This thesis found weak evidence that price 
elasticities were correlated with income as shown in the exploratory exercise in 
Chapter 4. This policy proposal is a blunt instrument and furthermore it does not 
consider the therapeutic effectiveness of a drug. The purpose of VBP is for drugs 
to incorporate the relative effectiveness of the drug in its price. In the long run, 
VBP sends correct prices signals to target areas of unmet need addressing equity 
and fairness concerns while at the same time addressing dynamic efficiency 
concern (OFT 2007b).  
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VBP could also inform price negotiations where drugs have no comparator which 
would particularly be useful for drugs to treat conditions that exclusively afflict 
low income countries. In this instance, a price premium could be offered to firms 
(OFT, 2007b). This price premium could use current measures to evaluate the 
treatment effectiveness of drugs such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) to 
reflect the therapeutic advantage of the drug (OFT, 2007b).  Furthermore, in cases 
where there was insufficient clinical data on the drug‘s clinical effectiveness, risk 
sharing agreements could be negotiated between the country and the firm (OFT, 
2007b). Once the drug entered the market, pharmacovigilance (phase IV) data 
could be used to better inform pricing decisions drawing on CEA. Risk sharing 
agreements are emerging as an appropriate policy response particularly to split the 
risk between the government and the industry. International organisations could 
draw on such tools to inform their pricing decisions in the short run. The long 
term solution is for countries to develop this capacity, as they become more 
skilled in their negotiations. 
 
This is a regulatory challenge for developing countries as many do not have well 
developed drug price sources. In the short run, international organisations can 
draw upon cost effectiveness data from high-income countries. This information 
would be useful particularly as some drugs are common in both high and low-
income settings due to the prevalence of chronic diseases. A variety of pricing 
approaches are used in high income settings and increasingly CEA is seen as an 
important element not only in market authorisation but in pricing and 
reimbursement (OFT, 2007b). CEA could be appropriately adjusted to reflect 
developing country settings where other factors such as morbidity, mortality, and 
prevalence could inform such discussions. 
 
Even though pharmacoeconomic analysis currently does not play an important 
role in policy development in developing countries, external pressures could 
potentially encourage its uptake (Babar 2010). In particular, the increasing 
presence of international organisations that work on behalf of developing 
countries to purchase medicines, assist with procurement, provide donations in the 
form of freely available medicines are required to follow appropriate 
accountability and transparency policies. As more multinational firms move into 
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countries which recognise their IPRs, such firms recognise that rationing will 
require a prioritisation of health spending and pharmacoeconomic analysis is one 
policy tool that could demonstrate the clinical effectiveness of their drugs relative 
to therapeutic equivalents.  
 
Another area that policies could be pursued to lessen the burden of OOP on 
households is to improve provider incentives. At the provider level, the literature 
notes that there is mixed evidence on the implementation of guidelines (Homedes, 
Ugalde et al. 2001b). An important area of policy development is the 
improvement of national formularies and that they are implemented. The right 
incentives are required for pharmacies and hospitals to procure medicines such as 
financial incentives to encourage cost effective prescribing (e.g. flat payment to 
prescribe the cost effective drug).  
 
Incentives for rational prescribing practices play a key role in securing patient 
access to cost effective medicines. Pharmaceutical firms employ a variety of 
techniques to promote their medicines in developing country settings which take 
the form of gifts (e.g. mobile phone, cars, down payment on property) (Consumer 
International 2007). For instance, the same medical experts may be used by both 
pharmaceutical companies and ministries of health in advisory roles that affect 
drug policy (Seiter 2010). A system which does not have sufficient checks and 
balances could undermine policies to promote rational prescribing because the 
information is not balanced but biased towards the firm‘s drug. Furthermore, the 
absence and lack of enforcement of clinical guidelines is a barrier to encourage 
rational prescribing practices. Targeted interventions at GPs can encourage an 
improvement in this area (Homedes et al. 2001b). 
 
Interventions targeted at health professionals should be multi-pronged beginning 
during their professional and educational training and continuing in the form of 
well-developed continuing education practices. Such approaches are typically 
used in high-income settings. The challenge in developing country settings is to 
design interventions widely to target not only GPs, but nurses and pharmacists 
who also play a key role in prescribing. Financial and non-financial incentives 
should complement one another. Financial incentives could be designed to reward 
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cost effective prescribing or through pay for performance activities. Evidence 
from Rwanda shows that pay for performance incentives led to cost efficiencies 
(Soeters R, Habineza C et al. 2006; Meessen B, Kashala JP et al. 2007). Financial 
policies have the risk of leading to gaming behaviour and should not be the only 
policy tool. Non-financial incentives such as continuing education activities, 
clinical guidelines, licensure and accreditation and revalidation should reward 
clinical behaviour. Evidence shows that such multi-pronged approaches achieved 
an improvement in rational prescribing practices (Pagnoni F, Convelbo N et al. 
1997; Chaudhury RR, Parameswar R et al. 2005).  
 
9.5.3 SUPPLY SIDE PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION  
 
There are a number of supply related policies that are important elements of 
pharmaceutical regulation. While policies related to IP issues and R&D (DiMasi, 
Hansen et al. 2003; Love and Hubbard 2007) play a very important role, this 
section discusses issues that are relevant to the thesis findings which include 
regulation of mark-ups and the system of taxation.  
 
The recent WHO/HAI survey provided an important first step in data collection to 
analyse the medicine supply chain in the countries sampled. Of particular 
importance was that mark-ups typically are not regulated and in some countries 
can vary from 20% to 150% (WHO/HAI 2006), contributing to a larger share of 
medicine‘s overall price than the manufacturer‘s price. For example in Malaysia, 
mark-ups were higher for generics (46% to 150%) versus branded drugs (27% to 
80%) and greater mark-ups were noted for dispensing doctors (129% for 
originator and 234% for generic) (WHO/HAI 2006). Furthermore, mark-ups in the 
private sector exceeded those in the public sector. These findings suggest that 
better regulation and enforcement of mark-ups could reduce the overall retail 
price of medicines to patients thereby improving access to medicines.  
 
Another key challenge in these settings is that governments are not the only 
procurers of medicines. The private sector plays a key role as well. Furthermore, a 
key policy challenge for governments relates to corruption. While most large 
 260 
pharmaceutical firms have explicit policies against corruption and unethical 
business practices based on the international codes for ethical marketing, these are 
less likely to be enforced in countries with weak overall governance (Seiter 2010). 
This is a particular problem where activities take place on a local level, where 
smaller firms are less exposed to oversight and more likely to resort to unethical 
practices. Some examples include using cheaper, lower-quality raw materials, 
eliminating labour-intensive in-process controls; switching off electricity-
consuming air-handling systems and reducing other activities that are part of 
GMP requirements (Seiter 2010). 
 
There is also evidence that importers collude with foreign suppliers to misreport 
procurement prices, and with retailers not to apply statutory margins. Pharmacists 
are reported to adjust prices according to market demand (Russo and McPake 
2010; Seiter 2010). These findings are consistent with the body of economic 
literature which maintains that price controls are not effective policy tools, 
especially in developing countries (Hongoro and Kumaranayake 2000; 
Kumaranayake et al. 2003).  
 
An important policy issue that affects mark-ups is taxation (e.g. consumption 
taxes) and tariffs applied to imported drugs. Levison and Laing (2003) showed 
that for a select number of developing countries such wholesale and retail 
margins, taxes and tariffs ranged from 48% to 88%. These authors found that 
taxes and tariffs alone ranged from about 3% to 39%. In some countries these 
measures are a significant portion of the mark-ups while in others wholesale and 
retail mark-ups dominate the contribution to a medicine‘s final retail price. 
Therefore, cash strapped developing countries have to balance their fiscal goals 
with health policy goals and the intended and unintended consequences of such 
fiscal policies on access to medicines. . A more comprehensive policy making 
approach is required which considers both demand and supply related factors to 
address such policy challenges.  
 
9.5.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDIAN CONTEXT  
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The findings from the Indian case study highlight that patient demand for 
outpatient and inpatient care is inelastic. This implies that individuals are not 
particularly responsive to changes in price. This section discusses the implications 
of these findings on access to medicines. One reason for the inelastic response 
could be due to the necessity of medications and also the potential lack of 
appropriate therapeutic alternatives. 
 
A number of issues arise from the Indian context in light of the finding of inelastic 
demand. First, households account for the largest share of total health expenditure 
and medicines account for a large share of household expenditure (55% on 
average in outpatient care, 38% to 66% in inpatient care). The literature from 
developing countries notes that the implementation of user charge policies in the 
face of inelastic demand led to inequities in access to care as utilisation dropped 
for low income groups. Evidence shows that this generally results with mixed or 
low effects on quality. Revenue generated from cost sharing does not offset the 
administration costs, which may or may not have exemptions.  
 
Second, the WHO/HAI (2006) survey indicates that India procures medicines 
efficiently relative to other low and middle-income countries. The survey also 
noted that within India, states vary in their relative efficiency of procuring 
medicines. Government procurement of medicines is an important element to 
secure affordable prices for their population.  
 
Third, evidence from the WHO/HAI survey suggests that stock availability is 
poorer in government (public) facilities than in private facilities. Medicines are 
typically free of charge in public facilities. This should promote access to 
medicines but public facilities tend to have low stock, which forces individuals to 
go to the private sector where they must pay for medicines.  
 
Fourth, the private sector is large and unregulated. Retail prices are high due to 
unregulated mark-ups, which could undermine access to medicines. Distribution 
networks in the private sector, however, resulted in greater availability of 
medicines despite high prices.  
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Fifth, prescribers are aggressively targeted by the industry to promote their 
medicines. The range of incentives prescribers receive makes it difficult to 
encourage rational prescribing practices.  
 
Sixth, the current institutional arrangement involves the federal government and 
states. The highly developed pharmaceutical market in India requires a balance of 
health policy with industrial policy goals. The current institutional arrangement 
lacks well-coordinated health policy-making between the federal government and 
the states. In particular there is a lack of coordination for licensing, and quality 
control of medicines.  
 
There are many considerations in the design of an effective pharmaceutical policy. 
These issues highlight the complex and multi-dimensional issue of access of 
medicines, and that it remains a pressing issue. The following sections explore the 
policy recommendations in more detail.  
 
Demand side policies 
 
On the demand side, the key policy areas include procurement, licensing and 
quality control, pricing of medicines, and prescribing practices. These policy areas 
would benefit from better coordination within government to strengthen 
information sharing. 
 
In India, government procurement of medicines according to international 
procurement practices is relatively efficient. This is an important finding but 
evidence suggests that not all states are efficient in their procurement practices. 
For instance, the state of Tamil Nadu is reported to have implemented a variety of 
procedures to improve procurement and quality control such as a two-part tender 
system, regular reviews of their stock levels to ensure availability of medicines, 
and quality control checks (World Bank 2000). At the state level, there is scope 
for state drug authorities to share best practices to improve procurement methods. 
 
The findings of inelastic demand for health care supports the argument that price 
setting should aim to keep prices low, which will increase expenditure on 
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medicines and possibly have a positive effect on access to medicines. The health 
benefits medicines bring to patients could inform the price of the drug. The 
current pricing policy does not capture this information. The concept of 
pharmacoeconomics has not come to India because competition has mainly been 
between generics. As more patented medicines enter the market there could be an 
increase in pressure to establish value. There may be scope for the NPPA to 
consider such information to inform its pricing policies.  
 
These approaches are widely used in developed country settings where there is a 
trend to use information on the benefits that drugs bring to patients to inform 
pricing decisions (OFT 2007b; Mossialos and Srivastava 2008). Levels of price 
setting, however, need to consider necessary incentives of the actors involved in 
the distribution and supply of medicines such as the pharmaceutical sector, 
pharmacies and health professionals. 
 
Rational prescribing practices can play an important role in improving access to 
medicines. As the findings from the measures implemented in Delhi indicate, a 
multi-targeted approach improved access to medicines (Chaudhury et al. 2005). 
This approach focussed on improved procurement and measures to educate health 
encourage rational prescribing. Continued efforts are underway by the Delhi 
Society for Promotion of Rational Use of Drugs (DSPRUD) to educate health 
professionals which is a welcome step. India has a highly developed generics 
market so appropriate financial incentives for prescribers should be to distinguish 
between the cost effective generic versus the more expensive alternatives. 
Furthermore, the large numbers of health professionals in the private sector should 
be included in such education efforts. There is scope for state drug authorities to 
share best practices to improve prescribing practices.  
 
Supply side policies 
 
Policy levers on the supply side could improve access to medicines and include 
regulation of mark-ups, licensing and quality control. These measures would 
encourage better coordination, and harmonisation of practices. 
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A key area which requires regulation enforcement relates to the mark-ups in the 
supply chain. Mark-ups are unregulated for drugs outside of price control but 
evidence suggests that even mark-ups under price control also exceeded the 
regulated levels. Therefore, this sector requires greater government attention to 
regulate markups and put monitoring systems in place. The WHO/HAI (2006) 
price surveys found that the private sector had better distribution systems. Given 
the small size of public budgets, programmes will need to better target the poor 
and where necessary, collaboration with the private sector may require 
subsidisation schemes to help the poor to have access to medicines in both public 
and private sectors. A potential area for policy development would be for the 
government to increase its collaboration with the private sector and to take 
advantage of its distribution networks of medicine supply. 
 
Licensing and quality control at the federal level is an important feature of 
pharmaceutical policy. Even though there are reforms underway at the federal 
level such as establishing a new central drug authority that would fall under the 
DCGI to look after standards of medicines and cosmetics, the government will 
need to continue to be proactive in the development of policy that strengthens key 
institutions—namely the MOHFW, and the DCGI. Steps for a central drug 
authority are welcome but the government should aim to secure the support and 
interest among state level controllers to assist in greater coordination between the 
centre and the states to improve quality control. Measures to improve 
transparency in the licensing of manufacturers are necessary. 
 
There is a need for greater coordination between government bodies, such as 
MOHFW, the DCGI and the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals to 
meet on a regular basis to coordinate their efforts. This could be achieved through 
joint budgeting arrangements so each institution has a greater incentive in 
implementation. Such measures should be supported by law with a clear 
accountability framework. 
 
The implications for India joining the TRIPS agreement are too early to tell the 
full impact of this policy move (Grace 2005). The pharmaceutical industry is very 
proactive with the government and it has proposed measures to improve 
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regulation of quality control. This reason for this approach is likely to remove 
many of the small scale generic manufacturers which currently pass lax quality 
control standards. 
 
The growing industry will bring much benefit to the Indian economy but the 
implications for the poor are less clear. A segment of the industry will be outward 
looking to penetrate western markets. Clear incentives and fiscal instruments will 
require that the government improve its regulation of quality control for domestic 
consumption (i.e. issue licenses that follow GMP and prove quality) and for the 
exportation of medicines to developing countries as well. 
 
Only 3% of medicines in the Indian market do not have substitutes (ORG-IMS 
2007).
33
 A McKinsey study projects that in 2015, the market will be worth $20 
billion; 10% of the market will consist of patented drugs and 90% will be generic 
(McKinsey 2007). The high number of competitors may encourage price 
competition. 
 
Overall, the discussion on pharmaceutical regulation in India indicates that the 
institutional framework could be improved to better regulate and implement 
pharmaceutical policies. A number of policy challenges exist, including 
corruption. A broader approach to pharmaceutical policy making is necessary that 
considers reform measures from a health systems perspective. This implies a 
different approach to existing institutional arrangements.  
 
Policy measures should improve regulation and monitoring of the pharmaceutical 
supply chain distribution, monitor pharmaceutical marketing practices, and 
incentivise physicians and pharmacists to dispense rationally. Certain policy 
efforts at the state level have led to encouraging greater access to medicines. 
There is scope for greater policy exchange with states to share best practices in a 
variety of policy areas.  
 
                                                 
33
 The level of substitution could not be confirmed. It is likely that this refers to substitutes at the 
chemical level. 
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9.6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
9.6.1 THESIS LIMITATIONS 
 
Limitations of the analytical approach used in this thesis were discussed in the 
respective chapters. In summary, data constraints did not allow for direct 
computation of price elasticities as price and volume data were not available and 
necessitated the imputation of elasticities.  This limitation influenced the 
analytical approaches taken in this thesis. The analysis in the empirical chapters 
use different data sources which are not exactly comparable but the main issues in 
each chapter are highlighted.  
 
The analysis in Chapter 4 imputed price elasticities using upstream prices 
(government procurement prices). While the technique was not based on a 
sophisticated approach, it was a first attempt based on data availability and was 
strictly an exploratory exercise. The data were cross sectional so did not allow for 
time series analysis. This analysis assumes that generic prices are reasonable 
proxies of marginal cost to apply the Ramsey rule. The lack of volume data 
required the imputation of price elasticities using the Ramsey pricing rule. The 
approach taken in this chapter could not model the interaction between 
government procurement and firm behaviour.  
 
The main limitation in chapter 5, 7and 8 was that detailed medicine information 
was lacking to measure downstream prices (i.e. patient level). The surveys did not 
properly capture those who could not seek care to better understand the 
implications for unmet need. Furthermore, supply information on health 
providers, settings, quality, appropriateness of care; context was limited because 
the analysis was from the patient‘s perspective.  Some evidence suggests that 
individuals may seek care from more than one provider simultaneously (Sepheri 
and Chernomas 2001) which undermines the choice models used in this thesis.  
The quantitative approach was limited in measuring the significance of regulation. 
These chapters drew on cross sectional information as panel data did not exist for 
analysis.   
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The analysis could not pick disaggregate difference within and across countries.  
There could be differences for diseases areas or due to differences in private 
sector providers or international organisations which could affect the price 
elasticity of demand. While data are not drawn from very recent waves of data, 
the findings do have policy relevance for these country settings. More recent data 
from these countries could fill an important area of analysis. 
 
Despite the thesis limitations, the research objectives were met in each of the 
empirical chapters. The data were adjusted to meet the modelling assumptions set 
out in the models used. The implication for the thesis results is that these 
limitations provide a conservative estimate of price elasticities and are therefore at 
the lower bound of the range found in the literature. Due to the data constraints, 
the empirical price elasticity estimates are imputations and it is important to note 
that they are proxies for the true price elasticities.  
 
9.6.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The literature on access to medicines in developing countries has been largely 
devoted to IP issues and patents. These issues are pressing but there are many 
actors in the pharmaceutical systems and each play an important role in improving 
access. The recent WHO/HAI data collection efforts, the establishment of 
organisations such as the Clinton Foundation, the launch of the Medicines 
Transparency Alliance (MeTA) signal a shift in pharmaceutical policy analysis to 
include this wider set of actors in policy making. 
 
There are three key areas where further research would expand the evidence and 
knowledge base on issues related to access to medicines in developing countries. 
These are regulatory analysis, supply side analysis and accessing existing and 
expanding data sources. 
 
Qualitative analysis of the regulatory environment of countries would fill an 
important gap in understanding the main challenges of pharmaceutical policy 
making in developing countries. Such analysis should in the first instance look at 
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P&R, and procurement. Countries which had a positive effect on access as 
identified from this analysis include Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Côte 
d‘Ivoire, Congo, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Mauritania, 
Malawi, Namibia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and Zambia. Similarly within 
India, certain states were identified as having relatively efficient procurement 
practices (Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu). Research 
into the regulatory environment would provide the opportunity of sharing of best 
practices which would be relevant for policy makers. 
 
The next key areas include licensing, rational prescribing practices, and insurance 
mechanisms to protect low income families. Current efforts such as MeTA aim to 
study such aspects of pharmaceutical policy. These initiatives are an important 
first step in this policy area. Typically, access to health care in developing country 
settings has studied issues concerning maternal/child health, malaria, TB and in 
the past two decades, HIV/AIDS. These are important health policy areas but 
research has not had enough focus on the impact of developing appropriate 
pharmaceutical policy responses within overall health policy planning. 
 
A second key area should be to study supply side issues. There is a significant gap 
in analysing policies concerning wholesalers, retailers, pharmacies, and overall 
industrial policy. Supply side information would provide a more comprehensive 
picture of pharmaceutical policy issues and the challenge to balance health policy 
goals with industrial policy objectives. Information on public and private sector 
providers would provide valuable information on the role of the private sector and 
implications for the public sector providers. 
 
The third important area concerns accessing existing data sources for analysis and 
for expanding data sources to study implications of P&R and licensing decisions. 
Data collection relating to volume, regulatory and supply issues would provide 
important information in understanding medicine issues in developing country 
settings. Such efforts would allow for strengthening information relating to data 
analysis. For instance, in India, the NPPA has price data which has potential for 
more research and analysis. Its industry data largely comes from ORG-IMS, 
which has its limitations but it is a source of information. The government should 
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encourage greater use of its data sources from the various bodies, and strengthen 
its data collection systems. Furthermore, there are many activities at the 
international level to improve access to medicines. Many of these institutions are 
in a position to collect and provide information which could strengthen data 
sources.  Recent efforts by the WHIO/HAI, Access to Medicines index, signal an 
important priority shift in this area. 
 
Reliable data from pharmaceutical markets in the world‘s most populous 
countries, China and India are in short supply (WHO 2004a).
34
 Inpatient data 
records are available but outpatient data are lacking. Surrogate surveillance is how 
current research and analysis are carried out. There will be health system 
pressures from an increase in consumption and sales among the middle class, and 
expansion of the private health insurance market, which will require a greater 
system of tracking information and coordination between various bodies that 
collect data. 
 
There is scope to improve the quality of academic research in this topic area as 
confirmed by a review of studies on user charges/cost sharing based on the 
Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) group of the Cochrane 
Collaboration (Lagarde M and Palmer N 2008). Main issues with the studies 
related to presence of confounding factors, small sample sizes, unreliable data, 
and policy changes not accounted for during the study period. Similarly, Homedes 
et al (2001b) reviewed community and patient level interventions to improve 
medicine uptake. The authors conclude that to carry out comparative analysis, 
there is a need for a minimum set of standards for evaluating interventions, some 
agreement on definitions of measurements, and outcome indicators. 
 
Future research in these areas, combined with international efforts and a concerted 
effort to improve the quality of academic research would significantly contribute 
to understanding the issue of access to medicines. As this thesis has shown, access 
                                                 
34
 Data on trade, production, expenditure and consumption come from different sources. Monetary 
value are reported rather than volume which does not reflect the scale of consumption (traditional, 
low-priced generics, branded and non-branded).  
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to medicines is a pressing yet complex public health issue. Research in this area is 
needed in order to continue to build evidence to inform the design of effective 
pharmaceutical policy and to contribute to improving access to medicines for 
people in the developing world. 
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A. 1 Estimates of the elasticity of demand for medicare
a 
Reference Total price elasticity 
  
Feldstein (1964) -0.19 
Feldstein (1970) 1.67 
Rosenthal (1970) 0.19 to -0.70 
Feldstein (1971) -0.49 for total bed days 
Davis and Russell (1972) -0.32 
Fuchs and Kramer (1972) -0.10 to -0.36 
Phelps and Newhouse (1972a) -0.14
b
 (OLS), -0.118 (Tobit) 
Scitovsky and Snyder (1972) -0.060
b 
Phelps (1973) Not significantly different from zero 
Rosett and Huang (1973) -0.35 to -1.5 
Beck (1974) -0.065
b 
Newhouse and Phelps (1974) -0.1 (length of stay) 
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) -0.10 
Newhouse and Phelps (1976) -0.24 (hospital), -0.42 (physician) 
Scitovsky and McCall (1977) -2.56 ancillary 
Colle and Grossman (1978) -0.11 
McAvinchey and Yannopoulos 
(1993) 
-1.2 
Newhouse and the Insurance 
Experiment Group (1993) 
-0.17 to -0.31 (hospital); 0.17 to -0.22 
(outpatient) 
Bhattacharya, Vogt, et al. (1996) -0.22 
Cherkin, Grothaus et al. (1989) -0.035
b
 (all visits); -0.15b to -0.075
b
 
(preventive) 
Eichner (1998) -0.32 
Summary -0.20 (visits price elasticity -0.05 to -0.15) 
  a
See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for details 
b
Elasticities computed according to appendix of Phelps and Newhouse (1972b) 
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Table B. 1 Standard error calculations of medicine prices by molecule name 
Molecule name 
Therapeutic 
category 
Brand  
pack  
Generic 
pack  
Brand  
per pill 
Generic 
per pill 
Sample 
       
Aciclovir Antiviral 6.4 1.3 2.6 1.1 4 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant 1.3 0.06 1.7 0.0 3 
Amlodipine 
Calcium channel 
blocker NA NA NA NA 
1 
Atenolol Antihypertensive 1.1 0.9 11.4 2.5 2 
Beclometasone Asthma 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 2 
Benzathine 
benzylpenicillin Antibiotic NA NA NA NA 
 
1 
Captopril Antihypertensive 29.1 8.3 15.0 5.7 5 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy 38.3 4.2 2.8 1.6 7 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic 2.1 1.1 2.1 1.0 6 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic 49.2 1.4 22.8 10.9 5 
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic 0.8 0 3.3 0.08 2 
Diazepam Anxiolytic 1.4 0.5 4.7 2.2 4 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory 7.7 1.4 14.6 3.3 
 
5 
Digoxin Cardio therapy NA NA NA NA 1 
Fluconazole Antifungal 166.0 6.3 49.0 0.2 3 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant 9.3 6.8 13.4 10.6 4 
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic 0.6 0 1.2 0 2 
Furosemide Diueretic 2.3 0 17.0 0 2 
Glibenclamide Diabetes NA NA NA NA 1 
Indinavir Antiviral NA NA NA NA 1 
Loratadine Antihistamine 1.3 0.6 7.3 0.5 2 
Mebendazole Antiparasitic 0.1 0 4.7 0 2 
Medroxyprogesteron
e Contraceptive NA NA NA NA 
 
1 
Metformin Diabetes 5.8 0.9 3.3 0.7 4 
Metronidazole Antiparasitic 16.8 0 38.3 1.4 2 
Nevirapine Antiviral 88.7 12.0 0.9 0.2 2 
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive 20.7 0.1 10.0 0.0 2 
Omeprazole Antacid 0.1 3.5 10.9 2.9 2 
Paracetamol Anti-inflammatory NA NA NA NA  
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1 
Phenytoin Epilepsy 0.6 0 0.9 0.0 4 
Ranitidine Antacid 7.2 0.6 8.3 0.3 3 
Simvastatin Lipid lowering NA NA NA NA 1 
Streptomycin Antibiotic NA NA NA NA 1 
Zidovudine Antiviral 153.6 13.4 8.2 1.3 2 
       
Note: Cells with NA are due to only one observation 
 Table B. 2 Table of elasticity results by molecule name 
Molecule name 
Therapeutic 
category Country Elasticity 
Brand pack 
price ($US) 
Generic pack 
price ($US) 
 
Pack 
size 
       
Aciclovir Antiviral Kazakhstan -1.3 17.5 3.9 25 
Aciclovir Antiviral Tunisia -1.1 25.0 2.4 25 
Aciclovir Antiviral Philippines -1.1 32.8 2.4 25 
Aciclovir Antiviral Syria -1.3 21.8 5.0 25 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Jordan -1.4 2.6 0.8 100 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Morocco -1.2 5.1 0.8 100 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Lebanon -1.3 3.4 0.7 100 
Amlodipine 
Calcium channel 
blocker Malaysia -1.1 8.8 0.4 30 
Atenolol Antihypertensive Syria -1.4 5.9 1.7 60 
Atenolol Antihypertensive Philippines -1.0 7.4 0.3 28 
Beclometasone Asthma Peru -2.0 6.8 3.4 200 
Beclometasone Asthma Morocco -1.5 7.9 2.5 200 
Benzathine 
benzylpenicillin Antibiotic Morocco -1.4 2.2 0.6 4 
Captopril Antihypertensive Morocco -1.5 59.6 20.3 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Malaysia -1.7 3.9 1.6 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Kazakhstan -1.4 5.1 1.6 60 
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Captopril Antihypertensive Pakistan -1.1 5.6 0.5 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Philippines -1.1 56.2 4.0 150 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Kazakhstan -1.8 26.9 12.2 150 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Shanghai -1.2 13.1 2.0 100 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Shandong -1.2 12.5 2.0 100 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Philippines -1.1 115.1 10.0 500 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Kuwait -1.3 12.2 2.9 150 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Malaysia -1.5 6.4 2.0 100 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Syria -1.4 20.2 5.5 150 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic South Africa -1.2 8.5 1.5 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Malaysia -1.7 6.1 2.6 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Kazakhstan -1.4 10.4 3.0 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Philippines -1.4 9.1 2.6 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Shanghai -1.1 10.2 0.7 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Shandong -1.0 12.5 0.4 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Kazakhstan -1.2 0.2 0.0 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Nigeria -1.3 0.9 0.2 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Morocco -1.6 2.1 0.8 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Philippines -1.0 111.0 3.2 100 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic South Africa -1.1 0.7 0.0 1 
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic Syria -1.5 0.8 0.3 70 
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic Tunisia -1.2 1.9 0.3 70 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Tunisia -1.8 2.8 1.3 100 
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Diazepam Anxiolytic Jordan -1.7 0.9 0.4 100 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Syria -1.4 3.9 1.2 100 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Morocco -1.1 3.8 0.4 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Shandong -1.7 9.3 4.0 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Syria -1.3 9.3 1.9 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Philippines -1.0 15.6 0.5 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Kazakhstan -1.1 27.1 2.1 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Morocco -1.1 9.7 0.5 100 
Digoxin Cardio therapy Philippines -1.1 28.5 3.3 500 
Fluconazole Antifungal South Africa -1.1 107.7 12.3 30 
Fluconazole Antifungal Tunisia -1.0 325.9 3.6 30 
Fluconazole Antifungal Jordan -1.8 0.2 0.1 1 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Malaysia -1.0 27.5 0.9 30 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Shandong -1.4 34.6 10.5 30 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Shanghai -1.7 35.1 14.3 30 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Philippines -1.0 49.7 0.8 28 
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic Morocco -1.4 1.8 0.5 1 
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic Jordan -2.0 1.0 0.5 1 
Furosemide Diueretic Philippines -1.0 3.5 0.1 28 
Furosemide Diueretic Jordan -2.0 0.2 0.1 20 
Glibenclamide Diabetes Philippines -1.1 14.6 0.8 200 
Indinavir Antiviral Morocco -1.9 133.4 62.6 180 
Loratadine Antihistamine Syria -1.3 4.2 1.0 20 
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Loratadine Antihistamine Malaysia -1.1 2.4 0.2 10 
Mebendazole Antiparasitic Kazakhstan -1.0 1.3 0.0 6 
Mebendazole Antiparasitic Kyrgyzstan -1.0 1.5 0.0 6 
Medroxyprogesterone Contraceptive Kazakhstan -1.2 7.4 1.0 1 
Metformin Diabetes Nigeria -1.2 7.1 1.4 100 
Metformin Diabetes Pakistan -1.6 1.7 0.7 100 
Metformin Diabetes Shanghai -1.2 15.3 2.8 100 
Metformin Diabetes Philippines -1.2 11.0 1.8 100 
Metronidazole Antiparasitic Syria -1.9 0.8 0.4 20 
Metronidazole Antiparasitic Philippines -1.0 24.5 0.4 100 
Nevirapine Antiviral Lebanon -1.2 197.8 31.0 60 
Nevirapine Antiviral Morocco -1.2 72.3 14.1 60 
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive Morocco -1.1 41.2 2.2 100 
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive Kuwait -1.3 11.9 2.4 100 
Omeprazole Antacid Shandong -1.1 39.1 3.6 30 
Omeprazole Antacid Shanghai -1.3 39.2 8.5 30 
Paracetamol Anti-inflammatory Syria -1.3 1.1 0.2 20 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Lebanon -1.2 4.1 0.7 100 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Kuwait -1.2 3.7 0.7 100 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Jordan -1.2 4.6 0.7 100 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Tunisia -1.3 3.2 0.7 100 
Ranitidine Antacid Philippines -1.1 23.0 1.2 50 
Ranitidine Antacid Kazakhstan -1.1 11.7 1.5 60 
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Ranitidine Antacid Syria -1.3 9.5 2.4 60 
Simvastatin Lipid lowering Malaysia -1.1 104.2 10.0 120 
Streptomycin Antibiotic Morocco -1.4 0.4 0.1 1 
Zidovudine Antiviral Lebanon -1.1 296.0 18.6 150 
Zidovudine Antiviral Malaysia -1.9 78.8 37.5 100 
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Table B. 3 Table of drugs coded by number 
Code Molecule name Therapeutic 
category 
Observations Countries 
     
1 Carbamazepine Epilepsy 8 
China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Philippines, Syria 
2 Ceftriaxone Antibiotic 7 
China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Philippines, South Africa 
3 Salbutamol Asthma 7 
China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Uganda 
4 Fluoxetine Antidepressant 6 China, Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, Tunisia 
5 Metformin Diabetes 6 
China, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines 
6 Aciclovir Antiviral 5 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Syria, 
Tunisia 
7 Amitriptyline Antidepressant 5 Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia 
8 Captopril Antihypertensive 5 
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Philippines 
9 Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic 5 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, 
South Africa 
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10 Diclofenac 
Anti-
inflammatory 5 
China, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Philippines, 
Syria 
11 Phenytoin Epilepsy 5 Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Tunisia 
12 Beclometasone Asthma 4 China, Morocco, Peru 
13 Diazepam Anxiolytic 4 Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia 
14 Losartan Antihypertensive 4 China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia 
15 Omeprazole Antacid 4 China, Philippines, South Africa 
16 Ranitidine Antacid 4 Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Philippines,Syria 
17 Fluconazole Antifungal 3 South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda 
18 Fluphenazine Antipsychotic 3 Jordan, Morocco, Peru 
19 Indinavir Antiviral 3 Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco 
20 Loratadine Antihistamine 3 China, Malaysia, Syria 
21 Simvastatin Lipid lowering 3 China, Jordan, Malaysia 
22 Zidovudine Antiviral 3 Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco 
23 Amlodipine 
Calcium channel 
blocker 2 China, Malaysia 
24 Atenolol Antihypertensive 2 Philippines, Syria 
25 Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic 2 Syria, Tunisia 
26 Fluconazole Antifungal 2 Jordan, Kazakhstan 
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27 Furosemide Diueretic 2 Jordan, Philippines 
28 Mebendazole Antiparasitic 2 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
29 Metronidazole Antiparasitic 2 Philippines, Syria 
30 Nevirapine Antiviral 2 Lebanon, Morocco 
31 Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive 2 Kuwait, Morocco 
32 Pyrazinamide Antiinfectives 2 Morocco, Philippines 
33 Valproic Acid Epilepsy 2 Malaysia, Morocco 
34 
Acetylsalicylic 
acid 
Anti-
inflammatory 1 Morocco 
35 Amoxicillin Antibiotic 1 Jordan 
36 
Benzathine 
benzylpenicillin Antibiotic 1 Morocco 
37 Cefradine Antibiotic 1 China 
38 Chloroquine Antimalarial 1 Tunisia 
39 Cimetidine Antacid 1 China 
40 Digoxin Cardio therapy 1 Philippines 
41 Diltiazem 
Calcium channel 
blocker 1 Jordan 
42 Enalapril Antihypertensive 1 Jordan 
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43 Glibenclamide Diabetes 1 Philippines 
44 Gliclazide Diabetes 1 China 
45 Insulin neutral Diabetes 1 Kuwait 
46 
Isosorbide 
dinitrate Cardio therapy 1 Philippines 
47 Itraconazole Antifungal 1 Malaysia 
48 Lisinopril Antihypertensive 1 Kuwait 
49 
Medroxyprogeste
rone Contraceptive 1 Kazakhstan 
50 Methyldopa Antihypertensive 1 Jordan 
51 Paracetamol 
Anti-
inflammatory 1 Syria 
52 Prazosin Antihypertensive 1 Malaysia 
53 Streptomycin Antibiotic 1 Morocco 
     Note: Due to lack of data, price elasticities could not be calculated for the following: Acetylsalicylic acid (34); Cefradine (37); Chloroquine (38); Cimetidine (39); and 
Glicazide (44). 
Note: Data from China were sampled in two regions, which resulted in two observations for this country. The corresponding elasticities were calculated separately. 
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Table C. 1 - Multinomial model without dummies 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -0.0310*** -0.0115*** -0.0310*** 
Age
2 
0.000201** 5.42e-06 0.000221*** 
Sex 0.382*** 0.272*** -0.00595 
Marital status 0.377*** 0.240*** 0.110** 
Self reported 
health -0.567*** -0.406*** -0.585*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.527*** 0.388*** 0.254*** 
Education 0.272*** 0.0170 -0.325*** 
Employed -0.250*** -0.0654*** -0.00675 
Urban setting 0.266*** 0.145*** -0.124** 
Health insurance 0.146** -0.0116 -0.743*** 
Household size -0.00990 0.00480 -0.0335*** 
Log house 
expenditure -0.131*** 0.0535*** 0.0834*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.145*** 0.0297* -0.662*** 
Constant -1.137*** 0.294*** -0.698*** 
    
N 42,668   
Pseudo R
2 
 0.0262   
Chi-sq. 2152.86***   
Log likelihood -40060.357   
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 2 - Marginal effects of multinomial model without dummies 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -0.000738*** -0.00155* -0.000949*** 
Age
2 
6.02e-06** -7.51e-06 8.56e-06*** 
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Sex 0.00723*** 0.0604*** -0.00715*** 
Marital status 0.00735*** 0.0503*** -0.00159 
Self reported 
health -0.00999*** 
-
0.0751*** -0.0136*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.00963*** 0.0789*** 0.000239 
Education 0.00880*** 0.00701 -0.0142*** 
Employed -0.00688*** -0.0114** 0.00161 
Urban setting 0.00612*** 0.0337*** -0.00870*** 
Health insurance 0.00605** 0.00855 -0.0247*** 
Household size -0.000358 0.00215** -0.00146*** 
Log house 
expenditure -0.00529*** 0.0137*** 0.00232** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.00424*** 0.0255*** -0.0274*** 
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 3 - Multinomial model with country dummies 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -0.0418*** -0.0155*** -0.0227*** 
Age
2 
0.000279*** 6.11e-05 0.000147* 
Sex 0.394*** 0.344*** 0.125** 
Marital status 0.491*** 0.257*** 0.0789 
Self reported 
health -0.626*** -0.468*** -0.689*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.649*** 0.471*** 0.225*** 
Education -0.0853 0.0800*** -0.193*** 
Employed -0.181*** 0.0329 0.0197 
Urban setting 0.198*** 0.144*** -0.211*** 
Health insurance 0.661*** 0.404*** -0.218* 
Household size -0.0127 -0.0150*** -0.00124 
Log house 0.0230 0.114*** -0.0577 
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expenditure 
Log predicted 
expenditure 0.188 0.326*** 1.235*** 
Bangladesh 1.138*** 2.546*** 1.417*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.305 0.450*** -2.592** 
China -0.450 0.0213 -1.996*** 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.637** 0.645*** -0.349 
Congo 1.708*** 0.491*** 0.280 
Comoros 0.957** -0.0752 -1.383*** 
Dominican 
Republic 1.355*** 1.058*** -1.308*** 
Ecuador 0.171 0.0492 -1.865*** 
Ethiopia -0.658 0.738*** 1.435*** 
Georgia -1.282*** -1.202*** -1.558*** 
Ghana 1.135*** 0.792*** 0.659** 
Guatemala 0.131 0.673*** -2.902*** 
India 0.261 0.990*** -1.528*** 
Kazakhstan 0.260 0.457*** -0.651* 
Kenya -0.246 -0.258* 1.419*** 
Laos 1.143*** -0.684*** -1.153*** 
Sri Lanka 2.279*** 1.462*** -1.674*** 
Morocco 0.309 0.286** 1.826*** 
Mali -1.182* 0.0210 -1.209** 
Myanmar 0.159 0.661*** 0.0550 
Mauritania 0.214 0.631*** -0.335 
Malawi 1.176*** 1.529*** 1.893*** 
Namibia 1.923*** 0.900*** -1.062*** 
Nepal -0.359 0.618*** 1.161*** 
Pakistan 0.530 1.524*** -0.902** 
Philippines 0.205 -0.413*** -1.008*** 
Paraguay 0.0954 1.260*** 2.374*** 
Russia 1.179*** 0.319** 0.959** 
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Senegal 1.001*** 0.501*** -0.00951 
Chad -0.0458 -0.112 0.544** 
Tunisia -1.139*** 0.0400 -1.960*** 
Ukraine 0.465 -0.155 -0.691** 
Vietnam 0.864*** 0.406*** -1.514*** 
Zambia 1.802*** 1.299*** 0.908*** 
Constant -2.445*** -0.967*** -1.535*** 
    
N 42,668   
Pseudo R
2 
 0.0902   
Chi-sq. 7424.98***   
Log likelihood -37424.3   
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 4 - Marginal effects of multinomial model with country dummies 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -
0.000888*** -0.00270*** -0.000389 
Age
2 
6.62e-06** 7.73e-06 3.24e-06 
Sex 0.00523*** 0.0756*** -0.00277* 
Marital status 0.00904*** 0.0542*** -0.00266 
Self reported 
health -0.00918*** -0.0904*** -0.0126*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.0104*** 0.0985*** -0.00244 
Education -0.00350* 0.0246*** -0.00753*** 
Employed -0.00565*** 0.0107* 0.000182 
Urban setting 0.00336* 0.0358*** -0.00927*** 
Health insurance 0.0132*** 0.0878*** -0.0133*** 
Household size -0.000108 -0.00345*** 0.000250 
Log house 
expenditure -0.00115 0.0285*** -0.00393*** 
Log predicted -0.00122 0.0542** 0.0326*** 
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expenditure 
Bangladesh -0.0170*** 0.378*** -0.0146*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.00120 0.116*** -0.0314*** 
China -0.00993 0.0286 -0.0292*** 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.00676 0.140*** -0.0177*** 
Congo 0.0760*** 0.0514 -0.00382 
Comoros 0.0471 -0.0304 -0.0243*** 
Dominican 
Republic 0.0234* 0.206*** -0.0303*** 
Ecuador 0.00511 0.0253 -0.0284*** 
Ethiopia -0.0202*** 0.128*** 0.0467** 
Georgia -0.0144** -0.261*** -0.0203*** 
Ghana 0.0213 0.139*** 0.00296 
Guatemala -0.00700 0.169*** -0.0358*** 
India -0.00932 0.225*** -0.0330*** 
Kazakhstan -0.000470 0.111*** -0.0205*** 
Kenya -0.00541 -0.113*** 0.105*** 
Laos 0.0888*** -0.189*** -0.0190*** 
Sri Lanka 0.0593*** 0.232*** -0.0340*** 
Morocco 5.24e-05 -0.0120 0.111*** 
Mali -0.0197*** 0.0306 -0.0227*** 
Myanmar -0.00679 0.148*** -0.0102 
Mauritania -0.00493 0.145*** -0.0171*** 
Malawi -2.12e-05 0.234*** 0.0326** 
Namibia 0.0692*** 0.142*** -0.0275*** 
Nepal -0.0165*** 0.116*** 0.0330** 
Pakistan -0.0124** 0.300*** -0.0307*** 
Philippines 0.0154 -0.0938*** -0.0181*** 
Paraguay -0.0176*** 0.173*** 0.0882*** 
Russia 0.0409** 0.0201 0.0310 
Senegal 0.0261 0.0930*** -0.00980 
Chad -0.000192 -0.0401 0.0255** 
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Tunisia -0.0200*** 0.0396 -0.0299*** 
Ukraine 0.0207 -0.0385 -0.0149*** 
Vietnam 0.0234** 0.0894*** -0.0279*** 
Zambia 0.0350** 0.205*** -0.00247 
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 5 - Multinomial model with reason for visit and country dummies 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -0.0296*** -0.0213*** -0.0304*** 
Age
2 
0.000171* 0.000111*** 0.000202** 
Sex 0.281*** 0.392*** 0.194*** 
Marital status 0.349*** 0.321*** 0.157*** 
Self reported 
health -0.633*** -0.461*** -0.670*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.596*** 0.453*** 0.159*** 
Education -0.101 0.0819*** -0.198*** 
Employed -0.120* 0.0112 -0.00659 
Urban setting 0.189*** 0.153*** -0.204*** 
Health insurance 0.658*** 0.401*** -0.222* 
Household size -0.0179 -0.0132*** 0.000331 
Log house 
expenditure 0.0423 0.106*** -0.0630* 
Log predicted 
expenditure 0.0633 0.371*** 1.306*** 
Immunisation -0.310 -0.261 -2.239*** 
Antenatal 0.268 0.441*** -1.538*** 
Family planning 0.342 0.153 -0.862** 
Childbirth 1.420*** -1.945*** -1.721*** 
Dental care -0.965*** 0.680*** -0.0805 
Arthritis 0.246 0.130** 0.413*** 
Asthma 1.173*** 0.219** 0.00351 
Heart disease 0.946*** 0.0707 -0.364** 
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Bodily injury 0.855*** -0.172*** -0.761*** 
Minor surgery 0.902*** -1.302*** -1.724*** 
Other reason 0.370*** 0.0680** -0.171*** 
Bangladesh 1.243*** 2.509*** 1.324*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.168 0.522*** -2.479** 
China -0.162 -0.0887 -2.184*** 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.749*** 0.636*** -0.382 
Congo 1.742*** 0.562*** 0.272 
Comoros 1.182** -0.183 -1.495*** 
Dominican 
Republic 1.284*** 1.057*** -1.233*** 
Ecuador 0.263 0.0136 -1.890*** 
Ethiopia -0.556 0.679*** 1.335*** 
Georgia -1.256*** -1.278*** -1.534*** 
Ghana 1.069*** 0.839*** 0.703** 
Guatemala 0.195 0.621*** -2.924*** 
India 0.482 0.937*** -1.662*** 
Kazakhstan 0.257 0.407*** -0.611 
Kenya -0.273 -0.255* 1.396*** 
Laos 1.240*** -0.726*** -1.168*** 
Sri Lanka 2.279*** 1.465*** -1.727*** 
Morocco 0.267 0.258** 1.803*** 
Mali -1.128* 0.0111 -1.156** 
Myanmar 0.0493 0.722*** 0.0611 
Mauritania 0.272 0.620*** -0.382 
Malawi 1.323*** 1.489*** 1.798*** 
Namibia 1.825*** 0.973*** -0.974*** 
Nepal -0.295 0.590*** 1.128*** 
Pakistan 0.795** 1.464*** -1.099*** 
Philippines 0.225 -0.456*** -1.010*** 
Paraguay 0.0288 1.193*** 2.466*** 
Russia 1.064*** 0.265* 0.995** 
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Senegal 1.070*** 0.458*** -0.0398 
Chad 0.0255 -0.127 0.512** 
Tunisia -0.956** -0.0155 -2.056*** 
Ukraine 0.620** -0.285** -0.720** 
Vietnam 0.918*** 0.339*** -1.554*** 
Zambia 1.906*** 1.313*** 0.822*** 
Constant -3.082*** -0.860*** -1.160*** 
    
N 42,668   
Pseudo R
2 
 0.1155   
Chi-sq. 9499.3***   
Log likelihood -36387.1   
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 6 - Marginal effects of multinomial model with reason for visit and country 
dummies 
Regressor Hospital Clinic Do nothing 
    Age -0.000386* -0.00427*** -0.000522** 
Age
2 
2.39e-06 2.13e-05** 4.02e-06* 
Sex 0.00112 0.0887*** -0.00130 
Marital status 0.00373** 0.0716*** -0.00113 
Self reported 
health -0.00825*** -0.0907*** -0.0118*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.00799*** 0.0978*** -0.00387** 
Education -0.00342** 0.0251*** -0.00750*** 
Employed -0.00304* 0.00454 -0.000308 
Urban setting 0.00253 0.0384*** -0.00894*** 
Health insurance 0.0113*** 0.0887*** -0.0129*** 
Household size -0.000243 -0.00298** 0.000260 
Log house 
expenditure -0.000424 0.0266*** -0.00386*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.00467 0.0666** 0.0332*** 
 310 
Immunisation -0.00296 -0.0436 -0.0277*** 
Antenatal 0.000194 0.113*** -0.0271*** 
Family planning 0.00724 0.0418 -0.0194*** 
Childbirth 0.150*** -0.430*** -0.0215*** 
Dental care -0.0202*** 0.165*** -0.0128*** 
Arthritis 0.00392 0.0193 0.0115*** 
Asthma 0.0411*** 0.0246 -0.00502 
Heart disease 0.0335*** 0.00200 -0.0112*** 
Bodily injury 0.0357*** -0.0504*** -0.0162*** 
Minor surgery 0.0752*** -0.310*** -0.0225*** 
Other reason 0.00825*** 0.0144** -0.00665*** 
Bangladesh -0.0129*** 0.376*** -0.0153*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -0.00325 0.134*** -0.0304*** 
China -0.00182 -0.00219 -0.0290*** 
Côte d‘Ivoire 0.00952 0.137*** -0.0176*** 
Congo 0.0650*** 0.0736** -0.00488 
Comoros 0.0606* -0.0625 -0.0241*** 
Dominican 
Republic 0.0174 0.211*** -0.0290*** 
Ecuador 0.00774 0.0151 -0.0276*** 
Ethiopia -0.0161*** 0.120*** 0.0415** 
Georgia -0.0117** -0.280*** -0.0192*** 
Ghana 0.0145 0.153*** 0.00344 
Guatemala -0.00403 0.157*** -0.0347*** 
India -0.00297 0.213*** -0.0327*** 
Kazakhstan 0.000336 0.100*** -0.0188*** 
Kenya -0.00510 -0.110*** 0.0994*** 
Laos 0.0880*** -0.199*** -0.0184*** 
Sri Lanka 0.0514*** 0.241*** -0.0332*** 
Morocco -0.000407 -0.0142 0.108*** 
Mali -0.0165*** 0.0255 -0.0215*** 
Myanmar -0.00853* 0.162*** -0.0107* 
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Mauritania -0.00285 0.143*** -0.0172*** 
Malawi 0.00484 0.232*** 0.0283** 
Namibia 0.0490*** 0.170*** -0.0264*** 
Nepal -0.0130*** 0.111*** 0.0312** 
Pakistan -0.00537 0.289*** -0.0307*** 
Philippines 0.0147 -0.105*** -0.0173*** 
Paraguay -0.0154*** 0.155*** 0.101*** 
Russia 0.0310* 0.0141 0.0352 
Senegal 0.0272* 0.0847*** -0.00952 
Chad 0.00185 -0.0435 0.0235** 
Tunisia -0.0150*** 0.0232 -0.0294*** 
Ukraine 0.0279* -0.0734** -0.0139** 
Vietnam 0.0246** 0.0750*** -0.0270*** 
Zambia 0.0354** 0.211*** -0.00499 
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 7 - Nested model code 
* run nested model 
expand 4 
bysort id: gen alternatives = _n 
gen choice = 0 
replace choice = 1 if soughtcare==alternatives-1  
bysort id: replace choice = 1 if illness==0 & _n==1  
 
nlogitgen type = alternatives(sick:2|3|4, notsick:1), nolog 
nlogittree alternatives type 
constraint 1 [notsick_tau]_cons = 1 
constraint 2 [alternatives1]log_pcost = 1 
*constraint 3 [alternatives1]facilityquality = 1 
*constraint 4 [alternatives1]traveltime = 1 
 
nlogit choice || type: age female married srhgood chronicpresent 
working primaryplus hsize urban insurance log_house, base(notsick) 
|| alternatives: log_pcost, base(4) noconstant case(id) 
constraints(1/2) vce(cluster country) 
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Table C. 8 - Nested logit model 
Regressor No dummies Country 
dummies 
All dummies 
    Age -0.0106*** -0.0265*** -0.0307*** 
Age
2 
-5.74e-07 0.000166*** 0.000200*** 
Sex 0.262*** 0.315*** 0.359*** 
Marital status 0.229*** 0.268*** 0.323*** 
Self reported 
health -0.424*** -0.520*** -0.511*** 
Chronic 
condition 0.388*** 0.458*** 0.434*** 
Education 0.0215 0.0474* 0.0475* 
Employed -0.0722*** 0.0227 0.00478 
Urban setting 0.116*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
Health insurance -0.0776*** 0.388*** 0.386*** 
Household size 0.00309 -0.0149*** -0.0133*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.0428*** 0.0550*** 0.0526*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
hospital 
0.0605** 
 
0.0699*** 
 
 
0.0768*** 
 
Log predicted 
expenditure 
clinic 
1.355*** 
 
1.082*** 
 
 
1.186*** 
 
Bangladesh  1.774*** 1.756*** 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  0.220* 0.284** 
China  0.366** 0.188 
Côte d‘Ivoire  0.364*** 0.374*** 
Congo  0.585*** 0.670*** 
Comoros  0.226 0.0979 
Dominican  0.366*** 0.396*** 
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Republic 
Ecuador  0.171 0.111 
Ethiopia  0.154 0.118 
Georgia  -1.084*** -1.171*** 
Ghana  0.155* 0.221** 
Guatemala  0.666*** 0.593*** 
India  1.014*** 0.931*** 
Kazakhstan  -0.203** -0.222** 
Kenya  -0.545*** -0.529*** 
Laos  -0.557*** -0.563*** 
Sri Lanka  1.270*** 1.287*** 
Morocco  -0.0865 -0.0905 
Mali  -0.684*** -0.669*** 
Myanmar  -0.0530 0.00879 
Mauritania  0.379*** 0.375*** 
Malawi  0.877*** 0.866*** 
Namibia  0.662*** 0.765*** 
Nepal  0.0147 0.00926 
Pakistan  1.607*** 1.504*** 
Philippines  -0.317*** -0.359*** 
Paraguay  0.755*** 0.718*** 
Russia  -0.212* -0.228* 
Senegal  0.0631 0.0526 
Chad  -0.297*** -0.289*** 
Tunisia  0.208 0.0985 
Ukraine  0.0284 -0.0911 
Vietnam  0.141 0.0912 
Zambia  0.627*** 0.667*** 
Immunisation   -0.401** 
Antenatal   0.298*** 
Family planning   0.0954 
Childbirth   -1.249*** 
Dental care   0.577*** 
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Arthritis   0.163*** 
Asthma   0.253*** 
Heart disease   0.0886 
Bodily injury   -0.172*** 
Minor surgery   -1.064*** 
Other reason   0.0513* 
Constant    
    
N 170,672 170,672 170,672 
Chi-sq. 16087*** 17242*** 17487*** 
Log likelihood -48196 -46709 -46271 
Ratio scale 
parameter
 
 
0.533*** 
 
0.419*** 
 
0.459*** 
 
LR test IIA 553.74*** 
 
179.32*** 
 
149.88*** 
 
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C. 9 - Generalised Hausman Test 
Test for equal 
coefficients across 
alternatives 
Chi square 
  Hospital and Clinic 180.62*** 
Hospital and do nothing 96.04** 
Hospital and not sick 4582.83*** 
  Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table C. 10 - STATA code for elasticity and marginal effect calculation in nested logit model 
 predict cprobchoice, hlevel(2) condp 
*P(B|LR), the conditional probability of choosing a branch given 
the choice of trunk and limb  
egen meanchoice=mean(cprobchoice) 
 
predict cprobtype, hlevel(1) condp 
*P(L|R), the conditional probability of choosing a limb, given the 
choice of trunk.  
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egen meantype=mean(cprobtype) 
 
*generate iv values for hlevel2 this is IV(B|LR) 
predict xb2, xb hlevel(2) 
gen double tau = [sick_tau]_b[_cons] if type==1 
replace tau = [notsick_tau]_b[_cons] if type==2 
bysort id type: egen double totexpxb = total(exp(xb2/tau)) 
gen double iv = log(totexpxb) 
egen meaniv=mean(iv) 
 
gen trunk= 1*1*(1-meanchoice) 
gen limb = 1* (1-meantype)*meanchoice * meaniv 
*gen branch = (1-1)* cprobtype*cprobchoice * iv * 1 
*branch effect is zero according to Greene 
 
gen F=trunk+limb 
 
egen meanh=mean(log_pcost) if soughtcare==1 & choice==1 
egen meanc=mean(log_pcost) if soughtcare==2 & choice==1 
 
*egen meanh=mean(log_averagecost2) if soughtcare==1 & choice==1 
*egen meanc=mean(log_averagecost2) if soughtcare==2 & choice==1 
 
 
 
*regression coefficients 
mat list e(b) 
 
 
gen coefficienth=[alternatives2]_b[log_pcost] 
*gen coefficienth=[alternatives2]_b[log_averagecost2] 
gen elasticityh=meanh*coefficienth*F 
 
gen coefficientc= [alternatives3]_b[log_pcost] 
*gen coefficientc= [alternatives3]_b[log_averagecost2] 
gen elasticityc=meanc*coefficientc*F 
 
*gen facilityh=[alternatives2]_b[facilityquality] 
*gen facilityc=[alternatives3]_b[facilityquality] 
 
 
*marginal effect calculation 
gen marginalcosth=meanchoice*meantype*coefficienth*F if 
soughtcare==1 & choice==1 
gen marginalcostc=meanchoice*meantype*coefficientc*F if 
soughtcare==2 & choice==1 
sum  elasticityh elasticityc marginalcosth marginalcostc 
 
*for other data 
*gen marginalfacilityh=meanchoice*meantype*facilityh*F 
*gen marginalfacilityc=meanchoice*meantype*facilityc*F 
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Appendix D: Appendix to Chapter 6 
Table D. 1 List of price controlled medicines 
List of Price Controlled Drugs (DPCO 1995)  
[ See Paragraphs 2 and 3 ]  
BULK DRUGS 
1. SULPHAMETHOXAZOLE  
2. PENICILLINS  
3. TETRACYCLINE  
4. RIFAMPICIN  
5. STREPTOMYCIN  
6. RANITIDINE  
7. VITAMIN C  
8. BETAMETHASONE  
9. METRONIDAZOLE  
10. CHLOROQUINE  
11. INSULIN  
12. ERYTHROMYCIN  
13. VITAMIN A  
14. OXYTETRACYCLINE  
15. PREDNISOLONE  
16. CEPHAZOLIN  
17. METHYLDOPA  
18. ASPIRIN  
19. TRIMETHOPRIM  
20. CLOXACILLIN  
21. SULPHADIMIDINE  
22. SALBUTAMOL  
23. FAMOTIDINE  
24. IBUPROFEN  
25. METAMIZOL (ANALGIN)  
26. DOXYCYCLINE  
27. CIPROFLOXACIN  
28. CEFOTAXIME  
29. DEXAMETHASONE  
30. EPHEDRINE  
31. VITAMIN B1 (THIAMINE)  
32. CARBAMAZEPINE  
33. VITAMIN B2 (RIBOFLAVIN)  
34. THEOPHYLLINE  
35. LEVODOPA  
36. TOLNAFTATE  
37. VITAMIN E  
38. NALIDIXIC ACID  
39. GRISEOFULVIN  
40. GENTAMICIN  
41. DEXTROPROPOXYPHENE  
42. HALOGENATED 
HYDROXYQUINOLINE  
43. PENTAZOCINE  
44. CAPTOPRIL  
45. NAPROXEN  
46. PYRENTAL  
47. SULPHADOXINE  
48. NORFLOXACIN  
49. CEFADROXYL  
50. PANTHONATES & PANTHENOLS  
51. FURAZOLIDONE  
52. PYRITHIOXINE  
53. SULPHADIAZINE  
54. FRAMYCETIN  
55. VERAPAMIL  
56. AMIKACIN SULPHATE *  
57. GLIPIZIDE  
58. SPIRONOLACTONE  
59. PENTOXYFYLLINE  
60. AMODIAQUIN  
61. SULPHAMOXOLE  
62. FRUSEMIDE  
63. PHENIRAMINE MALEATE  
64. CHLOROXYLENOLS  
65. BECAMPICILLIN  
66. LINCOMYCIN  
67. CHLORPROPAMIDE  
68. MEBHYDROLINE  
69. CHLORPROMAZINE  
70. METHENDIENONE  
71. PHENYL BUTAZONE  
72. LYNESTRANOL  
73. SALAZOSULPHAPYRINE  
74. DIOSMINE  
75. TRIMIPRAMINE  
Source: (Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers 1995)  
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The retail price of a formulation shall be calculated by the Government in 
accordance with the following formula namely:  
R.P. = (M.C. + C.C. + P.M. + P.C.) x (1 + MAPE/100) + ED. where  
 "R.P." means retail price;  
 "M.C." means material cost and includes the cost of drugs and other 
pharmaceutical aids used including overages, if any, plus process loss 
thereon specified as a norm from time to time by notification in the 
Official Gazette in this behalf;  
 "C.C." means conversion cost worked out in accordance with established 
procedures of costing and shall be fixed as a norm every year by 
notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf;  
"P.M." means cost of the packing material used in the packing of concerned 
formulation, including process loss, and shall be fixed as a norm every year by, 
notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf;  
"P.C." means packing charges worked out in accordance with established 
procedures of costing and shall be fixed as a norm every year by notification in 
the Official Gazette in this behalf;  
"MAPE" (Maximum Allowable Post-manufacturing Expenses) means all costs 
incurred by a manufacturer from the stage of ex-factory cost to retailing and 
includes trade margin and margin for the manufacturer and it shall not exceed one 
hundred per cent for indigenously manufactured Scheduled formulations;  
"E.D." means excise duty:  
 
Provided that in the case of an imported formulation, the landed cost shall form 
the basis for fixing its price along with such margin to cover selling and 
distribution expenses including interest and importer's profit which shall not 
exceed fifty percent of the landed cost.  
 
Explanation - For the purpose of this proviso, "landed cost" means the cost of 
import of formulation inclusive of customs duty and clearing charges.  
Source: (CDSCO 1995) 
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Appendix E: Appendix to Chapter 7 
 
Table E. 1 - Multinomial model 2004 wave 
Regressor Public Private Self-treatment Do Nothing 
     Age -0.009 -0.296*** -0.001 -0.014* 
Age
2 
-0.00008 0.0001** -0.00008 -0.00002 
Sex -0.072 -0.148** -0.133* -0.152** 
Marital status 0.463*** 0.641*** 0.217 -0.507*** 
Days ill 0.069*** 0.050*** -0.053*** 0.120*** 
Education -0.044 0.299*** 0.363*** -0.423*** 
Employed 0.038 0.094 0.168* -0.158* 
Urban setting 0.150** 0.116** -0.19** -0.007 
Health insurance -0.609 0.620 0.293 0.394 
Household size 0.002 -0.014 0.005 0.065*** 
Log house 
expenditure -0.153 0.625*** 
 
0.475*** -0.519*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure 0.650*** -0.216 
 
-1.088*** 0.322 
Region dummy1 1.06*** 0.890*** 0.231** 1.27*** 
Region dummy2 0.660*** 0.659*** -0.307** 0.813*** 
Region dummy3 1.204*** 0.321* -0.714** 1.13*** 
Constant -0.117 -1.12*** -0.014 -0.289 
     
N 29,449    
Pseudo R
2
 0.0540    
Chi-sq. 3731.68***    
Log likelihood -32713.02    
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. 2 - Multinomial model 1995-96 wave 
Regressor Public Private Self-treatment Do Nothing 
     Age 0.005 -0.025* -0.112 -0.004 
Age
2 
-0.00005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Sex -0.067 -0.133 -0.298* -0.330* 
Marital status -0.118 0.256 -0.064 -0.356 
Days ill -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.111*** -0.073*** 
Education 0.647*** 0.768*** 0.578** 0.497** 
Employed 0.0911 0.1222 0.124 -0.128 
Urban setting 2.59 1.200 -0.162 -0.695 
Health insurance -0.073 -0.1669 -0.003 -0.094 
Household size 0.033 0.019 0.031 0.091*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.681*** 0.890*** 
-0.117 
-0.306* 
Log predicted 
expenditure -2.49*** -2.291*** 
-0.768** 
-1.252*** 
Region dummy1 -0.897*** -1.294*** -0.885*** -0.631*** 
Region dummy2 0.680** -0.204 1.075*** 1.406*** 
Region dummy3 -0.0084 -0.170 -0.254 -0.333* 
Region dummy4 0.670 -0.780 -0.1266 0.440 
Distance dummy1 3.33* 1.33 0.001 -0.214 
Distance dummy2 1.897 -0.036 -0.892 -1.636 
Distance dummy3 2.953 1.366 0.296 -0.172 
Distance dummy4 2.382 0.878 -0.370 -0.689 
Distance dummy5 2.592 1.097 -0.109 -0.243 
Constant 2.613 4.66 4.732** 8.401*** 
     
N 32860    
Pseudo R
2
 0.0718    
Chi-sq. 4867.69    
Log likelihood -31448.63    
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. 3 - Elasticity results 
Test for equal 
coefficients across 
alternatives 
2004 Wave 1995-96 Wave 
   Public 0.67*** -0.40*** 
Cross price elasticity 
public -0.14 0.41 
Private -0.18*** -0.206*** 
Cross price elasticity 
private -0.37 1.55 
Self-treatment -1.05*** 1.31*** 
Cross price elasticity 
self-treatment -0.04 0.056 
   Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table E. 4 – Generalised Hausman Test 
Test for equal 
coefficients across 
alternatives 
Chi square 
  Private  209.75*** 
Self treatment 157.95*** 
Do nothing 180.20*** 
  Note: *** p<0.01, Public choice removed to test for equality across alternatives 
 
Table E. 5 - Nested model computer code 
expand 5 
bysort memberid: gen alternatives = _n 
gen choice = 0 
replace choice = 1 if seek==alternatives-1 
bysort memberid: replace choice = 1 if illness==0 & _n==1  
*list memberid illness seek alternatives choice 
 
nlogitgen type = alternatives(sick:2|3|4|5, notsick:1), nolog 
nlogittree alternatives type 
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xi: nlogit choice || type: age agesq male married daysill working 
primaryplus urban insurance hsize log_house i.regiondummy 
i.yeardummy, base(notsick) || alternatives: log_predictedcost, 
base(5) noconstant case(memberid) constraints(1/2)  
*vce(cluster code60th) if include IIA not calculated 
constraint 1 [notsick_tau]_cons = 1 
constraint 2 [alternatives1]log_predicted cost = 1 
nlogit choice || type: age agesq male married daysill working 
primaryplus urban insurance log_house, base(notsick) || 
alternatives: log_visitcost, base(5) noconstant case(memberid) 
constraints(1/2) 
 
 
Table E. 6 - STATA code for elasticity and marginal effect calculation in nested logit model 
*bug in STATA fixed so will compute IV values 
*compute IV values 
predict cprobchoice, hlevel(2) condp 
*P(B|LR), the conditional probability of choosing a branch given the 
choice of trunk and limb  
 
predict cprobtype, hlevel(1) condp 
*P(L|R), the conditional probability of choosing a limb, given the 
choice of trunk.  
 
*generate iv values for hlevel2 this is IV(B|LR) 
predict double iv, hlevel(2)  
 
gen trunk= 1*1*(1-cprobchoice) 
gen limb = 1* (1-cprobtype)*cprobchoice * iv 
*gen branch = (1-1)* cprobtype*cprobchoice * iv * 1 
*branch effect is zero according to Greene 
 
gen F=trunk+limb 
 
*regression coefficients 
mat list e(b) 
 
*log predicted 
gen coefficientpublic=[alternatives2]_b[log_predicted] 
gen coefficientprivate=[alternatives3]_b[log_predicted] 
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gen coefficientself=[alternatives4]_b[log_predicted] 
 
gen elasticitypublic=coefficientpublic*F 
gen elasticityprivate=coefficientprivate*F 
gen elasticityself=coefficientself*F 
 
zscore elasticity* 
gen pvepublic=2*(1-normal(abs( z_elasticitypublic))) 
gen pveprivate=2*(1-normal(abs( z_elasticityprivate))) 
gen pveself=2*(1-normal(abs( z_elasticityself))) 
 
**cross price F value 
 
gen cp_trunk= cprobchoice 
gen cp_limb=cprobtype*(cprobchoice)*iv 
gen cp_F= cp_trunk + cp_limb 
gen crosselasticity_public=-cp_F*coefficientpublic if seek==1 
gen crosselasticity_private=-cp_F*coefficientprivate if seek==2 
gen crosselasticity_self=-cp_F*coefficientself if seek==3 
zscore crosselasticity* 
gen pvcppublic=2*(1-normal(abs( z_crosselasticity_public))) 
gen pvcpprivate=2*(1-normal(abs( z_crosselasticity_private))) 
gen pvcpself=2*(1-normal(abs( z_crosselasticity_self))) 
 
*marginal effect 
gen 
marginalpublic=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[alternatives2]_b[log_predicted]*F  
gen 
marginalprivate=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[alternatives3]_b[log_predicted]*F  
gen 
marginalself=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[alternatives4]_b[log_predicted]*F  
 
gen marginalage=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[age]*F  
gen marginalagesq=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[agesq]*F  
gen marginalmale=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[male]*F  
gen marginalmarried=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[married]*F  
gen marginaldaysill=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[daysill]*F  
gen marginalworking=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[working]*F  
gen marginalprimaryplus=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[primaryplus]*F  
gen marginalurban=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[urban]*F  
gen marginalinsurance=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[insurance]*F  
 323 
gen marginallog_house=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[log_house]*F  
gen marginalhsize=cprobchoice*cprobtype*[sick]_b[hsize]*F  
 
 
zscore marginal* 
gen pvmpublic=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalpublic))) 
gen pvmprivate=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalprivate))) 
gen pvmself=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalself))) 
gen pvmage=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalage))) 
gen pvmagesq=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalagesq))) 
gen pvmmale=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalmale))) 
gen pvmmarried=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalmarried))) 
gen pvmdaysill=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginaldaysill))) 
gen pvmworking=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalworking))) 
gen pvmprimaryplus=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalprimaryplus))) 
gen pvmurban=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalurban))) 
gen pvminsurance=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalinsurance))) 
gen pvmlog_house=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginallog_house))) 
gen pvmhsize=2*(1-normal(abs( z_marginalhsize))) 
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Appendix F: Appendix to Chapter 8 
 
Table F. 1 - Results for 1995-96 Wave 
Regressor Poisson NB ZIP ZINB 
     Age 0.02238*** 0.01620*** 0.01850*** 0.00234 
Age
2 
-0.00011*** -0.00002 -0.00008*** -0.00004 
Sex 0.26552*** 0.22016*** 0.18849*** 0.18444*** 
Marital status 0.32361*** 0.33747*** 0.29902*** 0.04086 
Ailment past 15 
days 1.44736*** 1.43427*** 
1.17227*** 
0.57400*** 
Education -0.05787*** -0.02233 -0.02993** 0.01807 
Employed -0.27943*** -0.24935*** -0.20616*** -0.06891** 
Urban setting -0.05798*** -0.04162*** -0.03836** -0.09552*** 
Health insurance -0.07060 0.01407 0.01281 -0.10927 
Household size -0.12883*** -0.12973*** -0.11210*** -0.03053*** 
Log house 
expenditure 0.79751*** 0.79651*** 
0.69551*** 
0.44831*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.27729*** -0.34174*** 
-0.30498*** 
0.07002** 
Constant -5.84675*** -5.46690*** -3.72506*** -3.93449*** 
     
N 630590 630590 630590 630590 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0950 0.0646   
Chi-sq. 27017.96 16835.50 14897.78 1232.94 
Log likelihood -128661.92 -121809.69 -123366.4 -120149.7 
Alpha  4.85210   
LR test alpha  1.4e+04***   
Vuong test   32.35*** 26.42*** 
     Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Some of the coefficients are similar across the models. Men, those who are 
married, unwell are more likely to seek care. Those who are educated, employed, 
living in urban areas and come from small households are less likely to seek care. 
Unlike the data from 2004 survey, not all the coefficients are significant across the 
models from the 1995-96 wave.  
 
Overall, a more robust count data model is preferred over the standard 
Poisson.The specification of the Poisson model is assessed using the RESET 
command in STATA with the following calculation: chi-sq of 6.18 with a p-value 
of 0.0130. The result shows some evidence of rejecting the null hypothesis of the 
Poisson model.  
 
The negative binomial (NB) regression also shows evidence of rejecting the 
Poisson with the LR  test of the overdispersion parameter, alpha , of 1.4e+04 with 
a p-value of 0.00.  
 
The Vuong test in the zero-inflated model suggests that the ZIP is preferred over 
the standard Poisson with a z score of 32.35 and a p-value of 0.00.  
 
The Vuong test zero-inflated negative binomial on all the regressors suggests that 
the ZINB is preferred over the NB with a Vuong z score of 26.42 and a p-value of 
0.00. 
 
Table F. 2 - Results Two Part Hurdle Model 1995-96 
Regressor First stage 
Y=1,0 
hospitalisation 
1995-96  
Second stage 
Y= number of 
hospitalisations 
1995-96 
Elasticities 
 
 
1995-96 
    Age 0.02518*** -0.00144 -0.00144 
Age
2 
-0.00011*** 0.00001 0.00001 
Sex 0.29261*** 0.01421 0.01421 
Marital status 0.34464*** 0.01542 0.01542 
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Ailment past 15 
days 1.48226*** 0.13790*** 
0.13790*** 
Education -0.11210*** 0.01018 0.01018 
Employed -0.33653*** 0.00655 0.00655 
Urban setting -0.04676*** -0.03726*** -0.03726*** 
Health insurance -0.09791* -0.02358 -0.02358 
Household size -0.13707*** -0.00323 -0.00323 
Log house 
expenditure 0.79405*** 0.10621*** 
0.10621*** 
Log predicted 
expenditure -0.04389* 0.03791* 
0.03791* 
Arunchal 0.23372*** 0.08847 0.08847 
Assam -0.29085*** -0.05065 -0.05065 
Bihar -0.39234*** -0.05988* -0.05988* 
Goa 0.12752 0.03017 0.03017 
Gujarat -0.14914*** -0.00717 -0.00717 
Haryana -0.18666*** -0.00485 -0.00485 
Himachal -0.19745*** -0.00543 -0.00543 
Jammu Kashmir -0.52375*** -0.13032*** -0.13032*** 
Karnataka -0.07066* -0.04513 -0.04513 
Kerala 0.19987*** 0.09930*** 0.09930*** 
Madhya Pradesh -0.22884*** 0.12032*** 0.12032*** 
Maharashtra 0.01234 0.10228*** 0.10228 
Manipur -0.14768** -0.06045 -0.06045 
Meghalaya -0.18883*** -0.03126 -0.03126 
Mizoram 0.04340 0.03321 0.03321 
Nagaland 0.01592 0.19902*** 0.19902*** 
Orissa -0.19825*** 0.01320 0.01320 
Punjab -0.36233*** -0.10789** -0.10789** 
Rajasthan -0.28423*** 0.02786 0.02786 
Sikkim -0.27251*** 0.01383 0.01383 
Tamil Nadu 0.12643*** 0.03091 0.03091 
Tripura 0.78251*** 0.27348*** 0.27348*** 
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Uttar Pradesh -0.32888*** 0.03805 0.03805 
West Bengal -0.06129* -0.00318 -0.00318 
Chandigarh -0.37390*** 0.00240 0.00240 
Dadra -0.11298 0.02275 0.02275 
Daman 0.16875 -0.11880 -0.11880 
Delhi -0.50722*** -0.01353 -0.01353 
Lakshadweep 0.12166 0.22998** 0.22998** 
Pondicherry 0.13920 -0.04215 -0.04215 
Constant -7.00663*** -0.52367***  
    
N 630590 27144  
Pseudo R
2
 0.0923 0.0069  
Chi-sq. 20666.09 450.91  
Log likelihood -101599.62 -32425.436  
    
    
    
    Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: State dummies are relative to the state of Andra Pradesh 
Note: STATA dropped observations from the state of Andaman Nicobar Islands (4,514 
observations) due to collinearity. 
Note: Three new states were created when the 2004 wave was conducted. In the 1995-96 wave 
these states belonged to the following: Chhattisgarh was part of Madya Pradesh, Jharkhand part of 
Bihar, Uttranchal was part of Uttar Pradesh. 
 
